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THESIS ABSTRACT 
In the course of this thesis, I will argue that for more than two thousand years the 
practice of virtue enabled the flourishing of communities and societies. 
Undoubtedly, virtue was the transformational process that enabled individuals to 
achieve certain highly desirable ends — such as happiness, pleasure or eternal life. 
As well as caring for the self, virtue cultivated the care of others — stimulating 
responsibility for family, friends and community and promoting their well-being. 
However, virtue also transformed individuals into the sorts of people - heroes, 
politicians, monks and so on - that societies and communities needed to survive or 
flourish in the face of the social, cultural and political circumstances of the time — 
and when communities flourished, so did individuals. This inextricable 
interrelationship existed from the earliest times of Western civilization until some 
point between the beginning of the Renaissance and the end of the Eighteenth 
Century. Over these first four centuries or so of modernity, virtue gradually 
ceased to be the only way of successfully living in a social group and became 
merely one option, among many, from which individuals could choose. 
I will argue that the changes we can observe in virtue and virtues over the history 
were not due to fashion, arbitrary choices or moral errors. Virtues defined what 
was valuable about a particular society — what communities valued in their 
people; what people valued in their community; what people valued in themselves 
and in others. Virtues often correlated to the leadership skills that were pertinent 
to cultural, social and political circumstances. Traditional virtues were never 
sacrosanct; they could be reinterpreted, mis-remembered or simply left in 
abeyance until they were necessary again. The priority — or place in the hierarchy 
— of particular virtues could shift depending on, for example, whether courage, 
wisdom or love was most likely to lead to communal success. 
This thesis raises a number of questions about the focus of contemporary virtue 
theory on the character, choices and motivations of the individual moral agent, 
and about the persistence of the notion that virtue should be universal for all times 
and places. It concludes by examining a number of problems, misconceptions and 
mistakes that are perpetuated by a lack of attention to the relationship between 
virtue and societal or communal flourishing. After all, as social animals, we are 
relational and as such, we continue, to create and sustain communities. By 
expanding our focus on patterns found in individual character, reasoning and 
emotions, to include patterns found in societal or communal flourishing, a new 
understanding of twenty-first century virtue may develop. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The current revival of interest in virtue ethics focuses attention on the character — 
personal disposition and habits - of individual moral agents. In the course of this 
thesis, I will endeavour to show that this attention to the virtue of the individual — 
while unsurprising in the light of modem individualism - clouds the historical 
reality. Virtue was — in the past - the way of living in society and this way of 
living had profound, mutual and reciprocal benefits for society and its individuals. 
This interrelationship existed from the earliest times of Western civilisation until 
some point between the beginning of the Renaissance and the end of the 
Eighteenth Century. Over these first four centuries or so of modernity, virtue 
gradually ceased to be the only way of successfully living in a social group and 
became merely one option, among many, for individuals to choose. 
That virtue was the way of living and flourishing — in and of society - for 
these two millennia or more will be explored in the coming chapters. Virtue held 
a central place in philosophy throughout this period and as Hadot so eloquently 
argues — philosophy was in itself a way of life from the ancients to the Middle 
Ages.' Virtue may have been described, catalogued and theorised predominantly 
through examination of the individual moral agent, but it was always practised in 
the context of either society at large or a more intimate community, and 
sometimes both. The benefits to the individual of practising virtue, of 
transforming and caring for the self were always clear and overt. However I hope 
I Hadot Pierre, What is Ancient Philosophy?, Trans. Michael Chase, (Cambridge, Massachusetts 
and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), pp 240-241 
to show in this thesis that the benefits to society of these transformations were 
equally important, indeed crucial to communal stability, flourishing and in some 
eras were crucial to societal survival. Indeed, I will endeavour to show that 
virtue, the flourishing of the individual and the flourishing of society were 
inextricably bound up together, were mutually dependent and reciprocal. 
This interdependent relationship between virtue and societal flourishing 
explains why the question of 'Why be virtuous?' — so necessary to modern ethical 
theory - seems to have been not only unasked, but also incomprehensible, in the 
past. People lived in societies of diverse forms, but virtues were persistently what 
enabled concord, order, stability, security, growth, glory and more, to be achieved 
— that is, societal flourishing. The constituents of societal flourishing varied from 
time to time and place to place, depending generally on the circumstances, 
problems, opportunities and crises that prevailed. 
From around the time of the Renaissance and for a multitude of reasons, 
virtues became just one of many possible individual choices for flourishing - 
virtue ceased to be inevitable; it ceased to be the only means to a good life. I will 
argue that individual choice both came from and resulted in the breakdown or 
deterioration of that interdependence between virtue, individual flourishing and 
communal flourishing. 
Over the more than two thousand-year history that I will trace in this 
thesis, the meaning of the word virtue changed several times. The understanding 
of the quiddity or whatness of virtue changed several times. The context and 
focus, hierarchy and catalogue of particular virtues changed repeatedly. 
Furthermore, the motivations for virtue changed — generally in parallel with these 
other changes. What did not change, until the Renaissance, and what enabled the 
social institution of virtue to evolve and continue without anyone needing to 
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question its relevance was its function and the place and prominence it held in 
human life - that is in human social life. Virtue's function — its transformation of 
individuals into the particular sorts of people each society or community needed 
to survive and thrive — heroic, wise, faithful, obedient people and so on — was 
what justified its prominence and ensured its unquestioned place in human life. It 
turns out — I will argue - that the essences that had been so minutely examined and 
carefully described over the millennia were not actually what was essential to the 
prominence and place of virtue. It was not what virtue was that was unchangingly 
essential - it was what virtue did. I will argue therefore that virtue before the 
Renaissance and virtue since the Renaissance - and certainly since the Eighteenth 
Century - were not the same thing. Since at least the Eighteenth Century, virtue 
as we continue to know it has ceased to be the principle means to social 
flourishing — now other things enable Western societies to flourish. When we use 
Aristotle's ideas about virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics as a basis for 
contemporary virtue theory - without giving prominence to the social context and 
social benefits that he discussed or alluded to in the Politics and the Rhetoric - we 
are ignoring the fact that, for two millennia, virtue was never practised or even 
theorised about outside the overt or implied context of the benefits it had for 
society. We are also ignoring the fact that virtue does not operate now as it did in 
the past, because virtue — as moral excellence — is not apparently what makes 
contemporary Western societies flourish, in the way that they do. 
The broad aim of this project has been to explore the history of virtue and 
the virtues.2 This history begins with Homer, when the virtues were so clear and 
2 Despite fascinating parallels to be found, for instance, in Buddhist, ancient Egyptian and hunter-
gatherer virtues, this historical survey will — due to the time and space limitations of a Master of 
Arts project - focus only on what we might call the mainstream of Western philosophical and 
social history. 
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evident that they did not even need to be stated explicitly. It proceeds to the 
Presocratic philosophers and poets who were the first to think abstractly about the 
practical virtues that were implicit in Homer and who provided evidence of the 
transition from heroic virtues to city virtues. Then we examine the Sophists 
together with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and the great dramatists of the Golden 
Age of Athens, who first codified the virtues, adapted them to life in the city-state 
or polis and made clear and overt the connections between virtue and the 
flourishing of society. The four main schools of the Hellenistic period found that 
the Platonic and Socratic variations of polis virtue were especially adaptable to 
life in a chaotic empire where tranquillity was the antidote to social and political 
alienation. Then the early Christians blended a 'new' code of virtues from the old 
Jewish, Stoic and Platonic ones, enabling Christianity to stand out from the crowd 
of competing religions and philosophical ways of life. After a lengthy silence, the 
theologian philosophers and a few female voices of the Middle Ages described a 
veritable flood of virtues that counteracted the desperation of life amid war and 
deprivation, and brought some order and stability to an inherently disorderly and 
insecure society. This was followed by the cacophony of voices and ideas about 
virtue that characterised the Renaissance and Reformation - now that anyone 
could become a gentleman, civic and gentlemanly virtues became relevant again. 
We witness the budding new ideas of the Seventeenth Century and the first 
attempts to make a science of virtue. Culminating with the Enlightenment - when 
virtues had become passions rather than habituated character dispositions - and 
the passionate eighteenth century attempts to find something real in virtue even 
though it apparently defied scientific explanation. The history, I find, is 
fascinating for its own sake. The ideas about virtue and the virtues themselves 
flow through the history like a great river, clearer here, muddier there, narrowing, 
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widening, shifting course, retracing an old course, but the continuity and 
fundamental consistency - until it slowly faltered - is unmistakable. 
In the course of my research into this history, I became intrigued by the 
question of what had made virtue the compelling way of life that it had been. 
What was it that had changed that could cause virtue to lose its place as the way 
of life? Was it some inherent quality of virtue or the virtues, or was it a 
relationship between virtue and something else? It could not be that the essence 
or essences of virtue had changed, because the traditional definition of virtue as a 
habit or disposition that is closely associated with practical wisdom and so on 
continues to appear fundamentally valid today. 3 Furthermore, one would think 
that by definition the essence of something could not change. However, 
something to do with virtue had been capable of changing, and it left virtue the 
optional, even sometimes unattractive or derogatory thing that it became in 
modern times. Over these two millennia or so, virtue was consistently understood 
as the means for achieving what was most important to human life - honour, 
happiness, tranquillity or Heaven. Was it a persistent and widely held desire for 
these rewards that made virtue so compelling? Was it that throughout this history 
human life had a telos? In the past, people were certain that there was a purpose 
to human life and that this purpose was achieved through the practice of virtue. 
Was it living in small communities? In communities throughout this history, 
everyone had a necessary role to play that contributed visibly to general well-
being and everyone was taught and could observe the same virtues practised by 
people right there in the community. Probably each of these factors — the 
persistent essences, the exclusive link with human telos and smallness of 
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communities - was conducive to virtue being understood as the only way of living 
well. However, I suggest there was another compelling factor. 
The set of virtues valued in each of these historical eras consisted of three 
subsets: a group of virtues that remained fairly consistent throughout history; a 
group of virtues that took on more importance for a while than they had in the past 
or would in the future; and the virtues that were valued only during that one era. 
The full set of virtues associated with a particular era offered a specific remedy or 
survival response to the cultural, social and political circumstances and challenges 
of that particular time. Historically, virtues were not merely located in a place and 
time, nor were virtues just an aspect of what went to make up a society, like an 
architectural style or an administrative system. Virtues were not merely the 
means to individual flourishing (though they obviously were that too); they were 
the means to societal and communal flourishing. Virtue and virtues transformed 
individuals into the kind of people that a particular society needed to thrive, 
indeed in some eras, to merely survive. 4 
What do I mean by the notion that virtues became a choice and that this 
had something to do with the end of the necessity of virtue for societal 
flourishing? Obviously individuals always had a choice about being virtuous or 
not, aspiring to virtue or not. There was never a time in Western history when 
everyone had to be virtuous, or had to practice all the virtues equally. When I say 
that choice was the reason and consequence of the breakdown of the relationship 
3 For example, see Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski's detailed account of what virtues are in Virtues of 
the Mind: An Inquiry into the nature of Virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
4 The germ for this idea - that there might be a significant relationship between social and political 
circumstances and the changing definitions of virtue and virtues - came from reading Bertrand 
Russell's History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social 
Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, 2nd Edition, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., 1961) 
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between virtue and societal flourishing it is not this sort of choice that I mean. 
Throughout this history people generally had more than one notion about what 
virtue was — virtue was a habit, virtue was a unity (of wisdom or charity), virtue 
came from God, Jesus and charity, virtue was perfection of the soul, and so on. 
However, these ideas were not competing with each other. It was entirely 
possible, plausible and coherent for virtue to be a habit and wisdom, or to be a 
habit and an imitation of God. The aim was to find and share knowledge and 
understanding, not to find a single scientific principle that would explain 
everything. By contrast, eighteenth century ideas that virtue was all benevolence 
or virtue was all self-interest, that virtue was the means of societal flourishing or 
vice was — were candidates for a law of virtue and simply could not coexist. 
Indeed, they were competing opposite views and the moral agent had to decide 
between them. The moral agent had to choose whether or not virtue was the 
means to his or her own happiness — rather than power or wealth, laws or police, 
work or something else. Even more confronting, by the Eighteenth Century the 
moral agent had to choose whether virtue was real or not — given that it had failed 
to be successfully turned into a science. 
The changes we can observe in virtue and the virtues throughout history 
were not due to fashion, arbitrary choices or moral errors. Virtues defined what 
was valuable about a particular society — what society valued in individuals, what 
individuals valued in their society, what individuals valued in themselves and in 
others, and most importantly what excellences were needed to protect and 
promote the society itself. Throughout the history there were also connections 
between virtue and honour, virtue and blame and praise, that highlighted the 
importance of community response to individual behaviour. Furthermore, the 
ideas people had about the nature of virtue and the connection between virtue and 
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the telos of human life also provide insight into the link between virtue and the 
well-being of societies. Aristotle made it clear in the Nicomachean Ethics that 
virtues defined what the individual needed to flourish and that the individual must 
live and participate in a community. However, in the Politics we see that 
Aristotle also recognised and understood the significance and necessity of the 
relationship between virtue and societal flourishing, virtue and concord. We do 
not need to think about this relationship as a Mandevillian-style political 
conspiracy. Humans are social animals. People live in a social group. Each 
social group faces difficulties and in the past virtues reflected the behaviours, 
attitudes and actions that the group needed from at least some proportion of its 
inhabitants in order to meet or overcome those difficulties and flourish. Virtues 
once defined what societies needed to operate, to grow, to be successful and when 
the circumstances were extremely tenuous — to simply survive. 
By contrast, contemporary virtue theory focuses on the character, choices 
and motivations of the individual. I will argue that this focus perpetuates a 
number of problems, misconceptions and mistakes about the nature and 
application of virtue. By refocusing virtue as excellent behaviours or practices 
that ensure societal or communal flourishing, we are faced with several 
possibilities. Are contemporary virtues those habituated behaviours that enable 
doctrines such as consumerism, free market competition, entrepreneurism and 
economic rationalism to persist? For we could argue that these are what enable 
contemporary Western society to flourish in the way that it does. Alternatively, 
do we need to identify the virtues associated with the present way of living that 
gives rise to a more genuine form of community? These and other related 
questions about the implications of the history of virtue for contemporary virtue 
theory will be examined in Chapter 11. 
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During my study of the history of virtue and the virtues, I identified four 
themes in the relationship between virtue and society. 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
The definition of virtue and the virtues, their essence and nature evolved in ways 
that maintained appropriateness to the circumstances of the society or community. 
For instance, we can often find a relationship between the degree of stability of 
the society and the degree of rigidity or absoluteness of virtue - the greater the 
instability, the more contingent and flexible the approach to virtue tended to be. 
The unity or diversity of virtue was another aspect of the definition of virtue that 
was linked to society, offering a second range of strategies for coping with various 
types of social instability and adversity. 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
Virtues were always public values and were promoted by communal and/or social 
institutions, particularly educational institutions. They were always generally 
thought of as universal, though in fact there was never a time when all virtues 
were required in all people - there were always some limitations of class and 
gender. However this limited universalism was in no way incoherent, as virtue 
was always - either explicitly or implicitly, in total or in part - associated with 
excellence or perfection and therefore with some sort of elite group - be it nobles, 
philosophers or monks. 
The pro-society quality of virtue 
Virtues were pro-society, either directly being other-regarding or indirectly having 
consequences that were beneficial to others or the community in general. Virtues 
either promoted or encompassed the particular skills and behaviours that a society 
or community needed to survive or flourish. Virtues enabled the society to 
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overcome the dangers it faced, to survive in a hostile environment or to progress 
in the direction that it had chosen. 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
Virtues generally only existed in the individual when they were publicly 
recognised and this recognition — taking the form of reputation and often some 
kind of honour — was a principle motivation for people to achieve or practice 
virtue. Other motivations, for instance associated with the telos or purpose of 
being human, with shame or with fear were also widely held public values and 
involved, in various ways, the public recognition of virtue or its inappropriate 
absence. 
Each of these four themes either directly connected virtue with societal 
flourishing or were associated with community expectations that virtue would 
result in social good. We will find that the contents of each of these themes 
changed and evolved throughout the history from Homer to the Enlightenment. 
They were clear, readily identifiable and sometimes openly discussed up until the 
end of the Middle Ages, but with the Renaissance they began to break down, 
becoming slowly more difficult to find and describe. By the Seventeenth Century, 
some of these themes can no longer be identified and only traces of the remaining 
themes are evident in the Eighteenth Century. 
The next nine chapters examine these four themes in the relationship 
between virtue and societal flourishing, endeavouring to show that virtue and 
virtues defined something very important about societies - they defined what 
excellences, behaviours and attitudes were needed for society in each era to 
survive and/or thrive. The virtues that were valued and promoted in each era were 
not merely a matter of personal choice; they were not random or accidental. The 
changes to virtues over this history were not due to moral error. Virtues always 
10 
had their roots in the past, just as societies did. People were generally aware of 
the virtues from their past — at least their recent past — and were often at pains to 
describe how the virtues of their day were the same and how they were different. 
However, we will find that they did not always have an accurate memory of those 
past virtues. Virtues were not valued merely for the sake of being traditional, but 
because they continued to resonate with and remedy the problems and 
circumstances that societies and communities had to deal with. Furthermore, 
when a virtue was not relevant to the circumstances, it simply disappeared until it 
was relevant again. Virtues and societies happened hand in hand. Virtues were 
esteemed because they contributed something important to society, because a 
flourishing society benefited the individuals who lived there and because 
individuals personally benefited directly or indirectly from the practice of their 
virtue. 
1 1 
2 
THE HOMERIC STARTING-POINT 
Homeric values are suited to a community organized primarily 
on a basis of scattered individual households. Its values stress 
the prowess of the individual, and justify in the individual at the 
least a considerable panache; and accordingly the Homeric 
hero requires free space in which to manoeuvre. 
ARTHUR W. H. ADKINS 1 
The Homeric poems are heroic stories about a glorious past. Estimates vary as to 
the dating of the Iliad and the Odyssey, but they are thought to have originated 
sometime between the Fourteenth and Twelfth Centuries BCE and to be in their 
final form by the Eighth Century BCE. A mixture of fiction and history, they were 
the corner stone of Greek education for more than ten centuries. So we must 
assume they contained readily understood information or at least clear pointers 
about individual life in ancient Greece, as well as community life, morality, 
customs and the esteemed values of excellence or arete. It would also be 
reasonable to assume that as social, cultural, economic and political circumstances 
changed and social structures and institutions evolved — as they did considerably 
over these centuries — these poems were capable of the flexibility to be re-
interpreted in new, relevant ways. 
The relationship between virtue and society was direct and overt in the 
Homeric poems. Homeric virtues were not listed in a catalogue or discussed 
abstractly, but were implied in the behaviour of the noble characters in the poems. 
Homeric virtue was closely associated with moira or fate and the ancient Greek 
perception of the world as stable and orderly. Virtues were understood to be 
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contingent, reflecting the small, highly vulnerable state of Homeric communities 
and the life and death situations faced by the hero. Virtues were public values - 
shared, practised and promoted by the members of a society and also promoted by 
the social institutions, in particular the educational institution of the Homeric 
poems themselves. Virtues were, as a mle, reciprocal and pro-society. They were 
either straightforwardly other-regarding like loyalty and hospitality, or like 
wisdom and courage, they had a flow-on effect of protecting or helping others. 
Virtues were the particular skills and behaviours that were needed for Homeric 
heroes to provide leadership, protection, honour and glory, wealth and security 
and thus enable their communities to survive and flourish. The individual 
achieved Homeric virtue only through the existence of public recognition, fame 
and reputation. Furthermore, individuals were motivated to be virtuous by their 
desires for personal success in the public domain and the safety and success of 
their families and communities at home. 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
There are many diverse opinions among contemporary historians and 
philosophers as to what skills, behaviours and personal attributes constituted 
Homeric virtue or excellence, that is, arete. There is no neatly laid out list, nor 
any theoretical discussion about morality, ethics or excellence within the poems, 
which means the identification of qualities for a virtue catalogue is up for 
interpretation, both then and now. It also suggests that Homeric people had no 
doubt or questions about the universality of their values or the necessity of virtue. 
This can be explained by understanding the interrelationship between moira 
I Adkins Arthur W. H., Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1960), pp 75-76 
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(destiny or lot), charis reciprocity and exchange of gifts and favours) and arete 
(excellence or virtue). 
Homer and his hearers have the profound consciousness of a fundamental law 
maintaining the world's organization. They call the law Fate, Moira, fortune, 
lot, or destiny. More exactly it is the system of regulations which control the 
unfolding of all life; the life of men, of things, and of gods. This system secures 
that the world is a stable one. 2 
Arete and the particular virtues were the means to achieving one's moira and a 
sign or evidence of moira in the world. Heroes had arete because such was their 
moira or lot in life, and they achieved their destiny of fame and wealth because of 
their arete, or virtue. Thus moira was a system of ensuring social stability and 
virtue was both the evidence and the instrument of that system. Charis was a very 
ancient system of reciprocity and exchange, originating with peasant survival that 
had required a combination of self-sufficiency (as far as possible) and exchange 
(for extra necessities).3 Charis was clearly central to a number of Homeric virtues 
— hospitality, loyalty and co-operation, justice — but in fact, like moira, it both 
underpinned the value placed generally in virtue and was ensured by the practice 
of virtue. Moira will play a slowly declining role in social stability and the 
understanding of virtue, until it will be hardly mentioned in the golden age of 
Athens. Charis will continue to be central to the understanding of virtue and the 
cohesiveness of society until it slowly assumes a political expediency in the 
Roman Empire and then it too will cease to be overtly associated with virtue. 
However, reciprocity will continue to underpin virtue throughout the history. 
2 Mireaux Emile, Daily Life in the Time of Homer, Trans. Iris Sells, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., 1959), p28 
3 Cartledge Paul, 'Introduction: Defining a kosmos' , in Kosmos: Essays in order, conflict and 
community in classical Athens, Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett and Sitta von Reden, Eds., 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp 7-8 
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Homeric excellences were practical, pragmatic skills that directly 
contributed to the way of life, stability and prosperity of the community. 4 They 
were human ideals of excellence and would continue to be human ideals 
throughout the Greek and Hellenistic periods of history. It was only with 
Christianity that they became divine perfections for humans to imitate. These 
skills were not absolute but were contingent on the nature and circumstances of 
the community and the needs of the moment. For example, fighting and running 
skills predominated for many communities, but sailing skills were more important 
for others. The skills and behaviours admired during war were significantly 
different from those admired during times of peace. Furthermore, certain 
particular virtues, notably justice, were always contingent on the circumstances of 
the moment. Indeed, there was a day-to-day immediacy about Homeric arete, 
which reflected and was attuned to the day-to-day immediacy of a largely land-
dependent, farming-oriented community. 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
As mentioned above, the Homeric poems provided the foundation of education for 
children not just for this era, but for centuries into the future. Children would 
have heard these stories and learned which values, skills and behaviours were 
esteemed by their community. They learned how people should (and should not) 
behave toward family, friends, community and strangers. They learned these 
poems and stories as representations of their cultural heritage and perhaps even 
their cultural future. Mireaux describes Homeric culture as 'deeply rooted in the 
soil' and as 'fundamentally traditional and traditionalistic' 5 . However, he 
explains that this was not an immobile, unchanging, entirely feudal social order, 
4 Adkins, Op. Cit., pp 70-71 
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but that hearing the Homeric poems awakened new ideas about increased wealth, 
expansion and possibilities for individual achievement — exemplified in the 
wandering hero — that will lead to the establishment of democracy and the city-
state.6  Listening to the Homeric poems, children were inculcated with an 
understanding of their own and others' lot in life (moira), the necessity of 
reciprocity and exchange with others (charis) and the behaviours and skills that 
were honoured and esteemed in their community (arete). 
The pro-society quality of virtue 
The virtues of strength, speed and fighting prowess 
Most commentators put strength, speed and fighting prowess at the head of their 
lists of Homeric virtues. It seems to me that these are foundational in the way that 
faith will be foundational for Christians far in the future. Faith will not be a moral 
virtue, but rather a fundamental requirement for being a good Christian. Further, 
it will be the foundation or jumping-off point for other Christian virtues such as 
courage in the face of lions. In a similar sort of way, strength, speed and fighting 
skills were basic to Homeric courage and the kind of person one needed to be in 
Homeric society in order to achieve the most notable reputation and fame of arete. 
Strength, speed and fighting prowess were also indispensable skills required for 
the safety and flourishing of the small, vulnerable communities that the Homeric 
heroes protected and represented. Without them, courage on the battlefield was 
sheer foolhardiness. 
The virtues of courage and constancy 
Courage was the most prominent Homeric behavioural excellence and was central 
to the nobility of heroes such as Achilles and Hector. These characters 
5 Mireaux, Op. Cit., p 259 
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exemplified the raw courage required for one to one combat against an opponent 
with renowned fighting skills, before spectators who would be quick to spread 
news of the result. However, the poems provided many examples of other, more 
subtle kinds of courage. Odysseus had the courage to abandon some of his 
companions in Polyphemus' cave in order to save the rest. Priam had the courage 
to face his own anger and disgust and the possible ridicule of others in order to 
reclaim his son's mutilated body, an act which restored some dignity to his 
defeated family and city. 7 Penelope had the courage to manage and maintain the 
prosperity of the homestead and keep it safe from the suitors, during the long 
years of Odysseus' absence. 
Homeric courage was not the one-dimensional quality that it was often 
presented to be, even in the near or distant future. Whereas strength, speed and 
fighting abilities were the foremost physical capabilities required for the survival 
and flourishing of Homeric societies, courage — in a range of forms and situations 
- was the foremost attitude or disposition, and it was required for the same 
reasons. Courage was necessary not just for the survival of the wandering heroes, 
but also for the community at home that would benefit hugely from the reputation 
and wealth of the returning warrior. Courage was not the exclusive domain of 
fighting heroes - it was necessary for various sorts of people to cope with and 
survive a wide range of disasters, challenges and obstacles. 
The virtues of self-control and wisdom 
Self-control and wisdom were closely connected in the Homeric moral code. The 
Greek word sophrosyne, traditionally translated as temperance or self-control, 
6 	• Mireaux, Op. Cit., pp 259-260 
7 Williams Bernard Arthur Owen, Shame and Necessity, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993), p 40  
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actually meant sound intelligence8 and it was required as the antidote to hybris — 
arrogance, improper self-confidence or lack of respect for others. Homeric self-
control certainly did not mean an absolute lack of excess. Individuals and 
communities were often highly vulnerable, so self-control rather than moderation, 
together with boldness rather than modesty were crucial to dealing with the 
dangers and difficulties of Homeric life. 9 Homeric wisdom was a mixture of 
practical intelligence and cunning, together with control of the emotions — anger, 
pride, humility, even shame — and good planning and decision making skills. This 
sort of wisdom and self-control was especially needed for leadership on the 
lengthy and complex projects carried out by the Homeric heroes. 
Homeric virtue, success and distinction were all highly practical matters. 
Homeric wisdom was very pragmatic, it centred on the capability to determine the 
most desirable outcome and then devise and carry out plans to achieve that 
outcome. This sort of wisdom required self-control — especially control over 
anger — ingenuity, long-term focus and determination; and these were exactly the 
skills which brought Odysseus great success — personally and in terms of his 
project. They were precisely the characteristics that Achilles seriously lacked, 
leading directly to his downfal1. 10 Odysseus was outstanding for his wisdom, 
understanding, determination, cunning, ingenuity and overall success. No other 
Homeric hero was so consistently wise; no other hero enjoyed quite his level of 
success and distinction. Likewise, Penelope demonstrated wisdom and self-
control in her long-term management of Odysseus' homestead and throughout the 
siege by the suitors. The success (or otherwise) of the individual was not separate 
8 Pearson Lionel, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p 
52 
9 Pearson, Op. Cit., pp 41-42 
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from the success (or otherwise) of the social group. The kin-based communities, 
villages and small cities portrayed in the Homeric poems were dependent on the 
wisdom and self-control of heroic warriors and others in charge generally for their 
prosperity, security and sometimes for their very survival. 
The virtues ofjustice, kindness and hospitality 
There was no abstract concept of justice in the Homeric poems; words such as 
dike and themis had a variety of meanings: custom, established precedent, 
judgment, rule and rule of law. Justice was a respected behaviour, not an idea or a 
principle." There was a general understanding that the universe had a certain 
order (associated with moira) and '[t]he dikaios [just man] is the man who 
respects and does not violate that order.' 12 Just men feared and respected the law 
and judges. Just judges respected the law and judged impartially. 13 
To be law-abiding was one aspect of Homeric justice, but there were also 
conventions and obligations relating to fair and just behaviour and these are of 
course associated with the concept of charis or reciprocity of favours. These 
conventions included hospitality to strangers; kindness to supplicants - who may 
be gods in disguise; and the kindness of kings toward their subjects. I4 Kindness 
and respect toward one's neighbours was also important. These were all 
traditional obligations and were illustrated frequently throughout the Homeric 
poems. Hospitality was not simply a matter of general fairness, it was a code that 
underpinned all Homeric behaviour and was a highly significant requirement for 
moral worth, reputation and arete. Homeric justice also included the expectation 
I° Prior William J., Virtue and Knowledge: An 
New York: Routledge, 1991), pp 19-20, 37 
I ' Pearson, Op. Cit., p47 
12 Maclntyre Alasdair, After Virtue: A study in 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p 143 
13 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 78 
Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics, (London & 
Moral Theory, 2nd Edition, (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
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that if a person was wronged then they were entitled to retaliate, indeed vengeance 
was a requirement. Help friends and harm enemies was a general rule. 
This sort of law-abiding, fair, respectful and vengeful justice — expedient, 
practical, reciprocal and part of a complex, utilitarian code, rather than an abstract, 
theoretical, ideal notion — suited the nature of the communities Homeric people 
inhabited. These communities were highly stratified with a complex code of 
etiquette for behaviour between the classes. These communities were small and 
provided little more than subsistence living. They had only embryonic legal 
institutions. They were highly vulnerable to outside threat. These communities 
simply did not have the resources or security to allow justice to be anything other 
than contingent. The contingent nature of Homeric virtues such as justice gave 
the hero room to manoeuvre, to do whatever was necessary for the survival of 
himself, his companions and his community. 
The virtue of loyalty 
While much of the fighting in the Iliad and the Odyssey consisted of one to one 
combat situations, there were also some larger-scale battles and situations 
requiring significant loyalty, co-operation and co-ordination among the group. 
Odysseus showed loyalty to Penelope when he declined several attractive offers 
from goddesses and other women. There was also an element of loyalty in the 
conventions of hospitality to the stranger. Pearson suggests that the 'tie of loyalty 
between husband and wife is no less important than the tie between host and 
guest' . 15 However, there are several occasions in Homer when spouses are not 
loyal and reputations are not ruined as a result — for instance when Helen 
abandoned her husband for Paris. Nevertheless, loyalty and co-operation were 
14 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 61  
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often necessary for the survival of the group and the success of the hero's project. 
Again, the concept of reciprocity and exchange was evident in this virtue too, as 
was moira — one's lot in life - which made loyalty and co-operation an allotted 
obligation. 
The virtue of rhetoric 
Finally, rhetoric - speaking and arguing skills - was an important and admired 
virtue in Homeric society. Both Achilles and Odysseus were accomplished and 
effective speakers 16 able to convince their companions of the right way to 
proceed. Good leadership involved discussion, consultation and (sometimes) the 
gaining of consensus. Convincing leadership skills that promoted co-operation 
and enthusiasm for group activities and in the face of threat were clearly needed 
for the survival of small bands of companions and small communities with limited 
human and material resources. 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
Not only were the Homeric virtues practically oriented to success and distinction, 
but the motivations for virtue were also perceived in pragmatic terms. People 
were generally restrained from selfish behaviour by: fear of divine punishment, 
human revenge, public indignation, and respect and conventional community 
attitudes toward the weak — women, children and the elderly especially." The 
achievement of arete was not a matter of merely staying within the boundaries of 
one's place in life, merely having that position, or being lucky — though all these 
were important. Arete was not merely inherent in the character or social position; 
it was not just a matter of worthiness. Arete existed for Homeric people only 
15 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 62 
16  Prior, Op. Cit., p 16 
17 Yamagata Naoko, Homeric Morality, (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1994), pp 240-241 
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when an individual's excellence was recognised by others. The link between 
arete and fame or reputation was powerful: to be an excellent person one had to 
be doing the sorts of things that were admired, respected and honoured by others. 
In fact, excellence was really only achieved when it was recognised by the 
community. 
Shame could be used to motivate others, for instance on the eve of a battle, 
but it was as the fear of being seen failing to display the virtues appropriate to 
one's lot that it provided the strongest motivation. It was not that everyone in 
Homeric times was constantly fussing about what everyone else was doing, but 
that shame provided a personal, private necessity for virtuous behaviour. 
Individuals felt that they simply could not look their companions or the members 
of their community in the eye if they acted in certain ways. 18 
Another important motivation that inspired Homeric people to be excellent 
or virtuous was the success and glory that it brought. Glory for Homeric heroes 
was obtained primarily through success in combat, which gave rise to honour 
from other nobles, and consequently fame and reputation. This success also 
delivered practical, material benefits in the form of a share in the spoils of war. 
With the glory arising from courage and fighting success, a reputation was 
established that could then be enhanced (or diminished) by achievement in all the 
other virtues. Home, family and stability of the community were important to 
basic survival, but glory was what principally motivated the budding young hero. 
Luckily, there were plenty of opportunities for glory in the poems, reminding us 
that that they are stories and not necessarily history. Nevertheless, they do 
provide insight into the vulnerability of communities in this era. 
IS Williams (1993), Op. Cit., p 83 
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The ultimate motivation for virtue came from the compelling connection 
between the individual and his community. 
The demands of custom and the social order, the need to act 'according to one's 
due' and to feel shame, respect for the feelings and rights of others, beggars and 
wanderers included — all these demands exercise a negative restraining 
influence on man's behaviour. If he disregards these demands, he becomes a 
social outcast and deserves no mercy... 19 
This was motivation indeed. People might not do the right thing, the excellent 
thing all the time, but few would risk becoming a social outcast — for to be an 
outcast was to experience a living death. Homeric individuals identified 
themselves with their community — even those who wandered off to find 
adventure and glory — and communities identified themselves as the home of 
such-and-such the warrior hero. 
The community's need for leadership, protection and if possible growth 
and increased wealth, and the hero's desire for glory, wealth and the safety of 
home, family and self were all satisfied by the values associated with Homeric 
virtue or arete. In Homeric morality there was no real need for punishment — by 
the gods or anyone else — for not being excellent. Only excellence brought 
personal and societal success and, indeed, personal and societal survival. 
We need to remember that the Homeric poems provide neither an accurate, 
nor a complete picture of life for everyone between the Fourteenth and Eighth 
Centuries BCE. The poets who wrote the Iliad and the Odyssey came from the 
middle class and were in the business of reflecting praise and glory on the nobility 
who employed them; consequently there were many aspects of life that did not 
receive poetic attention. Nevertheless, there is a pattern to be found here in the 
close ties between Homeric virtue and Homeric social flourishing. Furthermore, I 
19 Pearson, Op. Cit., p48 
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will endeavour to show, in the course of this thesis, that this sort of pattern — this 
sort of multi-faceted interdependency — continued, with some shifts and turns, 
throughout the next two millennia. 
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THE PRESOCRATIC BRIDGE BETWEEN HEROIC AND GENTLEMANLY 
VIRTUE 
Without intelligence, reputation and wealth are not safe 
possessions. 
DEMOCRITUS1 
Documentary evidence of virtues and moral values is sparse during what I will 
call the Presocratic period — that is the period between the Homeric poems as at 
the Eighth Century BCE and the rise of the great Periclean age at the beginning of 
the Fifth Century BCE. The only philosophers to write explicitly about virtue and 
moral issues were Democritus and to a lesser extent, Heraclitus. Their remarks on 
arete tended to be brief, sometimes offering quite new ideas, other times 
reinforcing views that were consistent with Homeric arete. The evidence from 
the poets is also fragmentary; however along with traditional views, Hesiod, 
Theognis, Tyrtaeus, Solon and Pindar included in their works radical, new, but 
embryonic, ideas about the nature of virtue. 
Fragmentary though the source material is, the relationship between virtue 
and society is readily identifiable. In some respects the old contingency and 
practical immediacy of the virtues lingered. However, there was also a new 
promotion of reflection and contemplation evident in the beginnings of abstract, 
theoretical thinking, together with an increasing esteem for wisdom and 
intelligence. These changes became both necessary and possible in larger-scale 
communities with increased security and a growing leisured, educated class. 
Virtues and values continued to be shared, although we will see that they were 
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open to discussion and adjustment. They also continued to be fostered by the 
educational institution of the Homeric poems. The virtue catalogue contained 
several changes and these are readily explained in the light of the cultural, social 
and political circumstances of this era. Presocratic communities, the emerging 
city-states, depended on farmers, soldiers and especially political, military, and 
naval leaders to survive and thrive — not wandering heroes — and these were 
exactly the roles picked out for virtue and excellence in this period. Recognition, 
reputation, honour and fame continued to be important, but the notion of good 
intention — generally considered a private matter — was discussed as a necessity 
for virtue. Individuals continued to be motivated by desires for personal success 
and by the benefits they received from a flourishing society. The people of this 
period were deliberately creating communities, and inventing and testing concepts 
and institutions that would enable them to best flourish and that depended on 
individual citizens behaving as 'good' — that is noble and virtuous - men. 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
Moira, fate, destiny, one's lot in life continued to have an important role, but a 
changing one, in Presocratic arete. Tor greater fates win greater shares, 
according to Heraclitus' 2 merely indicates that moira continued to be significant. 
More importantly, Pearson finds in the poems of Solon and Theognis that '...the 
old idea of moira as a due portion of conduct has given way to the idea of a due 
portion of possessions.' 3 These possessions consisted in a certain level of wealth 
and political power, both of which the individual had more potential to influence 
than the old sort of social status that was acquired by birth into a particular family. 
I Democritus, quoted in Barnes Jonathan, Early Greek Philosophy, (London: Penguin Books, 
1987), p 270 
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Moira was tied up with the possessions and status that came with citizenship in 
the polls, and the polis could provide these benefits if citizens contributed certain 
excellences to the orderly management of their city-state. 
Charis was now, at least in some views (such as that of Theognis), an 
element of virtue that enabled noos — mind, where a person thinks, sometimes also 
having the meaning of intelligence, understanding or good-sense — to function 
properly. Theognis suggested that good qualities of noos were necessary for the 
virtues of wisdom, self-control and especially friendship. 4 This concern with 
interior reflection and thoughtfulness and the linking of it with charis (good will 
or gratitude) - which had been previously oriented to the practicalities of Homeric 
virtue - was possible and appropriate now. The hectic, vulnerable Homeric world 
had evolved into one of relative peace (albeit with intermittent and sometimes 
catastrophic wars) and democratic and social institution building. 
In this period, the concept of arete or virtue was examined theoretically 
for the first time. For instance, Democritus said: [t]o be good is not to refrain 
from wrongdoing but not even to want to commit it.' 5 In the Homeric poems, 
good and bad were firmly linked to what one did, one's actions, not ever what one 
thought or desired - Democritus was introducing good intention as one of the 
necessary qualities of virtue. Nearly two millennia later, Peter Abelard will 
promote the idea that only good intentions are necessary to virtue, that good 
actions themselves are not what constitute virtue. However, I am getting ahead of 
the story. The consideration of intention as necessary for virtue was another move 
away from the Homeric day-to-day, immediate, active, public sort of virtue 
2 Barnes, Op. Cit., p 125 
3  Pearson, Op. Cit., p 71 
4 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 86 
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toward a quieter, inner, longer-term one. This was a process that - as we will see 
- will continue through to the Christian eras. This shift toward quiet, inner virtue 
corresponded to the relative absence of physical dangers and threats to personal 
and communal safety and the increasing level of security and stability that was 
experienced by - indeed was a motivation for - the developing city-states of this 
era. Quiet, inner virtue would have been entirely inappropriate in the face of the 
violence and danger confronting Homeric heroes and their communities - active, 
physical, immediate excellences were required. In the developing city-states of 
the Presocratic era, where institutions and social control mechanisms for 
democratic and larger-scale communal living were being worked out, quieter, 
more thoughtful excellences were clearly appropriate and necessary. 
By this time the strong association between arete and the noble, heroic 
warrior was still alluded to, but was gradually being converted to an equally 
strong association with the politically astute citizen of a city-state. For instance, 
Democritus wrote that `[m]en flourish neither by their bodies nor by their wealth 
but by uprightness and good sense.' 6 However, he was also quoted as valuing the 
arts of war very highly, and the arts of war still required the warrior skills of 
heroic leadership. This reflected the continued need for military and naval leaders 
and the increased scale of wars that now sometimes required participation from all 
adult males in the community. The Presocratic era was typical of transitional 
periods - offering a mixture of views and ideas that reflected both old and new 
values, and admiration for both the old elite skills and the new ones. 
It could be argued that during this period the poets Theognis and Pindar 
initiated a philosophical debate that would be central to moral philosophy for 
5 Barnes, Op. Cit., p271 
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centuries. Theognis proposed the quite novel idea that arete lay in justice: lalll 
arete is included in justice... a man is good if he is just.' 7 While Pindar offered 
the equally contentious idea that wisdom was the key to arete because it was less 
transient than the glory that came from bravery and was not linked with wealth 
and power as justice could be. 8 Many philosophers throughout the next two 
thousand years and beyond discuss these ideas - that virtue was contained in one 
of the virtues and that there was a hierarchy with one virtue at the pinnacle. No 
one was suggesting that wisdom or justice were foundational in the way that 
strength and fighting skills were the first building block in Homeric arete. Rather, 
the idea was that all the virtues could be understood as one virtue - that somehow 
encompassed them all without actually eliminating the need for them all. This 
notion will be further developed and will become central to much of Greek 
thinking about virtue in the coming centuries and also to Christian thinking about 
virtue and charity. For now, the contributions to this debate were relatively 
embryonic. For instance Democritus remarked that 'Without intelligence, 
reputation and wealth are not safe possessions' 9, which could be extrapolated to 
mean that intelligence or wisdom was now the sole means of acquiring wealth and 
reputation and was therefore the whole of arete. However, Democritus may not 
have intended such a sweeping interpretation. 
At the time, such statement's were highly provocative. Justice had always 
been an excellence, but it was — and continued in this period to be - a contingent 
value that could be sacrificed for the sake of the safety and stability of the 
community. Many of the great Homeric heroes had exemplified arete yet had 
6 Barnes, Op. Cit., p285 
7 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 78 
8 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 79 
9 Barnes, Op. Cit., p270 
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lacked wisdom (Achilles being a prime example), displaying cunning at best, 
while none of them lacked bravery. To abandon courage in favour of wisdom and 
to make justice indispensable were radical proposals, requiring a major shift in 
values and perceptions of excellence. Just such a shift was beginning in this 
period and was accompanied by the shifting social needs and social institutions of 
the new cities. People could see that their relatively peaceful, town-based 
communities with developing notions of government and citizenship depended on 
wisdom and justice for social order and flourishing — whereas an emphasis on 
fighting skills and physical courage was more likely to generate social disorder. 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
These new ideas about wisdom and justice were also provocative because it 
continued to be the case that only certain types of people with certain kinds of 
skills or social roles could be virtuous — not merely anyone who was just or 
wise. 1° However, it is apparent that which skills and social roles attracted virtue 
could be challenged and changed, and the link with social and political needs 
seems clear. As far as I can determine, there were no practising farmers or non-
military politicians who qualified as Homeric heroes, but the excellences 
associated with these social roles were now acknowledged" — at least by some 
writers — and clearly the emerging city-states could not survive or thrive without 
farmers or politicians. 
The Homeric poems continued to be the primary source material for 
education, but were supplemented by the works of newer poets and philosophers. 
Yet it is clear from the fragments and from what we know of society and culture 
at this time that the Homeric poems needed to be interpreted and adapted in order 
1° Adkins, Op. Cit., pp 78-79 
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to maintain their relevance. That they were not abandoned ,as people created 
significantly new ways of living communally - indicates not merely a deep 
connection with tradition and the past (though it does that too) but that people 
were able to reorient the stories of heroism and Homeric arete to a quite different 
kind of lifestyle. This may have been achieved by another process of abstraction 
— by uncovering and re-prioritising the underlying values in the stories rather than 
merely mimicking the behaviours of the characters. I have found no evidence for 
this sort of abstraction, but it would have been consistent with the theorising about 
noos and charis, wisdom and justice, that we can see in the philosophical and 
poetical fragments. 
The pro-society quality of virtue 
The virtue of courage 
Courage as a virtue linked to fighting skills and warriors was becoming irrelevant 
to the Presocratic way of living and was mentioned only occasionally by some of 
the poets. Democritus left us two interesting ideas. The remark that Ic]ourage 
makes misfortunes small' 12 shifted courage from its previously fairly close 
relationship to fighting, to a much wider arena and made it more of an attitude to 
life in general than a behaviour of warriors. Whereas Nile courageous are not 
only those who conquer their enemies but also those who are superior to 
pleasures: some men rule cities and are slaves to women' 13 reinforces this shift, 
making a link between courage and self-control, as well as being an example of 
Democritus' consistently adverse attitude toward women. 14  The virtue of courage 
was not vividly portrayed in the writing of this period. Perhaps because the role 
"Pearson, Op. Cit., pp 73-74 
12 Barnes, Op. Cit., p271 
13 Barnes, Op. Cit., p 271 
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for courage in this transitional society was unclear. No one suggested that 
courage was not a virtue, but no one offered a compelling description of the sort 
of courage that was now deemed excellent. Furthermore my, albeit limited, study 
of the cultural, social and political circumstances of the period did not uncover 
any urgent need for a particular kind of courage from the noble, elite leadership of 
these developing city-states. There continued to be esteem for the sorts of 
courage that were linked to fighting skills, but it had diminished and I suspect this 
was, in part, because armies were now predominantly composed of ordinary 
people: soldiers rather than nobles or heroic warriors. So far in this history, and 
for a long while to come, ordinary people were not considered to have the 
potential for virtue. Presocratic virtues continued to be primarily focused on the 
behaviours and activities of the elite — and the group comprising the elite 
corresponded to those who could best protect, lead and enhance the prosperity of 
the community. 
The virtues of wisdom and self-control 
The old connection between wisdom and self-control continued in this period and 
was reinforced by statements such as '[a] man of sound judgment is not grieved 
by what he does not possess but rejoices in what he does possess.'" Wisdom, as 
outlined above, was rated very highly: ji]mperturbable wisdom, being most 
honourable, is worth everything' and Itlo a wise man the whole earth is 
accessible...' 16 . 
These statements seem to place wisdom at the head of the Presocratic 
virtue list and this new priority is consistent with what we know of life in the 
14 He was also against raising children unless you can select them, already grown enough to judge 
their characters, from among your friends' production. 
15 Democritus quoted in Barnes, Op. Cit., p 273 
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period. The Presocratic period saw an emerging democracy in small cities with 
social institutions that had quite different needs, goals and vulnerabilities from the 
even smaller, kinship-based Homeric communities. Leaders were no longer 
warrior kings and heroes, but were politically astute citizens, some of whom 
doubled (when necessary) as militarily cunning generals. The role of 
contemplative, intellectual gentleman was on the rise and that of active, not 
necessarily bright fighter was on the wane. 
As far as we can tell, Democritus - alone among the Presocratic 
philosophers and poets - was greatly concerned with temperance, self-control and 
moderation. 
For men gain contentment from moderation in joy and a measured life: 
deficiencies and excesses tend to change and to produce large movements in the 
soul, and souls which move across large intervals are neither stable nor content. 
Thus you must set your judgement on the possible and be satisfied with what 
you have, giving little thought to things that are envied and admired, and not 
dwelling on them in your mind... 17 
In addition to this relatively long fragment, there are seven other remarks that 
suggest why, in what circumstances and when one should practice self-control - 
none of which would be out of place among Stoics ideas. All of these statements 
resonate with the standard attitude toward self-control that will persist throughout 
the centuries of ancient Greek culture. Self-control was one of the 'informal 
social controls and protocolsd8 necessary for social order in the absence of a 
police force or the legislation and infrastructure of a modem State. I suggest that 
the absence of more widespread concern or questioning about self-control among 
the Presocratics was probably a simple matter of the continued appropriateness 
16 Democritus quoted in Barnes, Op. Cit., p 271 and 276 respectively 
17 Barnes, Op. Cit., p269 
18 Cartledge, Op. Cit., p 7 
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and relevance of the traditional value placed in self-control as a means of_social 
control. 
The virtues of justice, hospitality and kindness 
In addition to the emerging significance of justice to the overall concept of human 
excellence, there were also signals that abstract theoretical consideration of justice 
as a virtue had begun. Heraclitus and Democritus left us fragments that indicate 
they were interested in the origins of justice, connections between justice and the 
expectations of the gods, and the traditional role of vengeance in justice. I9 
However, generally speaking, the definition of justice together with hospitality 
and kindness and the language used to judge behaviours and dispositions was 
much the same as in the previous era.20 Again suggesting that the expedient, 
practical reciprocal justice, hospitality and so on of the previous era continued to 
suit and support the culture and developing social institutions of the new cities. 
The virtue offriendship 
Friendship was now a virtue and we can see that it was an appropriate application 
of charis or good will/gratitude in this new Greek society, reflecting the equality 
that came with the concepts of democracy and citizenship. 2I Friendship between 
Homeric heroes and their companions often looked more like a contingent kind of 
co-operation, rather than friendship. 22 Friendship among the Presocratics needed 
to develop further if long term social order was to be achieved; it needed to 
involve equality and it needed to be reliable over a longer period of time than 
most Homeric adventures. Friendship now involved similarity of mind, 
19 Barnes, Op. Cit., pp 124, 272 and 278 
29 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 83 
21 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 88 
22 A notable exception would be the deep and loving friendship between Patroklos and Achilles. 
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intelligence, a graceful character and a lack of inclination to find fault with the 
other23 - all useful in a developing democracy. 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
During this period, citizens generally felt an obligation to be 'good men' and to 
serve the state as required — this was again a matter of the reciprocity of charis. In 
return for serving their community, citizens received the important and substantial 
benefits and pleasures of security, public infrastructure, festivals and the pride of 
citizenship, which could be passed on to their children. 
Moreover, the man who refuses to serve his state is acting against his own 
interest. He may appear to win some temporary advantage, but in the end by 
damaging his country he damages himself; there can be no conflict here 
between the demands of gratitude and self-interest.24 
Thus Presocratic people, like Homeric people, had crucial external, physical and 
material reasons for being virtuous. 
Shame continued to play a role• in motivating virtue and it was not 
dissimilar to the Homeric sort of shame. 'Even when you are alone, neither say 
nor do anything bad: learn to feel shame before yourself rather than before 
others.' 25 We could view this interior, thoughtful sort of private shame as 
matching the new interior, thoughtful notions about the nature of virtue — 
intentions, the importance of noos and so on - outlined earlier in this chapter. On 
the other hand, shame clearly had a public aspect, but Democritus was 
encouraging people to focus instead on a private, inner process of shame. Shame 
— public or private - was another of the 'informal social controls' that Cartledge 
alludes to that was necessary for social order — though I imagine that private 
23 Barnes, Op. Cit., p288 
24 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 182 
25 Democritus quoted in Barnes, Op. Cit., p 275 
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shame would be seen to be more suited to the dignified and affluent style of polis 
social order. 
There are so few details to flesh out a picture of the values and virtues of 
Presocratic people, yet somehow this period and its ideas provided a bridge, a 
smooth evolution between Homeric morality and that of the great philosophers 
and dramatists of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BCE. The scarcity of comment on 
the virtues suggests a continuing strong reliance on the Homeric poems as the 
source of moral explication. Alternatively, perhaps the Presocratics did have 
other things to say, but the exciting new ideas to do with science, logic, 
mathematics, theology, mysticism and metaphysics were simply thought more 
significant, more worthy of preservation. 
The next period, the golden age of classical Greece, will perhaps be the 
most important in the history of virtue and in this period, for the first time as far as 
we know, aspects of the relationship between virtue and society will be openly 
and specifically discussed. 
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THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE ATHENIAN POLIS 
A city can be excellent only when the citizens who have a share 
in the government are excellent, and in our state all the citizens 
share in the government... 
AR ISTOTLE 1 
The city-state or polis of Athens experienced its golden age during the Fifth and 
Fourth Centuries BCE, peaking in the glorious Periclean era that spanned much of 
the Fifth Century. The sources of information about the virtues of this period are 
found in the surviving works of the dramatist poets such as Sophocles and 
Euripides, the Sophists such as Protagoras and the great philosophers of the 
period: Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. 
The city-state was an excitingly new and largely successful social and 
political development, but the Athenians were not at all disassociated from their 
past. 
It was from his reading of Homer that the young Athenian in the Periclean age 
was first made to think about the why and wherefore of human conduct; and it 
was his reading of Homer and the poets of archaic Greece that fitted him to 
understand the moral issues which were presented by the great tragedians of the 
fifth century. 2 
The Athenians lived with social and political structures, religious beliefs, arts, 
crafts and technologies that had evolved from those of their history. While 
education of the young continued to be based on Homer, it seems apparent that 
they were interpreting the poems differently from their predecessors, honing in on 
different behaviours as excellences, that better suited life in the polis. Because it 
Aristotle, The Politics, Ed. Stephen Everson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
1332a32-1332a38 
2 Pearson, Op. Cit., p 11 
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was traditional and ubiquitous, this education gave everyone a 'common frame of 
reference' and 'models for thought and behaviour which everyone recognised'. 3 
However, the Athenians were also open and receptive to new ideas and cultural 
change.4 
In this period, the connections between virtue and social or political 
leadership were as clear and overt as they had been in the Homeric poems, 
although of course the sort of leader needed was quite different. To be virtuous 
required the type of moral education that was generally only available within the 
polis. Virtue was essentially an ethos, which we can translate as a personal 
character or a group habit or disposition to behave in certain highly valued ways. 
Friendship — perhaps understood as the pinnacle of moral virtue - was plainly a 
means of social concord, along with justice and self-control. In short, a number of 
significant adjustments and adaptations took place in the relationship between 
virtue and societal flourishing in this period. 
Virtues — even previously contingent virtues, such as justice, which in the 
past could be abandoned in dire circumstances without any loss of arete - were 
now defined as both absolute and flexible. According to ancient Greek logic, one 
was either a sage — having perfect wisdom — or not a sage, one was good or bad. 
However, there was also a process of becoming wise, being neither good nor bad, 
that was logically possible. 5 In practice, there were no circumstances under which 
a person could have arete and be reckless for instance, but the balance between 
excess and deficit was to be carefully judged to suit the circumstances. This 
reduction in the contingency of virtue reflected the development of Greek 
3 Webster T. B. L., Athenian Culture and Society, (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1973), p 64 
4 Webster, Op. Cit., p 8 
5 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p46 
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civilisation from the small, vulnerable, unstable early communities of the past to 
the new, somewhat tentative developing cities of the Presocratic era and now the 
larger, stronger, more stable and sophisticated city-state. Virtues and values were 
widely shared — especially the commitment to courage, justice, wisdom and self-
control — at least at a fundamental level, with the specifics of how these were best 
exemplified and best understood theoretically, open to debate. The Homeric 
poems were still the basis of early moral education, but were no longer sufficient 
for teaching arete in the polis and were supplemented with a range of new 
educational sources. These included: private teachers such as the Sophists, the 
philosophical schools and at a wider, popular level, the great dramas of the period. 
The old virtues that were by now completely absent from the polis catalogue — 
speed, strength, fighting skills and heroic courage — had been replaced with 
quieter, more co-operative virtues. Truthfulness, generosity, good humour and 
good temper, pride, ambition and magnificence enabled, supported and promoted 
the institutions and aspirations of the city-state. Aristotle, for instance, identified 
several general relationships between virtue and society in this period. He 
associated virtue with living fully, participating fully in the community. As the 
epigraph to this chapter shows, as well as identifying the interdependencies 
between virtue and individual eudaimonia or flourishing, he identified the 
interdependencies between the excellence of individuals and the excellence of 
society. Recognition, reputation, honour and fame, together with the benefits of 
living in the glorious city-state, were still motivating people to be virtuous, but 
they had also been subsumed into the concept of eudaimonia or flourishing. 
Eudaimonia appears at first glance to be a telos for the individual to choose, but it 
was dependent on publicly shared values of what it was to be noble, aesthetically 
pleasing and honourable. Eudaimonia was only achievable when people lived 
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together in a community. Furthermore, as Hadot argues, care of the self was 
never intended to imply a lack of care for the city. 6 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
When Socrates questioned various civic and military leaders on the definition of 
various particular virtues, he received answers that were example or situation 
oriented. As he was looking for abstract, conceptual definitions Socrates found 
these sorts of answers inadequate, but they betrayed the deeply entrenched 
situation-based, story-based, practical, Homeric, non-abstract way of thinking 
about such matters. In the Metaphysics 7 Aristotle reported that Socrates was the 
first person to attempt this sort of abstract, conceptual definition. What he was 
looking for was an essential eidos, an idea or form; to be a standard, a formula, 
not what is the meaning of the virtue but what is its nature. Socrates, Aristotle 
explained, was seeking episteme, that is, scientific knowledge. However, instead 
of finding axioms that could be used to generate theorems, Socrates found 
inconsistencies and circular arguments 8 - and he was not the last to face this 
dilemma. As we will find, the goal of turning virtue into a science will reappear 
in the Seventeenth Century and will be tackled in many ways by many 
philosophers, with a similar lack of success. Socrates was not however seeking 
this scientific knowledge merely for its own sake. In his view `[k]nowledge is not 
just plain knowing, but knowing-what-ought-to-be-preferred, and hence knowing 
6 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p 37 
7 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred, (London: Penguin Books, 1998a), 987b1- 
987b4 s  Prior, Op. Cit., pp 78-79 
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how to live.' 9 The moral science-seeking philosophers of the future were to have 
a somewhat different agenda. 
Socrates argued that wisdom was essential for living the good life; and that 
wisdom, virtue and happiness were inseparable. Furthermore, he believed that no 
one having knowledge of the benefits to one's soul of behaving virtuously would 
then proceed to behave viciously. 'To care for one's soul is to maintain its health. 
Right actions benefit the soul, improve its health while wrong actions mutilate or 
damage the soul, destroy its health.' 19 Socrates narrowed down the field of 
virtues to five: wisdom, justice, self-control, courage and piety, and he found that 
as well as being practised and understood as different excellences for different 
aspects and problems of human life, they were also unified in one virtue — 
wisdom. He based this on an argument provided in the Meno ll that there are 
many goods, including virtue, which were advantageous — physical goods such as 
health and wealth, as well as spiritual goods such as temperance, justice, memory 
and nobility of character. However, all these things could sometimes be harmful 
— courage could result in injury or death for instance — and only right use, which 
came from knowledge or wisdom, ensured these goods were beneficial. Socrates 
concluded: 
If then virtue is one of the things in the soul and if it is necessary for it to be 
beneficial, it must be wisdom, since all the things in the soul in themselves are 
neither beneficial nor harmful, but become beneficial or harmful with the 
addition of wisdom or folly. By this argument if virtue is beneficial it must be a 
kind of wisdom. 12 
For Plato, wisdom did not equate to virtue in general. Instead, he saw wisdom, in 
the utopian Republic, as the domain of that very small class of citizens, the 
9 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p 33 
I° Prior, Op. Cit., p 71 
" 87d quoted in Prior, Op. Cit., pp 86-87 
12 Plato, A4eno, 88c-88d quoted in Prior, Op. Cit., p 86 
41 
guardians, who would rule the rest and decide how the state dealt with itself and 
with other states. Wisdom was the highest virtue and it controlled everything and 
everyone. Plato devised a set of four virtues: wisdom, self-control, courage and 
justice that will echo throughout the millennia as the Cardinal Virtues. This 
construct will be notably reinterpreted by the Hellenistic philosophers, the early 
Christians and even the very Aristotelian St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Plato - ignoring the early dialogues, which are generally considered to be 
his portrayal of Socrates' views — did not offer an opinion of the essence of virtue, 
per se. I3 In the Republic, Plato explored the connections between justice, the 
good individual and the good society. He found that a person needed to have 
justice if they were to be happy. Further, he found that justice enabled the other 
three virtues (temperance, wisdom and courage) to grow. Justice — not interfering 
in other people's business — existed when people did the right sort of naturally 
befitting work, which they would do if they were brave, wise and temperate. 14 
For Aristotle, practical wisdom or understanding was what people needed 
in order to deliberate and choose the right, mean action — that is the mean between 
two extremes. For instance, courage was the mean between an excess of 
recklessness and a deficit of cowardice. No one could be morally virtuous 
without practical wisdom and no one could be wise without moral virtue. 15 
Nevertheless, for Aristotle, wisdom was not the essence of virtue. He undertook a 
13 In fact, Plato did not explicitly define the Norms, the Forms, Reason, the Good or Beauty either, 
'for all these things are inexpressible in language and inaccessible to any definition. One 
experiences them, or shows them in dialogue or desire; but nothing can be said about them.' See 
Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p 75 
14 Plato, The Republic of Plato, Trans. I. A. Richards, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & 
Cn. Ltd., 1948), 427-433 
15 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Trans. David Ross, Revised by Ackrill and Urmson, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998b), 1144b30-1144b32 
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comprehensive analysis of the essence of virtue and as we shall see below, his 
approach to the question was quite different. 
These three perspectives offered an interesting range of arguments and 
nuances about the nature of wisdom, but there could be no doubt that they all 
placed wisdom firmly at the pinnacle of the virtue hierarchy. Virtue and 
particularly wisdom were necessary to the management of the state and the home. 
For the Greeks of the polis, that men congregated in cities and the existence of 
governments were self-evidently useful and naturally leading to the good life. 
While many of the virtues in the polis were traceable to the Homeric poems via 
the Presocratic adaptations, and were often discussed in Homeric terms, they had 
shifted in emphasis and priority. Presocratic virtues had expanded in their scope 
to accommodate a more co-operative and sophisticated way of living. Periclean 
Athens did not need independent heroes, it needed collaborative negotiators and 
decision-makers. The over-arching leadership quality needed in the polis was not 
fighting skill or courage - it was wisdom. 
Aristotle argued that the essence of virtue was not something virtuous like 
wisdom, but rather a disposition of the human character. Moral virtue was a state 
of character 16 or habit that exhibited an acquired disposition to choose the 
intermediate between excess and deficit that was right for the particular 
circumstances. Only people in certain circumstances could acquire this 
disposition. Aristotle explained that children did not have the maturity to reflect 
on moral problems, nor the power to make moral choices. Likewise, women and 
slaves did not have the power or freedom to make moral choices where it mattered 
16 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1106a10-1106a12 
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most - in the public domain. I7 On reaching a certain level of _maturity and 
education, the young adult (i.e. young male citizen around the age of twenty) was 
in a position to begin the process of learning, practising and deliberating on 
virtues, virtuous choices and virtuous actions, which would be a life-long pre-
occupation. The intermediate was not some fixed and repeatable rule simply to be 
applied consistently. I8 Rather, it was a variable somewhere on a continuum 
between the utmost excess and the utmost deficit, which must be gauged 
specifically for each situation requiring a moral choice. This calculation must 
consider not just the components and dynamics of the problem itself, but the 
needs and status of the other people involved, the moral agent's own particular 
needs and circumstances at the time, and consideration of the full panorama of 
virtues or behavioural excellences. I9 One could not find the right intermediate of 
courage without also, to some extent, balancing wisdom, justice, self-control, 
good humour and so on. 
This notion of virtue being a balance was also portrayed in the tragedies. 
Antigone was especially wise about one thing (piety), she was brave and 
determined, but she certainly was not prudent in many other ways — she lacked 
balance and she died horribly. Likewise, Oedipus lacked balance — he was 
impulsive rather than temperate, clever at solving riddles but foolish when it came 
to other matters — and his fate of two living deaths was even worse. 
The notions of balance and harmony will become centrepieces of thinking 
about the good life in the next period and were to be much admired, adopted and 
adapted by the philosophes of the Enlightenment. For the classical era the idea of 
17 Aristotle ( 1 998b), Op. Cit., 1111b4-1111b6 
18 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1106b36-1107a1 
19 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1106b I 8-1106b23 
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balance, finding an appropriate middle ground between excess and deficit - 
together with the promotion of life-long practice and habituation of virtue - 
provided mechanisms for social order and control that the city-state - undertaking 
its grand experiment in democracy and citizen participation in government - 
needed. 
The transition from arete as centred on the excellence of the affluent male 
hero to excellence centred on the affluent male politician/citizen, or perhaps the 
male philosopher, begun in the Presocratic era, had been fully realised by this 
period. Arete 'entails skill in managing one's own household and in transacting 
the affairs of the state. The end in both cases is clear and desirable: prosperity and 
stability.' 20 The end for heroic virtue also had been prosperity and stability, 
though it was counted in different goods — safety from attack, cattle and kin-based 
community property. Prosperity and stability for Presocratic society had involved 
the nurturing and development of new ideas and new social constructs, as well as 
protecting new kinds of material wealth that were in transition from the Homeric 
assets. Now prosperity and stability was counted as graceful affluence, slaves, 
comfortable private houses, a glorious culture, commerce, industry, remarkable 
public institutions and an unprecedented 'international' reputation. 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
Hadot explains that '[t]he flourishing of democratic life demanded that its 
citizens, especially those who wanted to achieve positions of power, have a 
perfect mastery of language.' 21 We can see this emphasis played out in various 
ways: in the new educational techniques of the Sophists; in Socrates' insistence on 
uncovering the essential truths about concepts such as virtue, wisdom, piety and 
20  Adkins, Op. Cit., p 278 
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_ so on; and in Aristotle's vigilance in exposing equivocation and his careful use of 
analogies and metaphors to communicate his ideas. All these concerns about 
language were not for the sake of linguistics, but were aimed at developing the 
communication, persuasion and argument development skills and general 
leadership of citizens, for the benefit of their city-state. 
The dramatists vividly and popularly portrayed the virtues and the 
connections between arete, wisdom and flourishing in this period. For instance, 
by killing that stranger at the cross-roads, even without knowing it was his father, 
Oedipus showed an excessively quick temper and a lack of wisdom. Lack of 
wisdom in some things and cleverness in others, to say nothing about lacking 
knowledge of the predictions made at his birth, caused Oedipus to carry out those 
strange predictions and to be ultimately reduced to blindness and exile. The 
dramatist was showing his audience that not only did Oedipus need the exterior 
goods of luck and destiny for success, but he needed to contribute wisdom and the 
other virtues as well. It was his own and his parents' choices and actions, their 
lack of wisdom that led to Oedipus' fate and his downfall, and this lack of 
excellence had awful consequences. 
Ideas about virtue, justice, honour and so on were also promoted and 
indeed ritually rewarded by religious cult associations. Worshippers at local 
temples vied to earn praise and honour awarded - at formal ceremonies for 
virtuous behaviour -by the leadership of the temple community. In this way, non-
citizens and resident aliens esteemed and practised the same sorts of virtues as 
21 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p 13 
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elite citizens, ensuring that many people contributed to the informal mechanisms 
for social stability that virtue provided. 22 
The opening statement of Aristotle's definition of virtue implies a direct 
relationship between individual virtue and community. 
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the 
main owes both its birth and growth to teaching (for which reason it requires 
experience and time) while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, 
whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the 
word ethos (habit).23 
Aristotle's use of the word ethos is particularly interesting. Within the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle used two words that are routinely translated as 
habit: these are ethos and hexis. The Greek word hexis is frequently used within 
the text and it has a wide range of meanings to do with the normal, ingrained way 
of behaving for both animate and inanimate things. For instance, it is the hexis of 
fire to burn things. However, it is also the word for an individual's habitual 
behaviour and state of mind. The word ethos had a social customs dimension, 
which gave rise to the contemporary definition of the English word ethos, as the 
'characteristic spirit, prevalent tone of sentiment of a people or community, the 
"genius" (disposition, prevailing character) of an institution or system' 24. In the 
Rhetoric, Aristotle outlined 'the characters of men in regard to their emotions, 
habits (ethos), ages and fortunes.' 25 He indicated that habits of virtue were not 
merely the habits of the individual, but were also habits shared by social groups — 
the young, the elderly and the middle-aged. For instance, he described the social 
22 Amaoutoglou Ilias, 'Between koinon and idion: legal and social dimensions of religious 
associations in ancient Athens' in Kosmos: Essays in order, conflict and community in classical 
Athens, Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett and Sitta von Reden, Eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp 78-80 
23 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1103a11-1103a16 
24 Murray James A. H. and Others, Eds., The Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1933), Vol. V, p426 
25 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, Trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 
1388b31 
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group 'youth' as habitually having the virtues of ambition, being sweet natured, 
magnanimous and as having a preference for 'doing what is noble to what is in 
their interest' 26 . Youth, as a group, also tended to excess — lacking control over 
bodily appetites and temper, being rash and bashful, rather than courageous and 
confident, and so on. Acquiring the habits of virtue was not a straightforward 
matter of each individual developing their own personal habits of virtue. Groups 
within the community were disposed to a particular subset of the complete range 
of virtues depending on circumstances - age, wealth, power etc. 
Ethos meant both individual and group habits, but the same word 
pronounced slightly differently — ethos — meant 'abode, dwelling place... the 
region in which a man dwells' 27 . Indeed, Heidegger argues that this ethos or 
abode was the place that 'contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to 
man in his essence.' 28 In other words, it was the most suitable, appropriate and 
proper place for human habitation — not a private place, but a familiar place where 
people live together.29 This suggests that the very words being used by the 
ancient Greeks to discuss moral virtue were a constant reminder of the interplay 
between society and virtue. An experience many people subsequently failed to 
notice because the words — ethike, ethos, ethos: morality, habit, place where 
people live together well - do not all share a common root in Latin or English. 
The words ethos and ethos retained their etymological connection into Latin — 
habitus and habito — as well as into English — habit and habitat. However, the 
translation of ethike to virtus meant the connection between virtue and dwelling 
place became indistinct. There is a parallel between this linguistic connection in 
26 Aristotle (1991), Op. Cit., 1389a32 
27 Heidegger Martin, Basic Writings, Ed. David Farrell Krell, (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 
1993), p 256 
28 Ibid. 
48 
the Greek words and the Chinese word for virtue. Wong writes that the Chinese 
word for virtue — jen — consists of two characters: the character for a man and the 
character for two, signifying a group. Thus, the very composition of the word 
establishes an inextricable relationship between virtuous behaviour, the individual 
and the social group.30  This might explain why the ancient Greeks did not often 
feel a need to analyse or discuss the relationship between virtue and society — it 
was obvious to them from the words they were using. 
The proper human abode - the place where people could live well - was 
the polls. It is clear in Aristotle's work that the polis was the place where human 
flourishing was achieved and where virtue was practised. 
[1]t is only within the polis that the life of eudaimonia can be lived out, and thus 
it is in and through the life of the polls that the virtues are exercised. Moreover, 
apart from the education afforded by the polls, especially the better kind of 
polls, human beings are incapable of the rationality required for virtue.31 
This interpretation implies that only those people who experienced an advanced 
education in the particular social, cultural and political circumstances that 
comprised a certain kind of polls — such as Periclean Athens - were capable of the 
wisdom or reasoning to be virtuous. Aristotle's statements on this issue appear to 
be somewhat ambiguous. Aristotle may have been arguing that it was only within 
a polis setting that moral education facilities were available, at this point in time - 
not that it was only within the particular socio-political institutions and the 
particular mode of community of his polis that moral virtue could be learned. A 
number of disparaging remarks were made about the Homeric poems in this era, 
but nowhere was it suggested that virtue or excellence had not existed prior to this 
sort of polls — a possible extrapolation from MacIntyre's statement about 
29 Heidegger (1993), Op. Cit., p258 
30 Wong David B., Moral Relativity, (Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1984), pp 154-155 
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eudaimonia and the polis quoted above. The Greeks of Athens, except for the 
audiences of the historian Herodotus, were not particularly interested in the 
virtues and values of other societies with which they came in contact. However, 
this could be for a number of reasons other than a belief that foreigners had no 
virtue at all: loyalty to the city-state and its values, lack of detailed 
anthropological information, or simply a normal preoccupation with their own 
affairs and a sense of the irrelevance of other people's values. Moreover, 
Aristotle did not live in a city-state in the latter part of his life; he lived in an 
empire. Nowhere did Aristotle suggest — in the writings that survive - that with 
the demise32 of the Athenian polis there was no more possibility of virtue. Like 
Socrates, the Stoics will find virtue — that is perfect virtue — extremely rare in the 
next period, but this rarity will not be because they do not live in a city-state. 
Taking a different perspective, Heidegger suggests that the polis was not a 
particular form of political system — a city-state — but the 'abode of the essence of 
[Greek] Inunanity'. 33 The polis was the place of abode that best suited humans 
and where they were allotted their correct place. 34 It was the place where 
orderliness was found, which is not to say there was no disorder, but that this was 
where assignments and arrangements for human living were made. 35 The polis 
was both the place and the way of people living together — the community not the 
political structure as such.36 Therefore, the term polis encompassed the simple 
Homeric community as well as the sophisticated Periclean city. 
31 MacIntyre Alasdair, 'Virtue Ethics', in Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2"d Edition, (Routledge NY: 
Becker and Becker, 2001), p 1758 
32 1 do not wish to imply there was cultural demise, it was a political, military and diplomatic 
demise, see Arnaoutoglou, Op. Cit., p69 
33 Heidegger Martin, Parmenides, Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz Trans., (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p 90 
34 Heidegger (1992), Op. Cit., p92 
35 Heidegger (1992), Op. Cit., pp 92-93 
36 Heidegger (1992), Op. Cit., p 96 
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Aristotle highlighted another aspect of the public promotion of virtue, 
when he said: 
[nor legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is 
the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and 
it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. 37 
Aristotle expected this aim to be shared by all legislators, regardless of the 
particular form of government operating within a state or empire, not just the 
legislators of the Periclean sort of government In The Politics, Aristotle 
examined the similarities between the good life for the individual and the good 
life for the state. He concluded that the life of excellence, of acting well — that is 
virtue — 'is best for each individual, and for states and for mankind collectively.' 38 
Indeed, he defined the state not merely as a place where people live side by side, 
but as 'the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by 
which we mean a happy and honourable life.' 39 A happy and honourable life was 
an excellent and virtuous life. Aristotle set out to show that the contribution of 
noble actions - that is, personal and political excellence, which were essentially 
the same and achieved by the same means — was far more important both to 
society and to the individual than noble birth or wealth. 4° The excellence of the 
individual and the excellence of the state were mutually dependent. An excellent 
polis needed mechanisms for social control and virtue in general, in conjunction 
with several of the particular virtues, was a prime candidates for meeting this 
need. 
37 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit. , 1103b3 
38 Aristotle (1988), Op. Cit., 1325b30 
39 Aristotle (1988), Op. Cit., 1280b40-1281a1 
4° Aristotle (1988), Op. Cit., 1281a1-1281a8 
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The pro-society quality-of virtue 
The virtue of courage 
By contrast with the previous era, there was now a considerable depth to the 
discussion on courage. For everyone except Plato, the association between 
courage and the battlefield had been discarded. Oedipus' ultimate act of courage 
was to blind himself and then go into voluntary exile - something like two living 
deaths. Antigone went to her horrible death with similar courage. These actions 
were necessary to restore social stability and maintain the rule of law respectively. 
Aristotle explained that courage, as a virtue, referred to feelings of fear and 
confidence - which were both appropriate responses depending on the 
circumstances. Aristotle debated whether poverty and illness were things we 
ought not fear as they did not generally stem from our own vices, but he 
concluded that to be fearless of these was also to be brave. Furthermore, 'Where 
are some evils, such as disrepute, which are proper and right for [a man] to fear 
and wrong not to fear'. 41 However, he gave most credit to courage in the face of 
what is most terrifying to a person and death seemed to Aristotle to be that most 
fearful thing.42 In the Republic, courage was the domain of the soldier class, 
however these soldiers were very different from the heroes of the past. The 
soldiers of the Republic were to be educated and trained - we might say 
indoctrinated - to fear only those things the state wished them to fear.43 This 
courage sounds rather mechanical, automatic and a matter of soldiers doing 
merely what they have been taught to do and what they are required to do by law. 
Aristotle's lengthy argument against courage being about behaviour on the 
41 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Trans. Martin Ostwald, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1962), 1115a11-1115a12 
42 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1115a6-1115a25 
43  Plato, Op. Cit., 429-430 
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battlefield was possibly aimed at repudiating this idea. But Plato also said 'that 
the soul possessing elevation of thought and the contemplation of the whole of 
time and being will not view death as something to be feared' 44 — a perspective on 
virtue and fear that was paradoxically to be central to Epicureanism in the next 
period. Courage in facing one's own fears and even the courage of the 
professional soldier were quieter, more controlled than the courage of a warrior-
hero. Periclean courage matched the needs and social structures of the polis, 
where the flamboyant, independent courage of the Homeric hero would have been 
destabilising and inappropriate. 
The virtue of self-control 
Like his predecessors of the last two eras, Socrates closely connected self-control 
with knowledge. Xenophon explained that 
[H]appiness begins with a certain sort of self-sufficiency, which is gained by 
ruling over one's desires. This self-control is the origin of gentlemanly virtue, 
which Socrates defines as knowledge about human concerns, such as what is 
holy and what impious, what is noble and what shameful, what is just and what 
unjust, and so on.45 
While recognising pleasure as good, self-control for Aristotle was concerned with 
how people dealt with physical pleasure and to some extent pain, for both 
themselves and others — the balance between insensibility and self-indulgence. A 
'temperate man is so called because he is not pained at the absence of what is 
pleasant and at his abstinence from it'.46 An excess of feeling about pleasure or 
pain resulted in self-indulgence, while an absence of such feelings would be 
insensibility. Aristotle considered pleasure a thing to be guarded against, because 
44 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p20 
45 Stephens John A., 'Friendship and Profit in Xenophon's Oeconomicus' in The Socratic 
Movement, Ed. Paul A. Vander Waerdt, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p 
209 
46 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1118b35-1118b36 
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people tend not to judge pleasures impartially. 47 These notions about self-control 
were quite consistent with those of the previous era. This suggests that the value 
and expectations placed on self-control that had been adapted from the Homeric 
tradition to suit the Presocratic societies continued to meet the needs of the city-
state for a level of personal control and conformity that would preserve social 
order and stability. 
The virtue of justice 
Socrates proposed a radical innovation — a compelling argument that doing evil to 
another person, friend or foe was always unjust". Vengeance had always been 
(and continues to this day to be) some part of justice and punishment for crime. 
Even if Socrates' argument did not prevent vengeance from being the prominent 
element of justice it was for most of Western history until well into the Middle 
Ages, he did raise an important question that would resonate in thinking about 
justice throughout those centuries. More relevant for this thesis, Socrates 'thought 
that it was impossible to be just by oneself. If one was just all by oneself, one 
ceases to be just.' 49 This might seem obvious, but the concept of justice had in 
previous eras been a contingent and largely personal matter — obtaining one's due 
portion through whatever reciprocity was needed - together with traditional 
respect for laws, rather than a matter of communal well-being, per se. 
Aristotle explained that justice was 'complete because he who possesses it 
can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbour also ...' 5° . 
This raises the question of what Aristotle intended by the word complete. Did he 
mean it was complete because it benefited both parties involved in a dispute? Did 
47 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1109b6-1109b9 
48 Vlastos Gregory, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, (Ithaca N. Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), pp 196-197 
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he mean it was complete because it benefited the individual, his neighbour (i.e. 
opponent) and the concord of society as a whole? Alternatively, did he mean it 
was complete because a person needed to exhibit courage, wisdom, truthfulness, 
generosity and all the other virtues, in order to be just? Regardless, the concept of 
justice reached a new height of sophistication in this period, reflecting and 
complementing the new sophistication of the governmental and legal systems of 
the polis. Furthermore, Aristotle declared it was the reciprocity of justice that 
held people and cities together 51 . All these new ideas about justice were occurring 
in the context of the development of the first comprehensive justice system — the 
shifting of justice from a 'tribal' code to an institutional 'civic' code. The 
intention behind this social development was plainly a desire for increased 
stability and the prevention of social conflict. 52 
The virtue of piety 
Piety was the principal theme of the Antigone and of Plato's Euthyphro, and it 
was the first of three virtues mentioned in the Heraclidea: 
There are three aretai which you must practice, my child. Honour the gods, 
your parents, and the common laws of Greece, and in so doing you will have 
forever an excellent, kallistos, garland of eukleia; fair fame.53 
Furthermore, 'Aeschylus has the chorus in the Agamemnon say that only impiety, 
not wealth, brings divine punishment'''. Each of these examples reflect the 
increased importance of religion in Periclean Athens compared with earlier times. 
Piety was also of major concern for Socrates, alone among the philosophers. 
Despite being a 'deeply religious man' and despite the fact that flouting the 
4° Merleau-Ponty quoted in Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p 37 
5° Aristotle (1992b), Op. Cit., 1129b35 
51 Aristotle (1992b), Op. Cit., I 132b36 
52 Schofield Malcolm, 'Political friendship and the ideology of reciprocity' in Kosmos: Essays in 
order, conflict and community in classical Athens, Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett and Sitta von 
Reden, Eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp 38-39 
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religious consensus was 'an offence against the state .punishable by death' 55 
Socrates created his own definition of piety and defied centuries of belief about 
the role and behaviour of the gods. He claimed that piety was not mere respect 
for the gods and respect for religious ritual, but that Ip]iety is doing god's work 
to benefit human beings' 56 . This might have been a comfortable idea for Jews or 
in the future for Christians, but it was an astonishing idea for the ancient Greeks. 
Piety, religion and religious ritual were important social institutions in the polis 
and 'Honour the gods' was a very ancient axiom, but the idea that piety was a 
virtue — an excellence - expressed by Socrates and some of the dramatists was 
controversial and somewhat ahead of its time. For when religion and piety were 
state matters, they would surely be considered norms rather than an excellences. 
On the other hand, the social stability and order that derived from piety and the 
practice of religion were apparent, so it was consistent to make piety a virtue 
along with the other informal mechanisms for social control. 
The virtue of generosity or liberality 
For Aristotle, generosity or liberality was a virtue associated with money, wealth, 
and material things and it was particularly concerned with giving them in the right 
way and with obtaining them from the right sources. 57 Generosity was the 
balance between meanness or stinginess and prodigality or extravagance. 
Aristotle noted that it was generally thought that people who inherited their wealth 
were more inclined to be generous, as they had never lived without and they felt 
less attached to their money, not having earned it themselves. 58 This virtue seems 
53  Fragment alleged to belong to the Heraclidae, quoted in Adkins, Op. Cit., p 176 
54 744-754 quoted in Prior, Op. Cit., p22 
55 Vlastos, Op. Cit., p 158 
56 Vlastos, Op. Cit., p 176 
57 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1119b20-1120a10 
58 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1120b10-1120b13 
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to be a logical adaptation of the conventional hospitality and kingly generosity 
that were Homeric virtues, suited to the affluence of the elite classes of the polls. 
Part of the glory of Periclean Athens was that people travelled long distances to 
see this unprecedented art, culture and philosophy for themselves. A pervasive 
tone of generosity and hospitality would clearly make Athens even more 
impressive, as well as being appropriate to the gentlemanly aspirations of the elite. 
The virtues of magnificence, pride and good temper 
Aristotle's virtue of magnificence, the balance between niggardliness and 
tastelessness was also to do with money, but in the sense of spending money well, 
using money to make life beautiful and tasteful for the sake of honour, rather than 
for the sake of showing off or obtaining things cheaply. 59 Homeric heroes (who 
were almost by definition also wealthy and noble) spent their money on 
adventures, which brought glory to themselves and their homes. By Aristotle's 
time, money was spent to bring glory to individual citizens and to their great polls 
by acquiring tasteful, aesthetically pleasing homes, possessions and 
entertainments. We should note that magnificence was not viewed as an 
independent virtue — one could not have arete from being magnificent without 
having all the other virtues.° 
Hubris had long been a vice for the Greeks, but for Aristotle, there was a 
proper virtuous sort of pride - the pride of feeling worthy of the things one 
genuinely deserves. As with magnificence, people only deserved to be proud 
when they were good in all the other virtues. 61 Proper pride was the mean 
between undue humility or thinking too little of oneself, and empty vanity or 
59 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1122b5-1122b10 
60 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1124a1 
61 Aristotle ( 1 998b), Op. Cit., 1123b1-1123b3, 1123b29-1123b31 
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thinking too much of oneself. Another Aristotelian virtue related to honour was 
the unnamed median between striving too much for honour, status or wealth and 
not striving enough. Aristotle saw this proper sort of ambition as being related to 
proper pride in a similar manner to the relationship between generosity and 
magnificence. 62 
The virtue of gentleness or good temper was concerned with managing 
anger and was the balance between apathy or undue meekness and short temper. 
Aristotle explained that this did not mean never being angry, rather that one 
should be angry for the right reasons, with the right people, in the right manner 
and for the right length of time. 63 
The links between these virtues and societal flourishing are clear. Proper 
pride, ambition and good temper would be highly desirable, indeed necessary 
qualities for citizens participating in the government of their polis and holding 
positions of power. Without magnificence and pride the city-state would not hold 
its glorious place in the world, it would not advance or be seen to advance. 
Without gentlemanly good temper, political and judicial arguments would be 
violent and endless, and democratic decisions would never be reached. 
The virtue offriendliness or good manners 
Aristotle's virtue, unnamed but resembling friendliness, involved general good 
manners towards everyone. It was behaving appropriately to strangers as well as 
people one knew64 and with a sense of honour and politeness. 
62 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1125b1-1125b7 
63 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1125b31-1125b35 
64 Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1126b19-1126b27 
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It was a balance between grouchiness or quarrelsomeness and obsequiousness. 
He will behave differently toward eminent men and toward ordinary people, 
toward those he knows well and those he knows less well, and he will observe 
similar distinctions in his behaviour, paying the proper tribute to each. 65 
This sort of conduct was quite consistent with the conventional manners and rules 
of hospitality that were Homeric virtues and with the respect required to maintain 
the stratified social structure of the polls. Friendliness and good manners would 
also be invaluable to the orderly processes of democratic, participatory 
government in the city-state. We will find in the next chapter that good manners 
will (arguably) comprise the public face of virtue in the Hellenized Roman 
Empire. Even later, in the Renaissance, people will debate whether good manners 
in fact comprise virtue. 
The virtue of truthfulness 
For Aristotle, the mean associated with boastfulness and mock modesty was 
nameless; but it was primarily truthfulness and included having appropriate 
motives and not pretending to be something other than what one was66. 
Truthfulness per se had not been a virtue in the past, although boastfulness, part of 
hubris, had always been a vice. For Homeric heroes, success in their adventures 
often involved deceiving people about their intentions and/or identity. Life in the 
relatively quiet and leisurely polis did not require this sort of deception; indeed it 
would be destabilising and would prohibit the orderly conduct of political and 
commercial business. 
65 Aristotle (1962), Op. Cit., 1 126b35-1127a2 
66 Aristotle ( I 998b), Op. Cit., 1127a23-1127a27 
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The virtue of good humour — 
Recognising that life included leisure and amusement as well as serious activities, 
Aristotle found tasteful good humour to be a virtue 67 - it was the mean between 
boorishness and buffoonery. This was perhaps another effect of living in the 
polls, which is not to say there was no humour in the Homeric poems, but there 
does not appear to be too much relaxation in between the battles, journeys, ordeals 
and adventures. Life in the polis was far more leisurely and affluent, and good 
humour, as exemplified for instance by Socrates, clearly made a valuable 
contribution to co-operative, participative, city living. 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
While virtue in the home was considered important and necessary, virtue in public 
life received the major proportion of analysis and consideration. Honour and 
honours received from the display of virtue were highly sought in the religious 
domain68 and the political domain. 
Socrates claimed in the Apology that care of one's soul – which was 
inextricably bound up with care of others and care for one's city 69 - was the most 
important human task and that this care was achieved through virtuous actions, 
indeed the soul was damaged by vicious ones. 'By basing ethics on the care of 
one's soul, Socrates provides the strongest motive for moral action; he makes 
right conduct a matter of the greatest importance for each individual.. 
Aristotle took the view that all things had a good mode of living or operation - a 
good flute was tuneful, a good oak had healthy green leaves and produced acorns. 
Furthermore, the good human was one who lived the life of eudaimonia, one who 
67. Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1127b33-1128a1 
68 Arnaoutoglou, Op. Cit., p 79 
Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p38 
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achieved the telos of happiness or flourishing — the good, happy, aesthetically 
pleasing, honourable, noble life - and the means to this flourishing was the 
practice of virtue. To function well as a human was to habitually practice the 
virtues, and the habit (ethos) of virtue was bound up with the community. and 
social groups within the community. 
Shame was still a motivation of sorts, but I would argue that this period 
saw a decline in shame's importance. Aristotle saw it as a way for young people 
to learn from their mistakes and I think shame was the motivation for Oedipus' 
final dramatic and tragic actions against himself. Nevertheless, motivation 
primarily came from the interdependence between the virtues and eudaimonia. 
By living virtuously people were living well, caring for the health of their souls, 
achieving honour, wealth and nobility, and because they were living well — being 
healthy, wealthy, honourable and noble - they were able and disposed to practice 
the virtues. 
The shift in emphasis for virtue - from Homeric action in the here and 
now, to Periclean consistency of character over a lifetime — could occur because 
society was experiencing relatively secure conditions, seemed to have a long-term 
outlook and needed reliable sorts of behaviour to reinforce that stability. 
Intermittent feats of independent heroism would have been destabilising for this 
sort of orderly and secure society. In addition, the relatively affluent and stable 
socio-political conditions of the polls meant there was a shift in focus or 
expectation from merely surviving to living well. 'We ought to make not living, 
but living well the most important thing' said Socrates 71 . Living well involved 
7° Prior, Op. Cit., p 71 
71 Crito 48b quoted in Prior, Op. Cit., p 70 
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nobility — with all its connotations of excellence, beauty, elegance and grace, as 
well as moral rightness. 72 
Now the wise men say ... that heaven and earth, gods and men are bounded by 
community and friendship, order and temperance and justice; and that is why 
they call this whole universe the 'world order' ..." 
Virtue, community and order were inextricably connected in this Athenian 
experience of the kosmos as an orderly, beautiful world. Knowing how to live 
well, living gently with each other, responding in an excellent way to the 
circumstances faced - these were central to the pride and glory of the golden age 
of Athens. To be virtuous was to satisfy both internal goals relating to 
accomplishment and fulfilment in one's own particular life, and at the same time 
to satisfy the goals of one's society — goals of order, stability, magnificence and so 
on. 
We can see that the relationship between virtue and societal flourishing 
had been direct and intense throughout these first three historical eras from Homer 
to Periclean Athens. In these times, people defined and understood themselves 
largely in terms of their community or society. For Homeric people this 
inextricable relationship between virtue and societal flourishing was a matter of 
plain survival, with some added advantages of possible increased wealth and 
glory. For the Presocratics, it was a blend of survival plus flourishing in terms of 
growth and development of a new kind of democratic, city-state way of living 
together. For the Athenians, the relationship was even more overtly a matter of 
order, stability, growth and glory, of living well, not just surviving. In each case, 
the relationship was mutual and reciprocal between individuals and their society. 
72  Prior, Op. Cit., p 70 
73  Plato, Gorgias, Terence Irwin Trans., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 507e5-508a4 
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Throughout these three eras, virtue and the responsibility for societal 
flourishing came about through the transformation of individuals into the sorts of 
people - mostly leaders — that society needed: heroic warriors, military leaders and 
gentlemanly politicians. Over the next fifteen hundred or so years, we will 
observe a gradual — but certainly not evenly progressing — shift toward what we 
might call the 'democratisation' of virtue. The close associations between virtue, 
societal flourishing and elite, leadership roles will decline, and other sorts of 
people will be practising virtue and contributing to the communal flourishing. 
The reciprocity that gave so much structure to virtue and relations between 
people in these last three eras will develop in two distinct directions. One 
development is a public mode of patronage that had much to do with politics, 
power, influence and money and little to do with virtue as such. The other will be 
a quiet, relatively private mode of reciprocity that will manifest as small, close-
knit circles of friendship among the Hellenists and later, small close-knit Christian 
communities. Reciprocity; the apparently innate tendency of humans to depend 
on each other and to practice division of labour; and the adaptation/adaptability of 
modes of reciprocity and modes of virtue, were — I will argue — central to the 
existence and continuation of the relationship between virtue and societal 
flourishing. 
Meanwhile, within a very short space of time, the Athenian polis lost its 
glorious independence and found itself part of an empire. During the next period, 
ideas from this golden age will undergo remarkable transformations to meet the 
needs of dramatically different social and political circumstances. Encompassing 
the short-lived Macedonian Empire through to the rise of the Roman Empire was 
the Hellenistic period — during which the various empires adopted, adapted and 
promoted Greek values, ideas and ways of thinking. This next period is not just 
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interesting for its own sake, it is also essential to understanding how ideas about 
virtue progressed from the classical Greek world to the Christian world, and to 
understanding and contextualising the marvellous 'new' ideas about virtue of the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment. 
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HELLENISTIC TRANQUILLITY, WISDOM AND ENDURANCE 
Just don't go on discussing what sort of person a good person 
ought to be; be one. 
MARCUS AURELIUS 1 
This period spanned the Third Century BCE to the First Century CE, overlapping 
with Aristotle (who died in 322BcE) at the beginning and the career of Augustus 
at the end. It encompassed the rise and decline of the Macedonian Empire and the 
rise of the Roman Empire. Throughout this period, moral philosophy and ideas 
about virtue were dominated by Greeks and Greek ideas - even though Alexandria 
and then Rome, rather than Athens, were the official cultural and political centres. 
The proponents of these Greek ideas and ideals were four highly influential 
schools of philosophy — the Cynic, Sceptic, Epicurean and Stoic schools — each of 
which propounded ways of thinking and living virtuously. 
All these schools were deeply concerned with the problem of living a 
moral life that was tranquil - free of fear and anxiety. The Cynics aimed to be free 
of fear through the rejection of all conventions and indifference to material 
goods. 2 The Sceptics held that anxiety stemmed from trying to decide what was 
truth, from being dogmatic and expecting to be certain about the nature of things. 3 
The Epicureans sought freedom from anxiety via the physical discipline of living 
rather frugal, moderate lives and the mental discipline of avoiding activities that 
Marcus Aurelius, Against Catiline, 10.16, quoted in Sharpies R.W., Stoics, Epicureans and 
Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p 
132 
2 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., pp 108-109 
3 Sextus PH 1.12 quoted in Sharpies, Op. Cit., p 114 
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would incite the passions, such as parenthood or politics. The Stoics hoped to 
achieve freedom from anxiety through personal orderliness, balance with nature 
and consistency of character. 5 The Epicureans and the Stoics explicitly connected 
the desired life of serenity with the life of virtue; and all the schools connected the 
attainment of tranquillity with certain ways of defining wisdom. These ideas, 
stated very briefly, appear to be quite different from the values of the city-state as 
described in the previous chapter. Indeed, a number of significant changes took 
place in this period — to the understanding of what virtue entailed, how it was 
practised and where it was recognised. However, we shall see that these sorts of 
ideas developed directly from and were fairly consistent with many of those 
earlier ideas and ideals. For instance, the Epicureans and Stoics expanded on 
Socrates' ideas about the unity of virtue. They perceived the particular virtues to 
be highly unified - not just in their equation between virtue and wisdom, but even 
where particular virtues such as courage, friendship, humility and cheerfulness 
were described, the interdependencies with wisdom and endurance were highly 
apparent and important. The whole focus of virtue in this period was — I will 
argue - united in the effort to endure chaos and difficulty, and manage or avoid 
fear, and this plainly made sense as a response to the chaotic, difficult and fearful 
circumstances of the time. Education, and moral education in particular, 
continued to be crucial to the ways of living propounded by each of the schools 
and association with them required the choice to live in a particular way. The 
virtues of wisdom, courage and justice had become even quieter than they were in 
Periclean Athens and they promoted the survival (physical, emotional and 
4 Sharpies, Op. Cit., pp 84-88 
5 Long A. A. and Sedley D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume I Translations of the 
principal sources with philosophical commentary, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), p 377 
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political) of individuals and small groups, each alienated in various ways from the rn  
wider society. At the same time, these particular virtues avoided conflict with 
Imperial society and enabled the goals and activities of the centralised, despotic 
powers of the Empire to continue. The overt narrowing of the scope of the 
everyday relationship between virtue and society — to the individual within a small 
community rather than the wider society - and the rise of friendship as a principal 
virtue was another significant adjustment reflecting the survival needs of the time. 
Most individuals had little or no control over the decisions or values of the Empire 
— but they could participate in a smaller community. The motivations for virtue 
continued to be teleological and associated with public values that linked virtue 
with an honourable, excellent human life. There was increased importance for the 
care of the self that featured in the previous era, but it appears to have become 
more closely linked with care for one's friends rather than care for the city. 
During this period, individuals made monumental contributions to public 
building, infrastructure and entertainment 6, but these gifts appear to have been 
more acts of political power and lobbying than acts of care for the city or acts of 
virtuous generosity. 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
Some insight into the meaning of arete in this period can perhaps be gleaned from 
the Stoic word for the non-virtuous, non-sage majority — phauloi. This meant 
'inferior and ordinary rather than wicked or vicious' 7 suggesting that the word 
arete continued to hold its meaning, at least to some extent, of excellence or 
nobility. According to MacIntyre, Stoic arete was essentially a singular 
> 
6 Veyne Paul, 'The Roman Empire' in A History of Private Life, Volume I, From Pagan Rome to 
Byzantium, Paul Veyne Ed., Arthur Golcihammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
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expression; an all or nothing matter_ that required unfailingly right judgment. 8 
However, I suggest this was largely true for the Epicureans, Cynics and Sceptics 
as well - virtue generally consisted in a way of thinking, the knowledge of certain 
principles, or wisdom. In this respect, all four schools seem to have taken as their 
starting point the Socratic view that virtue was unified in wisdom. Furthermore, 
none of the Schools developed or promoted a comprehensive catalogue of 
particular virtues in the way that Aristotle had done. I will endeavour to show that 
— at this point in history - the Socratic and Platonic virtues were more compatible 
with and capable of adaptation to needs for individual and communal flourishing 
than were the citizenship and politically oriented Aristotelian virtues. 
For the Cynics, virtue was the wisdom to discard all conventions and 
desires. For the Sceptics, virtue was the wisdom to avoid dogmatic thinking. For 
the Epicureans, virtue was the wisdom to contemplate the pleasures of life and 
avoid all unreasonable pains. This wisdom was 'even more precious than 
philosophy; and it is the natural source of all the remaining virtues'.9 Moreover, 
for the Stoics, virtue was the wisdom and will to live in harmony with Nature and 
'possession not just of individual true judgments but of truth - a systematic body 
of moral knowledge' I° . Consistent among all the Schools was the notion — again 
Socratic in outline if not in detail - that happiness, wisdom, and virtue were 
equivalent. Happiness came from a sense of tranquillity. This tranquillity or 
absence of fear and anxiety was achieved through a certain kind of wisdom that 
was also virtue. It was only the means of achieving this tranquillity or absence of 
fear and the kind of wisdom aimed at that varied from school to school. 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), p 95  
7 Long and Sedley, Op. Cit., p427 
8 Maclntyre (1984), Op. Cit., p 168 
9 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 131-32 quoted in Long and Sedley, Op. Cit., p 114 
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Furthermore, personal tranquillity_ was the only resort of people who realised that 
they were 'completely incapable of helping to remedy the corruption of the 
city' I I . Practising a philosophical way of living — alone or with friends — was the 
only solution. I2 
The Epicureans were frequently criticised — by their contemporaries and 
ever since - for deliberately avoiding active, public life while the Stoics were 
renowned and praised for their participation in public life. Stoic participation was 
in fact not being active for the sake of virtue or even for the sake of one's society. 
Rather, it was cheerfully playing one's role and taking care to ensure this activity 
would never impinge on the 'preservation of one's inner freedom'. 13 In fact, both 
Stoics and some Epicureans undertook political leadership roles, but they did so 
with an intention of indifference to the material pleasures and political honours 
that this participation offered. I4 Hadot explains that the appeal of Plato's 
philosophy for the Hellenists was that he had advised his students that while they 
waited, to govern the ideal city, they should devote 'themselves to a disinterested 
life of study and spiritual practices: 15 The Empire was a chaotic place, where 
anything could happen, where truthfulness and honest dealing were not the norm. 
Taking a role in public life could result in great wealth or great loss of wealth - 
due to the public building and infrastructure projects, public events, amusements 
and feasts that politicians were expected to fund. Only a relatively small 
I° Sharpies, Op. Cit., p 105 
H Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p94 
12 Ibid. 
13 Prior, Op. Cit., p214 
14 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., pp 94-95 
15 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p60 
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proportion of the aristocracy was involved in public life and the rest did not 
necessarily want to be involved. 16 
The Stoics created the term cosmopolis — mostly used in relation to Rome 
— meaning world-city and implying that Rome contained people and marvels from 
all over the world, as well as the notion that '[t]he world and the city of Rome 
occupy the same space'. 17 This concept suggested that citizens of Rome were 
citizens of the whole world; that the security of the city extended throughout the 
world; and that the whole world was managed 'as if it were one polls' . 18 
Nevertheless, the notion of cosmopolis did not entail the participatory rights and 
obligations that citizens had enjoyed in the pre-Imperial polls. 
Social conditions during the Hellenistic period were very different from 
the relatively stable and manageable conditions of the city-state. Ordinary 
individuals, pretty well wherever they lived in the various Hellenistic empires, 
had little or no personal security, although with money and no desire for personal 
power they could potentially live comfortably. While virtue had been self-
oriented in the previous periods - in the sense of requiring the honing of physical 
skills, intensive personal development and reflective voluntary choices - it was 
now also self-oriented in other ways. The social and political chaos that began 
with the upheaval of the later period of the Hellenistic Empires and continued 
with the centralisation of political decision-making in the Roman Empire gave 
rise to an enormous sense of social and political alienation. The Hellenistic focus 
on the moral individual who was isolated from the context of the city should not 
be thought of as individualism as we understand it today. Rather it was an 
16 Veyne, Op. Cit., pp 95-100 
70 
imposed, enforced, highly undesirable separation of the _individual from any 
useful intervention in the social and moral values of his city. Even the Stoic 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius experienced this sort of alienation and 'expressed 
feelings of impotence in the face of his subjects' inertia and lack of 
understanding'. I9 Nevertheless, Stoic virtue was — in line with traditional Greek 
thinking - a matter of living harmoniously with the universe and in friendship with 
one's loved ones. Stoic self-sufficiency was not a matter of living in complete 
isolation — either physically or emotionally, it was instead a matter of cultivating 
indifference to things that one could not control and having great love for one's 
friends. In a similar vein, the Epicureans avoided contact and participation with 
the general society, yet gave great value and attention to their own community in 
the Garden. 
In order to survive, actually and politically (it was very easy to lose one's 
life trying to intervene in decisions made by the central authorities), many 
individuals dedicated themselves to living relatively obscure rural lives and the 
management of their estates. This was not a replacement of the old moral sphere, 
but a reduction. In the previous period, the good management of one's home had 
been as morally important - although less publicly visible - as the good 
management of the polis. The Hellenistic situation could generally be construed 
as a retreat from public life and the corruption of the city, though by the Fourth 
Century CE and perhaps earlier, it was also a tactic for limiting attendance at 
17 Ovid, Fasti 2.684 quoted in Edwards Catherine and Woolf Greg, `Cosmopolis: Rome as World 
City', in Rome the Cosmopolis, Catherine Edwards and Greg Woolf Eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p 3 
18 Ibid. 
19 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p94 
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banquets and gatherings of the powerful. 2° Virtues now reflected the needs of 
small, friend-based communities and the antidote to these times was not fighting 
skills and heroism, citizenly leadership, orderliness and flexibility, but wisdom 
and endurance. The value placed on endurance was also a response to the long-
held view of the Greeks and Romans that their society was decadent — that is soft 
and extravagant - that people were generally unable to resist any luxury or 
lasciviousness. It was thought that this softness was dangerous to the survival of 
individuals and society at large. 21 The Stoic and Epicurean promotion of 
endurance, indifference and avoidance of 'false' pleasures seem to have been 
directly aimed at countering this perceived deep-seated threat to the future of their 
society. 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
The abandonment by the Cynics of all conventions and trappings of society was a 
deliberate rejection of their society's values and needs. At least this was the way 
it was commonly perceived by contemporary commentators and subsequent 
historians. However, given a context of the social chaos and dangers of the era, 
the Cynics could be seen as taking a positive and moral stand against the 
prevailing social and political values and circumstances. This stance could also 
be viewed as a means of enduring the social and political alienation that came 
from the effective removal of citizenship rights and the ability to make any 
practical contribution to the government and leadership of society. 
Likewise, the Epicureans were frequently criticised for refusing to 
participate in the public institutions that gave them security and other social 
20 Brown Peter, 'Late Antiquity' in A History of Private Life, Volume I, From Pagan Rome to 
Byzantium, Paul Veyne Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), p 274  
72 
benefits. However - aside from not being entirely true - given the circumstances_ 
of the time this criticism seems either unreasonable or a matter of expecting polis 
citizenship behaviours and attitudes in quite different circumstances. This was 
after all, an empire 'founded on and protected by violence'. 22 Centralisation of 
both political decision-making and the management of public institutions made a 
nonsense of democratic participation as it had been understood in Periclean 
Athens. . 'The Greeks always believed that surpassing strength and prowess were 
the natural basis of leadership: it was impossible to dissociate leadership and 
arete: 23 However, by the Hellenistic period, this association had been stretched 
almost to breaking point and only a subtle relationship between virtue and 
leadership remained. Virtue continued to be associated with gentlemanly 
standards that were not applicable to everyone and - as in Homer and throughout 
the history to date - 'the nobleman educates others by presenting to them an 
eternal ideal'.24 The Stoics and the Epicureans were deeply concerned with 
educating themselves and their adherents, and providing models for the others in 
their society. 
For the Stoics and Epicureans, exercises that promoted and enabled self-
awareness were essentially ethical - transforming the 'being, living, and seeing' of 
the individual. These widely practised exercises of care of the self required 
f 
awareness of one's moral state and would provide a tradition for what the 
Christians later called examination of the conscience. 25 
21 Veyne, Op. Cit., p 178 
22 Brown Peter, Op. Cit., p 246 
23 Jaeger Werner, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, Trans. Gilbert Highet, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1945), p 5 
24 Jaeger, Op. Cit., p 7 
25 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p 198 
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The pro-society quality of virtue 
The Hellenistic writers of this period - unlike their predecessors, but in common 
with the early Christians - had little to say about most of the particular virtues 
beyond the fact they existed and that they were associated with wisdom and/or 
endurance. Nussbaum offers an explanation for this when she says of the Stoics: 
We see here no positive concern for social justice, no generosity to one's fellow 
human beings, no courage for friends or country.... What courage can there be, 
if poverty, slavery, loss of loved ones, and even death are not to be counted 
evils and there is no fear to manage? What commitment to justice can there be, 
if the goods distributed within society have no real human worth? Again, what 
generosity? The only virtue that can exist here fully is, perhaps, sophrosune 
construed as knowing and keeping one's proper place in the scheme of things. 26 
This could readily be said of the Epicureans also, for when 'the good is easily 
obtained, the terrible easily endured' 27 there was perhaps little need for courage, 
justice or generosity. However, there were in fact identifiable virtues in this 
period, although they were certainly less vividly or comprehensively described 
than they were by the philosophers and dramatists of Periclean Athens. I would 
also disagree with Nussbaum on the matter of self-control or sophrosune — there 
was more to it than passively sticking to one's 'proper place'. Certainly Epictetus 
wrote: 'we must remember who we are and what is our title, and try to regulate 
our proper functions to suit the possibilities of our social relationships ...' 28 . 
However, self-control was also a matter of good discipline, seemliness, modesty 
and moderation29, qualities that were consistent with the traditional Greek 
insistence on the importance of this virtue. Self-control was necessary to: 
Epicurean management of desires; to Stoic cultivation of indifference; and to elite 
Roman notions of superiority demonstrated by highly controlled mental and 
26 Nussbaum Martha C., The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p470 
27 Sharpies, Op. Cit., p 7 
28 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.12, 15-19, quoted in Long and Sedley, Op. Cit., p425 
74 
physical deportment. However, Nussbaum may be technically correct, there 
seems to be an absence of specific and detailed discussion on self-control as a 
virtue per se. 
Sharples argues that Marcus Aurelius was encapsulating the whole 
Hellenistic philosophy when he wrote 'Just don't go on discussing what sort of 
person a good person ought to be; be one.' 3° This puts the absence of any detailed 
examination of the particular virtues in a different light from Nussbaum's and also 
explains the absence of theorising about a reductive essence for virtue in this 
period. The people of this era apparently wanted to give primacy to being 
virtuous, learning virtue, practising and habituating virtue, making writing about it 
or contemplating its essential meaning secondary. This suggests a return to an 
intensely practical approach to virtue, also perhaps evidenced by the wealth of 
material Hadot and Foucault draw on in their studies of techniques for care of the 
self. However, as we will see, this return to a less theoretical approach did not 
mean a return to Homeric virtues. The needs of Hellenistic communities were 
very different. 
The virtue of courage 
For the Stoics, courage was associated with endurance, confidence, high-
mindedness, cheerfulness and industriousness. These latter characteristics or 
behaviours seemed to be quite different things from Homeric bravery on the 
battlefield, or even Aristotle's bravery in the face of the fear of death, any death. 
Aristotle had implied that courage was more of a mental, internal thing than a 
physical display, but Hellenistic endurance did not necessarily involve managing 
a fear at all, rather going about one's business in an accepting and useful way. 
29 Long and Sedley, Op. Cit. p 373 
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The _need for management or even better, avoidance 	of fear - in such 
circumstances as the Hellenistic people found themselves in — is clear. Courage 
was also needed to assume and persist with a life of self-sufficiency and 
indifference to everything except moral intention.31 
The virtue of justice 
Epicurean justice was purely instrumental — a social contract designed to avoid 
personal disturbance and anxiety. The Stoics had little to say about justice per se, 
except that it was a matter of piety, honesty, equity and fair dealing, 32 and justice 
was 'the virtue of resisting the temptation to be partial to one's own cause.' 33 As 
Nussbaum argues in the passage quoted above, when there was no value placed in 
material goods and no evils to be feared, there was little requirement for anything 
other than a basic, instrumental justice. Prior writes that 
The polls was a form of social organization in which the individual could 
indeed make a difference, by arguing effectively in the assembly or by standing 
his ground in battle. In the Macedonian Empire this was no longer true. Only 
those close to the emperor could hope to influence public policy; others could 
only bear the consequences of decisions they had no role in shaping. 34 
In general, this was also the case for individuals living in the Roman Empire. 
When the individual could not influence the decisions of governments and 
administration, nor influence the justness of social institutions, this personal and 
instrumental sort of justice enabled the individual to avoid inappropriate risk-
taking and enabled those in power to get on with whatever they were doing. 
Furthermore, a centralised, despotic government could not survive or thrive if 
significant numbers of individuals insisted on seeing their own concept of justice 
done. 
" Marcus Aurelius, Against Catiline, 10.16, quoted in Sharpies, Op. Cit., p 132 
31  Veyne, Op. Cit., p45 
32 Long and Sedley, Op. Cit., pp 377-378 
33 Prior, Op. Cit., p 218 
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The virtue of piety 
As in the city-state, piety was most important as a means of social order - 
supporting the legal system in keeping the masses just and fair. 
[Roman religious cults] comprised no moral teaching. None the less social 
morality was thought to be linked with belief in the gods; take that away, said 
Cicero, and worship will be neglected, piety and religion will disappear, and 
then, (who knows?) good faith, human solidarity, and justice. 35 
By encouraging the individual who was not living a philosophical life to be just — 
or face the retribution of the gods - piety continued to be a relatively quiet, 
informal means of social order and stability. 
The virtue of humility 
There had always been a limit to Greek pride beyond which hubris lay, but the 
Stoics were the first in the Greek tradition to eschew pride altogether and make 
humility a virtue. The Manual of Epictetus contained many warnings against 
pride in one's possessions, one's eloquence, learning and learning ability, even 
one's choice of lifestyle. Prior asserts that [t]he reasoning behind this seems to 
be that it is unreasonable to take pride in things such as wealth and status that are 
not in our power and that taking pride in one's own attitudes, which are in one's 
power, conflicts with the ideal of detachment.' 36 Another way to interpret this 
virtue is that whereas personal possessions, good taste and magnificence might 
have contributed to the glory of the Empire, they did not contribute to the glory of 
Epicurean and Stoic communities. Even eloquence — so long a matter of citizenly 
importance and pride - was peripheral when one could not influence political 
34 Prior, Op. Cit., pp 195-196 
35 Brunt P. A., 'Philosophy and Roman Religion' in Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy 
and Roman Society, Eds. Griffin Miriam and Barnes Jonathan, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
pp 178-179 
36 Prior, Op. Cit., p219 
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decisions. Furthermore, if one's lifestyle was counter to the values of those in 
power, then pride was not just inappropriate, but downright dangerous. 
The virtue of cheerfulness 
Aristotle's anger management virtue of good humour was discarded by the Stoics 
in favour of cheerfulness — a very different matter. For Aristotle, good humour 
was a strategy associated with leadership and anger management. One could be 
angry for the right reasons, toward the right person, for the right duration of time 
— otherwise one should be good humoured. For the Stoics, cheerfulness was the 
face one put on acceptance and endurance of all things, including those things that 
incited anger and those things that seemed neutral. In other words, there were no 
good reasons or occasions for the Stoic to be angry and Aristotle's good humour 
virtue was redundant. This seems to be an appropriate strategy. Displaying anger 
was highly dangerous if the individual had no social or political power - it did not 
obstruct the progress of a despotic, centralised government; nor did it resolve the 
social and political alienation of the individual living in the Empire. Moreover, if 
one happened to be in a position of power, then cheerful acceptance and 
endurance were an admirable and useful leadership style. 
The virtue of friendship 
Friendship was an important Hellenistic virtue for Stoics and Epicureans. Ancient 
clzaris — reciprocity of gifts and favours, and mutual benefit — were evident and 
there was (not surprisingly) a close connection between friendship and wisdOm. 37 
'The man of noble character is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship. Of 
these the former is a mortal good, but the latter is immortal.' 38 However, how 
could friendship be so important to the Epicureans when it risked the disturbance 
37 Sharples, Op. Cit., p 119 
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of tranquillity? It was understood that the benefits of friendship outweighed the 
risks and furthermore, Epicureans did not have the view that it was possible or 
desirable to avoid all risks, merely that they should be minimised and chosen 
carefully. For Epicureans, friendship was seen to bring a long term, mutual 
pleasure — one of the right sorts of pleasure. 39 The Stoics also considered 
friendship and wisdom to be closely connected. With echoes of Aristotle, they 
considered friendship to exist only between virtuous people and a matter of the 
'sharing of life's wherewithal' and of treating others as ourselves. 40 In general, 
Hellenistic friendship was central to the sense of community, and it was not 
limited to relationships between equals. There were many unequal friendships as 
well, for instance between patrons and clients who trusted in a future and not 
necessarily well-defined reciprocity.41 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
The Hellenistic motivations for being virtuous continued to be associated with 
perceptions of the purpose of human life. For the Epicureans this telos was a 
proper human pleasure, controlled and modified by wisdom and temperance. For 
the Stoics, the human telos was a proper function, a balance between natural 
impulse and appropriateness. 42 Epicureans were therefore motivated to be 
virtuous because virtue was the means to their idea of the good human life — 
enjoying the right sort of pleasures. Stoics were motivated to be virtuous because 
virtue was the means to living a balanced, natural and appropriate life. Each of 
these motivations entailed a survival strategy for dealing with the social and 
38 Long and Sedley, Op. Cit., p 126 
39 Sharples, Op. Cit., pp 119-120 
Diogenes Laertius, 7.124 quoted in Long and Sedley, Op. Cit., p 432 
41 Veyne, Op. Cit., pp 103-105 
42 Diogenes Laertius, 7.108-9 in Long and Sedley, Op. Cit., p361 
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political chaos, uncertainty, unreliability and the lack of personal power for most 
citizens of the time. 
However, clearly, the adoption of the values of any of the Hellenistic 
schools also meant that the individual was withdrawing, to a lesser or greater 
extent, physically, emotionally or both — from public life and the wider society. 
Maclntyre argues that Stoicism was a response to the loss of community — 
because the polis no longer existed. 43 I offer an alternative view for 
consideration. The Stoics and Epicureans retained a central place for virtue by 
redefining it and the boundaries and nature of community, given the loss of the 
polis and in response to the Empire in which they found themselves. I would 
argue that this withdrawal actually enabled the centralised Roman Empire and 
empire-building activity to flourish - without the hindrance of intervention by 
individual citizens and without the costs of varying local institutions and 
reinventing wheels. This is not to say that the Schools endorsed the values of the 
Roman Empire — the Epicureans, Sceptics and Cynics certainly did not and the 
endurance and indifference of the Stoics implied an arms-length sort of 
participation and endorsement. It could well be that this Imperial society would 
not have grown and flourished, in the way it did, if everyone demanded their old 
citizenship rights to virtuously participate in public decision-making. 
Furthermore, the Roman Empire had significant success at colonising the known 
world. People were sent to live in strange foreign countries and were required to 
survive considerable martial, political and social challenges. The definition of 
excellence in this era was exactly what the Empire needed to achieve such success 
—. a willingness to cope with great difficulties through personal tranquillity, 
43 Maclntyre (1984), Op. Cit., pp 169-170 
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endurance, and an overarching intention of avoiding ot overcoming fear. The 
ethics and virtues of the Hellenistic period present us with the first human 
response to life in a large, complex society where individuals had little or no 
control, power or influence over social, economic and political decisions and 
events. The Hellenistic development of ethical systems that focused on 
endurance, acceptance and personal tranquillity in a social situation that was 
fraught with chaos, complexity and remote autocratic decision making, suggests 
that the Hellenistic virtues transformed individuals into the type of people that 
Hellenistic society needed. People who cultivated courage and endurance, self-
control and moderation, wisdom and indifference, to be practised quietly, with 
humility and no insistence on power or personal rights, were exactly what the 
Roman Empire needed to thrive. 
HoweVer, before the end of this period and well before the end of the 
Empire, a new phenomenon — Christianity — began to change the face of virtue 
again. As we will see in the next chapter, perhaps despite common perceptions, 
this was not a whole new system of virtue or morality. Jewish values and ideas, 
Hellenistic influences on contemporary Jewish thought and (in particular) Stoic 
ideas will be remarkably visible and significant in the early Christian practice and 
understanding of virtue. 
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THE EARLY CHURCH — ASSERTING MORAL DIFFERENCE 
Making morals means making community. 
WAYNE A. MEEKS 1 
The development of the relationship between society and virtue entered a new 
phase with the early Christian era. Not only were the notions of virtue and the 
particular virtues that were valued important to the success of these communities, 
but the very existence of a morality that was perceived to be radically different 
was crucial to the attraction of Christianity and the cohesion and development of 
its communities. Curiously, this view of significant difference between Christian 
morality and the moral codes of everyone else was widely accepted, even though 
most of the ideas and values incorporated into that morality were a synthesis of 
older ideas and values. 2 Furthermore, there never was a clear cut, singular, 
universally accepted definition of what Christian morality entailed. 3 
This era spanned about the first four hundred years of Christianity from 
the Gospels and the letters of St. Paul, through the beginnings of the 
institutionalised church to St. Augustine. Early Christian morality was an 
amalgam of Jewish, Stoic, Cynic and Platonic (or Neo-Platonic) concepts, 
complicated or perhaps facilitated by the Hellenisation of Jewish morals and 
thinking during the proceding two centuries. 
We find in this era that the elements of the relationship between virtue and 
societal flourishing have shifted again. The general relationship bears many 
Meeks Wayne A., The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries, (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1993), p 5 
2 Meeks, Op. Cit., p 84 
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resemblances to that of the Hellenistic era, which is_not surprising as the Roman 
Empire spanned both these periods. Nevertheless, the early Christian movement 
created a new focus for virtue, redefined the particular virtues, redefined the 
human telos and what leads to happiness, and created or re-prioritised motivations 
for people to be virtuous. There were many discussions among the early 
Christians about the unity of the virtues - in charity - and the dependence of all the 
other virtues on charity was clearly important. However, there were also several 
particular virtues that were vitally important in their own right — notably faith and 
humility. This suggests that being fairly single-minded was essential to the 
survival of early Christian communities (as it had been to the Hellenistic schools 
which were single-minded about wisdom and endurance), but so was being 
different from mainstream — that is Hellenistic — ideas about virtue. There was 
not one single, clear-cut moral vision held by all Christians, even in this earliest 
phase, but there was universal acceptance of their difference and their alienation 
from the rest of society.4 Certainly there was universal belief among Christians 
that they were 'chosen ones' and that they were acting on God's orders, but what 
this entailed, how it was to be interpreted and implemented was by no means 
universally agreed. Theological and moral education was central to the early 
Christian development of community and identity. Some of the most important 
virtues in this period involved new ways of thinking about personal and 
communal identity and behaviour — such as charity, faith and humility - while 
others were directly linked to communal survival — such as hospitality and 
almsgiving. The scope of the relationship between society and virtue continued to 
be confined to the individual within a small community. This was consistent with 
3 Meeks, Op. Cit., pp 215-216 
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the general Hellenistic situation, but the importance of friendship had 
metamorphosed into a concept to do with love of God, fellowship with the faithful 
and an impersonal love of humanity. The motivations for virtue continued to be 
teleological, although the Christian idea of the human telos involved a new way of 
achieving happiness. Nevertheless, we should remember that the Stoics and 
Epicureans had also developed new ideas about the human purpose so the 
Christians could be seen as part of a general trend. The early Christians practised 
private exercises in the tradition of care of the self, and supplemented them with 
public exercises of admonition, shunning, penance and so on. 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
One of the most interesting things about the Christian style of virtue was — as we 
shall see — that it was understood to contribute to general social stability as well as 
the orderliness, stability and flourishing of their own communities. Furthermore, 
it was a crucial means of survival for the embryonic Church as a whole. The 
differentiation of their moral vision from that of mainstream Greek and Roman 
ethics was exactly what attracted converts, fed their sense of alienation and 
provided cohesion for the new, developing communities. The fact that outsiders 
were aware of this differentiation and alienation, and treated it with hostility, 
added fuel to the process of community building. 
The early Christian era was the first time in the Western tradition that 
religion and ethics became intertwined and inseparable. For the ancients, as I 
have mentioned previously, religion and ethics were separate. The early 
4 Even in cases where an unbiased observer might find very small differences in fact, the 
perceptions of difference produce hostility and conflict.' Meeks, Op. Cit., p 179 
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Christians understood their religion and morality to be inseparable — and indeed 
superior - because their morality imitated the virtues of God. 
Since Christianity enjoins upon its believers the virtues ofjustice, self-control, 
frugality, and conjugal fidelity, its morality, Augustine insists, is far superior to 
that described and extolled in pagan writings about the gods. If men imitate 
these deities, they are rendered 'depraved' and 'unfit to be good members of 
society' 5 
However, as we have seen in the history to date, Greek and Roman virtue had not 
usually aimed at imitation of the gods, but at achievement of an ideal of human 
excellence. 
There were additional reasons for the inseparability of Christian ethics and 
religion. God and Jesus had revealed the moral rules, and there was a unity 
between God, Jesus, charity and virtue. For instance, in various writings 
Augustine said that God was the perfect good and the source of all virtue, that 
Jesus Christ was a virtue and the source of virtues, and that charity was the 
essence of all virtues.6 He also stated that virtue was 'a mental disposition 
consistent with nature and reason' 7 - which sounds very Stoic - however for 
Augustine, reason meant faith in the revelations of God and Jesus and nature 
meant behaviour in accordance with those same revelations. Furthermore, the 
ancient religion — unlike ancient philosophy and Christianity — had not been 'a 
way of life that included all of existence and all of inner life' . 8 Ancient religion 
had operated in a quite different sphere and had not competed with philosophy 
and ethics at all. By contrast, Christianity - for the first time in the Western 
tradition - offered a whole philosophy of life. The Christians would argue it was 
5 Deane Herbert A., The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine, (New York and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1963), p85 
6 Deane, Op. Cit., p83, Osborn Eric, Ethical Patterns in Early Christian Thought, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp 136 and 175, and Portalie Eugene, A Guide to the Thought 
of Saint Augustine, Trans. Ralph J. Bastian, (London: Burns & Oates, 1960), pp 272-273 
7 On 83 diverse questions, 3.1.1, quoted in Osborn, Op. Cit., p 147 
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the only true philosophy and it included all the informal mechanisms for social 
control and order that philosophies in previous eras had provided. This link 
between Christian virtue and social order was recognised at the time. For 
instance, Justin insisted that good (presumably Roman) rulers should welcome 
Christians. 
[M]ore than all other people we are your supporters and allies in maintaining 
public order. We believe, you see, that it is impossible for a wrong-doer or a 
greedy person or a conspirator - or a virtuous person - to hide from God, and 
everyone is headed for either eternal punishment or eternal salvation, depending 
on the merit of one's deeds. 9 
Of course, the differentiation between Christian ethics and the ethics of their 
contemporaries was not simply a case of fearing hell-fire and damnation. Meeks 
reports that the early Christian virtues were described in the language of Greek 
high culture"). They consisted in virtues that had been previously included in lists 
by Jews, Romans and Greeks." Virtues were presented in the form of moral 
aphorisms, precepts and commands, discourses — on household management, 
friendship and so on - and letters, all of which were common to the Greeks and 
Romans. I2 Yet, Christian ethics were perceived by converts and outsiders alike as 
being so different as to result in aggression and discord. 13 It has been suggested 
that what was different was in fact the urgency with which the Christians adopted 
and practised their virtues. I4 We can also see that the availability of Christian 
virtue to people from every social stratum and ethnic background was a 
significant means of differentiating Christianity from the traditional elitism of 
Greek virtue and Roman virtue. Indeed, Augustine pointed out that 'Christianity 
8 Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., p272 
9 Apology, 12:1-2 quoted in Meeks, Op. Cit., pp 175-176 
l° Meeks, pp 30-31 
" Meeks, pp 71-83 
12 Meeks, p 77 
13 Meeks, p 179 
14 Peter Brown, Op. Cit., p260 
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has the same content as Platonism... but only Christianity has been able to make 
the masses adopt this way of life.' 15 
The early Christians propounded ethics that they and everyone else 
perceived as separating them from the larger society. This was arguably another 
manifestation of the social and political alienation experienced by the Hellenists 
and discussed in the previous chapter. However, the Christians also chose to see 
themselves as 'resident aliens' — inhabiting the Imperial state, but asserting loyalty 
to God and the Kingdom of Heaven. I6 Furthermore, examination of the surviving 
documents from the earliest times of Christianity shows that almost all of them: 
were concerned with the proper, moral behaviour of converts; were addressed to 
communities (not individuals); and were aimed at promoting the development of 
those communities. I7 In other words, for the early Christians the construction of 
morals and the construction of community were the same process. I8 
According to the early Christians, reason, wisdom, virtue and the virtues 
were not ideas to be analysed and defined — they were commands and promises 
made by God. I9 In addition, Jesus had given commands, such as 'love others as I 
have loved you' and 'follow me'. Thus the source and nature of wisdom, 
reasoning and values changed in this period - from humans thinking and 
developing ideas, definitions and concepts, finding moral wisdom within 
themselves and aspiring to a human ideal - to God revealing commands and 
values and humans being required to believe and obey. Whereas God and Jesus 
were understood to be perfectly wise, wisdom lost its place as the foremost human 
virtue when St. Paul claimed that: 
15 Hadot (2002), pp 251-252 
16 Meeks, pp 30-31 
17 Meeks, p 5 
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[N]othing of value exists without love... Knowledge is imperfect and will be 
superseded.... Love is the summing up of the law... Love is the realm of God's 
grace which is prior to the faith of the believer and makes that faith possible. 
Sacrificial love for others is the core of Christian behaviour... 20 
That ethics and wisdom were revealed by God and Jesus to their chosen people 
was another source of differentiation, solidarity and community cohesiveness. In 
addition, the divinity of moral laws was a source of a Hellenistic like tranquillity. 
Clement of Alexandria asserted that: '[t]he divine law must inspire fear, so that 
the philosopher may acquire and conserve peace of mind, thanks to prudence and 
attention to himself.' 21 Just as tranquillity was an entirely appropriate Stoic and 
Epicurean strategy for coping with the chaos, fearfulness, difficulties, and 
individual lack of political power in the Empire, so it was for the Christians. The 
early Christians were — by virtue of their minority social status - even more 
powerless and vulnerable than the Epicurean and Stoic Greeks and Romans. 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
Education, self and public examination, and personal development — crucial to the 
acquisition of virtue in the past, but now involving some new techniques and 
adaptations of old ones - were central to the conversion process in particular and 
the ongoing practice of Christianity in general. At the same time, there was a 
notion of what we might call 'instant virtue', that was available through God's 
grace and the conversion and baptism rituals. The conversion process was 
understood to have a transformational effect on the individual's morality and this 
was not new either. The idea that a moral transformation was achieved through 
conversion had been common in Judaism for some time. For instance, Philo 
wrote about Jewish conversion that: 
18 Ibid. 
19 Osborn, Op. Cit., p 22 
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The proselytes become at once temperate, continent, modest, gentle, kind, 
humane, serious, just, high-minded, truth-lovers, superior to the desire for 
money and pleasure, just as conversely the rebels from the holy laws are seen to 
be incontinent, shameless, unjust, frivolous, petty-minded, quarrelsome, friends 
of falsehood and perjury...22 
This idea of transformation is interesting and raises many questions. Why were 
people seeking an instant transformation, which would have been inconceivable to 
their predecessors in Western civilisation and, for instance, their Stoic 
contemporaries? On the other hand, if they were not actively seeking it, why was 
virtue presented as such? Was the Hellenistic life of reflection perceived as too 
difficult, too unattainable, too time consuming, too elitist? The fact is that early 
Christian converts underwent rigorous selection, induction and educational 
processes prior to their formal acceptance into the Church. These processes 
aimed at weeding out people from inappropriate professions and backgrounds, 
and then providing comprehensive moral training for the successful candidates. 
Why the notion of a transformative ritual would be viewed as necessary in these 
circumstances seems unclear. However, it does seem clear that both of these 
processes — the lengthy educational one and the quick transformational one — were 
conducive to making people feel part of a special community, different and 
separate from others. The sense of community was further entrenched by the 
ambience of 'secret' meetings under the symbol of the fish. 
These selection and conversion processes were all part of keeping the 
community pure and enabled St. Paul and others to exaggerate the moral 
differences between Christians and others. Conversion was intended to 
`stigmatiz[e] "the world" being left and to distinguish the sacred space being 
20 Osborn, Op. Cit., pp 34-35 
21 Stromata,11, 20, 120 quoted in 1-Iadot (2002), Op. Cit., p241 
22 On the Virtues, 181-82 quoted in Meeks, Op. Cit., p30 
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entered.' 23 Likewise, the ritual of baptism — being washed clean of the rest of the ____ 
world - was a powerful means of generating an individual sense of transformation 
and a sense of communal solidarity. 
This sense of a separate moral community was, of course, not entirely 
new. The Epicureans were notable for forming 'intentional and highly structured 
communities, and it is in them that we find the closest social analogy, at least 
among the philosophical schools.. •,24•  However, the Christian communities were 
of a scale — in terms of numbers of communities, not size of individual 
communities — and style that was new. The early Christians formed many tiny 
communities that depended on the private space and hospitality of a patron — the 
householder who provided a house where the community could meet. Being 
unable — because of their minority status and exposure to hostility and violence - 
to make use of public space and facilities, the Christian communities were, from 
the first, established on a structure of reciprocity and mutual trust. 25 The people 
offering their homes were providing patronage and the rest were obliged to 
respect and receive that patronage. These people were (almost exclusively) not of 
the class that traditionally held or owned patronage. They were distant from the 
decurial class (that normally could offer Roman patronage) but were imitating the 
conventional honour-dependence patron-client mode1. 26 However, there was 
some disagreement among Christians as to whether such traditional Greek/Roman 
social structures were to be respected. Should they be encouraged - as leading to 
civic harmony and avoidance of strife - or should they be avoided because 'unity 
of the church will be attained not by practice of civic virtues, but by isolation and 
23  Meeks, Op. Cit., p 33 
24  Meeks, Op. Cit., p26 
25  Meeks, Op. Cit., p45 
26  Meeks, Op. Cit., p46 
90 
purity'.27 It _appears this question was never resolved and was ultimately 
overtaken by the development of the institutional Church effectively making the 
question redundant. 
The pro-society quality of virtue 
The virtue of charity 
The notion of charity was a principal means of integrating Christian religion and 
virtue, it defined the Christian notion of the human telos, and it was a prominent 
means of creating, maintaining and controlling communities. As a virtue, charity 
was the habit of loving well, of loving one's neighbour as oneself. It was also an 
act of religious piety — loving God — and through this love achieving what was 
understood in this period to be the telos of all humans — union with God. The 
telos of union with God was approached in a variety of ways — imitation of God's 
virtues, love of God, being the recipient of God's grace, and ultimately attaining 
Heaven following judgment by God. Thus, the telos of union with God was 
intricately bound up with methods of achieving virtue and the motivation for 
being virtuous. The early Christian understanding of charity was also a means of 
re-framing the question of what constituted the good of human life. Augustine 
said `[w]hen we ask how good a man is we do not ask what he believes or hopes 
but what he loves.' 28 This ignored the fact that until the advent of Christianity, 
the calculation of good in a person was never concerned with beliefs or hopes, but 
only how the person acted, particularly in respect of family and community. 
Presumably though, love would have similar consequences as virtuous acts 
toward family and community. 
27 Meeks, Op. Cit., pp 46-47 
28 Augustine, Enchiridon on Faith, Hope, and Charity, 31.117; 32.121 quoted in Burt Donald X., 
Friendship and Society: An Introduction to Augustine's Practical Philosophy, (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), p 47  
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Charity can also be understood as a re-framing and combining of several 
ancient virtues and moral concepts. Love of one's neighbour bore a strong 
resemblance to various Greek virtues such as friendliness, justice and friendship. 
Love of God echoed the very ancient maxim 'Honour the gods' and the virtue of 
piety, especially as Socrates had envisaged it. Love of oneself could be seen as a 
reworking of care of the self, especially when we remember that care of the self 
implied care for others as well. Even love of enemies - while it must have seemed 
a strange notion to many Greeks and Romans - would have been comprehensible 
to Socrates for instance. The Christian bundling of these four values into the 
virtue of charity provided a powerful tool, not just for community building, but 
for social control, order and flourishing as well. 
The virtue of faith 
In' this era, faith subsumed the old important intellectual virtue of wisdom and 
knowledge. Faith - unlike the intellectual virtues as described by Aristotle 29 - was 
a habit and it was a habitual way of thinking that counteracted reason, preceded 
reason and was reason itself. 
Faith is a knowledge of those things which cannot otherwise be understood. 
Except you believe you will not understand. Greeks look down on faith but 
without faith there can be no knowledge of higher things. Faith becomes 
knowledge, a knowledge which is a habit and can stand up against reason and 
argument.... Faith anticipates, faith is an act of will, faith understands in 
advance.3° 
Nevertheless, Clement used Aristotle's demonstration that 'all proof depends on 
an unprovable first premise' as an argument for faith being rational, necessary and 
not merely opinion. 31  Faith was, I would argue, the glue for Christianity. It 
enabled the intertwining of religion and ethics through the understanding that 
29 For whom intellectual virtues such as wisdom and knowledge were learned through education 
rather than habituation. See Aristotle (1998b), Op. Cit., 1103a11-1103a15 
3° Osborn, Op. Cit., p 69 
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moral rules were revealed, thus making Christianity a whole way of life. It gave 
converts the sense of being different, of being chosen, and of being part of a 
special community. It was necessary to have faith in order to love God and be 
charitable, and thus was a means to the social control and flourishing that came 
with charity. 
The virtue of humility 
Death by crucifixion was designed to be the most shameful punishment possible. 
For the central figure in a religious movement to be revered and respected, this 
official and profound shaming needed to be transformed into a virtue. Christian 
humility consisted in despising the conventions, believing Jesus to be God, 
refusing to recant, and emulating, patterning or modelling oneself on Jesus. 32 
Humility was shown by taking the lowest seat at a meal; wearing simple clothing; 
quietness and moderation; and it could only be practised within a community. 
One could not live alone and care for others or come last. To follow Jesus' 
pattern, one needed brothers with feet to wash. Imitation of a god was great 
hubris and arrogance according to the Greek way of thinking. However, the early 
Christians redefined humility and pride on the grounds that Jesus had come down 
from heaven to take the form of a man, conforming in humble obedience to God's 
will and then dying for others. Nonetheless, Christian humility did not mean 
avoiding self-praise. Augustine said: 
[T]here is nothing wrong in praising ourselves as long as we praise ourselves as 
the work of God, praising ourselves not because we are this or that kind of 
person but because we are God's creation, praising ourselves not because we 
have this or that gift but because God works through our gifts (whatever they 
are) to accomplish his purpose in the world... 33 
31 Osborn, Op. Cit., p 70 
32 Meeks, Op. Cit., pp 86-88 
33 Burt, Op. Cit., p 50 
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This perspective on humility also connected with the_notion of being God's 
chosen ones. Humility and praising oneself for being created by God reinforced 
community spirit and increased the sense of alienation and difference from 
everyone else. Then there was the militant suffering component of humility, so 
admired by early Christians. 
The simplest virtues - sexual purity, a quiet life, regular attendance on the 
rituals of the group, obedience to leaders - become heroic in a world where the 
devil plots to destroy the faith and employs the very pillars of the dominant 
society in his ultimately futile attack upon the people of God. 34 
Being God's creation was a matter for self-praise and being humble was 
justification for thinking oneself heroic — and to feel heroic when one was part of 
apolitically powerless social minority would have been attractive indeed. 
The redefining of the boundaries, questions and language of virtue and 
ethics was most clearly visible in discussions on charity, faith and humility. 
These redefinitions enabled the early Christians to assert their moral difference 
and to perceive themselves as a new race of people - aliens living in a foreign 
world while they waited to be admitted to their own Kingdom in Heaven. 
The virtue of almsgiving 
The Christian virtue of almsgiving was a very different matter from the generosity 
of Aristotle's high-minded gentleman. For one thing, 'ordinary people with no 
great wealth but out of each week's income should, not just in one grand gesture, 
but little by little, systematically gather what money could be spared...' . 
money was not just for local needy people or local church expenses, but was sent 
great distances for people ('brothers' and 'saints') who would never be seen by 
the almsgivers. The practice of almsgiving is thought to have been closely 
34 Meeks, Op. Cit., p 88 
35 Meeks, Op. Cit., p 107 
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connected with — indeed a primary driver for - the institutionalisation of the 
Church36. I would note, however that this Christian virtue originated in Judaism 
where there was no parallel institutionalisation, nor was there in Buddhism which 
also had a strong tradition of almsgiving. So perhaps it was not the practice as 
such, but the type of people engaged in the practice and their particular objectives. 
Christian almsgiving created a major power base for bishops in large cities who 
had control and administration of the offerings, which could be withheld or passed 
on to the poor. Almsgiving also required significant co-ordination between 
churches and communities in widely spread locations. Unlike all the other 
Christian virtues, almsgiving was not commanded by God or Jesus and was 
viewed as voluntary — although in view of the habituation of church ritual, and the 
public nature of the offering, it was perhaps difficult to avoid volunteering. 
Furthermore, almsgiving was perceived as an imitation of Christ who 'though he 
was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be 
rich.' 37 Christ's impoverishment was not to do with earthly wealth, but with 
giving up his heavenly riches to come down to the world in obedience to God. 
The funding and support of distant missions, the institutionalisation of the Church, 
to say nothing of the growing wealth of the Church, achieved through almsgiving, 
was crucial to the success of the early Christian movement and indeed, its long-
term survival. 
The monastic or ascetic virtues 
The monastic or ascetic virtues of poverty and obedience, linked with 
mortification, humility, self-control and detachment from the world were 
described and propounded by Basil the Great around the mid to late Fourth 
36 Meeks, Op. Cit., p 108 
37 2 Corinthians 8:9 
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Century CE.38 These virtues came with several worrying double standards. First, 
that there was an appearance of one morality for monks and another for the laity. 
This was not Basil's intention; rather there was to be one morality with two paths 
- a path of perfection and a lower way - with a parallel in the elite virtue of Plato's 
philosophers. Basil drew on this philosophical ideal, but at the same time saw it 
as a dilemma because he wanted one church and no mediocrity. 39 Second, while 
monastic poverty meant lack of ownership by the individual monk, it certainly did 
not necessitate a lack of wealth and material goods for the monastic community - 
goods that would then be enjoyed by the residents. Third, while monks might 
have viewed themselves as a community detached from worldly business, they 
still needed food, shelter, clothing and so on, and this required either some level 
of worldly effort on their part or reliance on worldly people outside the monastic 
community. Indeed, supporting a local monastery that espoused un-worldliness 
was often an important defming activity and responsibility for a 'worldly' 
community. 
Basil wanted all Christians, not just monks, to practice asceticism, to 
renounce Worldly possessions, relationships and behaviours. He saw asceticism 
as an alternative to martyrdom - the only two ways of renouncing all connections 
to present life and being ready for being with God. 4° Osborn remarks that 
'However much we may admire the spirit and heroism of Basil and the early 
ascetics, we should remember that their contribution was neither distinctly 
Christian nor ultimately harmless.'" Yet arguably, Basil's ascetic vision 
fundamentally shaped Christian morals. The ascetic virtue that was always 
38 Osborn, Op. Cit., pp 97-98 
39 Osborn, Op. Cit., pp 110-111 
40 Osbom, Op. Cit., pp 92-94 
41 Osbom, Op. Cit., p 112 
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required of everyone was the virtue of obedience - which may in fact have been 
the. most important virtue for the survival of the early Church and indeed its 
survival for the next twelve centuries or so. The virtue of obedience placed an 
inviolable prohibition on the questioning of any virtue, value, dogma or decision 
made in the name of God or the Church. Whereas an absence of charity would be 
difficult to prove and punish — no one could say what love existed in another's 
heart - an absence of obedience was clear and much more easily policed. Making 
a virtue of obedience ensured that the Church had control over everyone within 
what would eventually become an empire spanning most of the known world. 
The virtue of self-control 
Self-control or continence was another important Christian virtue. This is because 
self-control was the antidote to lust, for writers such as Augustine, a generic term 
for sin, not limited to sexual concerns but including lust for material goods 
(greed), lust for honour (pride) etc. Self-control was also concerned with 
language, money, eating and drinking, although Augustine's view was that self-
control was a matter of controlling the heart not just the lips'. Nevertheless, the 
connection between self-control and sexual behaviour was extremely close. 
Clement for instance considered marriage to be a more ideal state than celibacy 
because it provided more opportunities for practising self-control and more trials 
to overcome." Self-control, was a Christian means of informal social order and 
behavioural control — in the absence of a police force and complex legal and 
judicial systems —just as it always had been in the previous eras of the history of 
virtue. 
42 Osborn, Op. Cit., p 163 
43 Osborn, Op. Cit., p 64 
97 
The virtue offriendship 
Friendship was a virtue in the early Christian catalogue, but it was a remarkably 
different concept from the friendship of the Stoics and Epicureans. Early 
Christians clearly thought of themselves as brothers, but they were exhorted by 
people such as Basil not to have individual, affectionate friendships or personal 
relationships. The personal reliance and reciprocity of Greek and Roman 
friendship was replaced by friendship as a sense of community, both among 
people within a local church and with people the Christian might never meet. 
Friendship was an important virtue for Augustine because of its potential to create 
the ideal sort of society he envisaged. 
In all their societies they would aim at creating the elements crucial for 
friendship: a knowledge that could be the basis for mutual understanding and 
trust, a concern for the good of the other, a unity of heart with each other and 
with God that would truly make their society to be 'one out of many'. Of 
course, the size of the society would be an obstacle to true friendship with 
everyone. But they would try to love others, if not as actual friends, at least in 
order that they might become friends. They would be so open to others that 
they would consider no one to be a stranger, realizing that all people are 
members of the one human family." 
In other words, this was a concept of friendship that did not require people to be 
friends or even know each other. Augustine had a dream of a 'truly ordered 
society' and he saw Christian friendship as the means to unity, order and concord 
between all strata of people.45 
The virtue of hospitality 
With both a symbolic and a practical function, the early Christian virtue of 
hospitality reminded individuals of their identity as God's people and made the 
travelling ministries of prophets and apostles feasible. 46 Hospitality was a Jewish 
and Middle Eastern traditional virtue and although it had disappeared from the 
44 Burt, Op. Cit., p 146 
45 Burt, Op. Cit., p 149 
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Greek virtue catalogues_since the Homeric era, it seems clear that it had remained 
as one of the basic social mores. However, the early Christians changed the 
definition of this virtue too. Withholding hospitality was recommended as a 
'weapon in disputes over right belief and proper behaviour'. 47 Christians were 
exhorted not to provide hospitality to purveyors of other beliefs or to people who 
stayed more than one day (unless in need) or who asked for money. 48 The idea 
that a virtue should be withheld as a weapon or limited to a very short period of 
time seems questionable, but there we are. 
The virtue of courage 
Courage was only occasionally mentioned as a Christian virtue although clearly it 
was required of travelling apostles and preachers, as well as the martyrs. In the 
middle of the Second Century, Justin wrote in his Apology that 
Previously, while devoted to Plato's doctrines, he had heard the Christians 
slandered, but when he saw their fearlessness in the face of death and other 
threats, he recognized that the slanders must be false. For no 'pleasure lover or 
dissolute person or cannibal' ever showed such indifference to death. 49 
Courage had not been highlighted as a major virtue by the Hellenistic Schools 
though it had been necessary to be courageous if one was to commit to a (non-
Imperial) philosophical way of life. The early Christians appeared consistent with 
their peers and immediate predecessors in this matter. We might argue that 
courage was redundant — as a virtue - if one had absolute faith in an omnipotent 
God or one felt more attached to the Kingdom of Heaven and the next life than to 
this place and earthly life. On the other hand, courage was implicit in the heroism 
and suffering of martyrs. The physical hardship of the monk's witness was also 
seen as courageous and heroic. Then there was the courage it took all early 
46 Meeks, Op. Cit., p 105 
47 Meeks, Op. Cit., p 106 
48 Ibid., referring to 2 John 10 and the Didache 
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Christians to believe and bear witness to what were perceived as radically new 
ideas, while surrounded by a hostile prevailing culture. Interestingly, there is a 
suggestion that the faith of martyrs could not be questioned, because it would 
require too great a paradox to think that people who were so courageous could 
have wrong beliefs. 50 
The virtue of justice 
Like their Hellenistic contemporaries and predecessors, the early Christians had a 
fairly practical and uncomplicated view of justice — it was a matter of equity and 
fair dealing. What early Christianity added to the concept of justice was a sense 
of benevolence, of wanting to do justice because of love for both friends and 
enemies. 51 Unsurprisingly, Augustine had very Socratic ideas about justice. A 
Christian 'does not return evil for evil, since to do so would be to make himself 
evil and unjust.' Justice had been commanded by God, but the early Christian 
also understood that 'nothing one's enemies can do can harm his soul' and one's 
soul was one's most precious possession. 52 We need to note however, that the 
early Christians had even less authority or power to influence justice in their 
world than the Stoics and Epicureans. They lived as a minority within the hostile 
Imperial society and for the most part could only experience justice as it was done 
to them. The notion of justice as a virtue that embodied benevolence to others, 
even enemies was therefore yet another feature of their moral differentiation from 
the people around them and their community building. 
49 Meeks, Op. Cit., p 20 
93 Rousseau Philip, The Early Christian Centuries, (London, New York: Longman/Pearson 
Education, 2002), p 166 
51 Deane, Op. Cit., p 83 
52 Deane, Op. Cit., p 84 
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The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
Early Christians were motivated to be virtuous by a number of mostly public and 
community oriented practices. It was expected that conversion and baptism had 
been morally transforming. The socialisation or habituation that came from 
Christian sacraments and rituals, as well as the public admonitions, shunning and 
shaming practices that were part of Church attendance were also expected to 
motivate the individual to be virtuous. Then there was the motivation of God's 
policing of behaviour and the consequent rewards and punishments after death — 
which if not a public process as such, was a publicly shared belief. 
Conversion and baptism rituals were certainly influential experiences for 
'taking off vices - like taking off clothes - and leaving one free to be virtuous. 53 
The ritual of the Eucharist was an opportunity for admonishing or shunning 
people whose behaviour was not acceptable. For instance, it was expected that 
people would not profane the sacraments or expose the community to discord, by 
not patching up quarrels beforehand. 54 In addition to a therapeutic outcome, 
moral exhortations and overt, public, external shaming provided a quite new 
motivation for being virtuous. In previous eras, morality had been largely self-
motivated. Learning and practising virtue was a personal choice — that had 
benefits for the individual and the community - and involved a close relationship 
between a teacher and student within the educational setting, such as a 
philosophical school. In this period, all sorts of people (not just teachers or 
parents or people in authority) were telling one another what to do and teaching 
each other. Shame had dwindled as a motivation for virtue in the previous three 
historical eras, but now the early Christians revived shame as an important 
53  Meeks, Op. Cit., p 94 
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motivation and redefined it as an external and public process. Other rituals: 
singing hymns and psalms, prayer at particular times throughout the day and 
waking up at midnight to pray, fasting (as an expression of humility) and other 
forms of self-denial were all intended to reinforce the moral code. 55 They also 
reinforced the sense of belonging to a special and separate community. 
Arguably, the primary motivating factor was that Christians believed 
virtue would be rewarded and sin punished after death. Seneca's rejection of 
judgment after death as 'mere tales' and a threat to equanimity, together with 
similar responses from other Stoics and Epicurus, suggest these were widely held 
popular beliefs. They were certainly held by some of the late Jewish groups. The 
Christians believed that no one could hide from the judgment of God and that 
there was no other possibility than eternal damnation and punishment for the 
sinful and eternal salvation for the virtuous.' There was also a sense of being 
virtuous (or at least not committing sin) in daily behaviour that expressed loyalty 
to God the King. 57 Notions of a final judgment dependent on virtue were widely 
promoted from the earliest Christian times." 
Honour continued to be mentioned, but like Hellenistic attitudes toward 
honour, it was not necessarily associated with virtue. For example, Paul stated 
that honour should be given to whom it is due 59 and along the same lines: 'Honor 
all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honor the Emperor' 60. Meeks 
explains this conformity as a case of early Christians wanting — like any 
immigrant group — to be seen as quiet living, undemanding people, causing no 
54 Meeks, Op. Cit., pp 96-97 
55 Meeks, Op. Cit., p 99 
56. Meeks, Op. Cit., pp 165-166 
57  Meeks, Op. Cit., p 168 
58 Meeks, Op. Cit., p 175 
59 Romans 13:7 
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_trouble and behaving appropriately toward the non-Christians that surrounded 
them. 61 
This is the challenge in understanding the survival and success of the early 
Christians. On the one hand, asserting a moral difference was central to their 
survival, on the other, these same moral values involved much conformity with 
prevailing views and behaviours and 'almost no innovation' 62 . Unique in the 
history of Western virtues, this era saw a concept of virtue and particular virtues 
that were precisely the means of creating communities and differentiating them 
from the wider society. These moral values provided a sense of identity as a new, 
alien race. It was Christian virtue(s) that attracted converts and funding, enabling 
the growth and survival of small communities, the institutional Church and 
ultimately an empire. 
There was a very long chronological gap between this early Christian era 
and the next, but early Christian ideas about virtue and the virtues provided both 
the foundation and the problems for ethical thinking in the Middle Ages. We will 
see that some of the serious social problems of the intervening dark ages will be 
dealt with by medieval virtues. Also of interest is that some of the ancient ideas 
ignored or rejected by the early Christians and indeed some that were ignored by 
the Hellenists, will be revived, adopted and adapted by the medieval Christians. 
601 Peter 2:17 
61• Meeks, Op. Cit., p 49 
62  Peter Brown, Op. Cit., p 260 
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7 
VIRTUE — THE MEDIEVAL WAY OF LIFE 
Starting with the Bible, moral instruction floods all life. 
KARL VOSSLER 1 
Despite widespread superstition, social and religious strife and deep anxiety about 
sin, the people of the Middle Ages valued a rich abundance of virtues. Indeed, 
virtue was once again the antidote to fear, but whereas the Hellenistic era had 
adopted a fairly single-minded, wisdom plus endurance approach to dealing with 
fear, in this era fear was managed and counterbalanced by a multiplicity of 
virtues. In the medieval world almost everything a person did, felt or thought was 
either a virtue or a sin — life was flooded with morality. Work was undertaken for 
its virtuous properties. Even the game of chess was 'moralised' by Dominican 
Jacob° de Cessole's humbling of the role of the king.2 Almost all the virtues of 
the past reappeared in the medieval catalogues and dozens of new virtues were 
added. 
There is a considerable gap in the moral philosophy literature between the 
• previous era and this one, which spanned the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Centuries 
CE. Nevertheless, we will find that the medieval understanding of virtue can be 
confidently traced to the past. Early Christian ideas persisted or were deliberately 
re-worked to resolve inconsistencies and errors of logic. The school syllabus used 
classical Latin texts (such as Cicero) to teach both grammar and virtue.' There 
Vossler Karl, Mediaeval Culture: An Introduction to Dante and his Times, Volume 1, (New 
York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1958), p 254 
2 Le Goff Jacques, Medieval Civilization 400-1500, Julia Barron Trans., Oxford and New York: 
Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989), p 361 
3 Luscombe D. E., 'Peter Abelard and Twelfth-Century Ethics' in Peter Abelard's Ethics Ed. D.E. 
Luscombe, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p xviii-xix 
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was a fashion for collecting classical tags and proverbs chosen for their ethical 
content.4 Furthermore, philosopher theologians such as Peter Abelard and St. 
Thomas Aquinas incorporated Greek - especially Aristotelian — ideas into the 
Christian ethical framework. Glimpses of light on the problems and 
circumstances of life in the intervening Dark Ages also offer explanations for 
some of the emphases in medieval virtue. 
Not surprisingly, given the history of the virtues and their relationship with 
community to this point, we will see that the nature of that relationship continued 
to adapt and evolve in the Middle Ages. The general strategy for this period was 
not to find unity in the virtues and a single-minded approach to dealing with 
difficulties, but instead to promote a profusion of virtues that each attended to 
different sorts of problems. There continued to be variations in the moral vision 
held by Christians, but at the same time there was universal acceptance of a core 
group of virtues, especially charity, chastity, wisdom obedience and sobriety. 
Moral education was universal and was delivered primarily via ubiquitous 
religious instruction — from sermons, architecture, art, morality plays and so on. 
The virtues of this period were generally aimed at maintaining the status quo, at 
coping, at controlling the populace — both as individuals and as communities - and 
where possible, controlling the social environment or if that was not possible 
controlling human responses to social and environmental problems. Indeed, 
virtues were often fairly direct solutions or antidotes to the vast array of cultural, 
social and political problems. The scope of the relationship between virtue and 
society had two layers in this period. One layer was the local relationship of 
virtue, honour and flourishing of the individual and the small community he or 
4 Luscombe, Op. Cit., p xix 
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she lived in. The other layer was the global relationship between the individual or 
community and the whole Christian world. The failure of some people within a 
community to practice the Christian virtue of unquestioning obedience could have 
horrendous consequences for the entire community. As for instance, the 
Albigensians discovered to their cost when they were all massacred because the 
Pope's general could not identify which were the heretics among them. Virtue 
and the human telos continued to be linked; though the link was not quite as clear-
cut and direct as it had been in earlier eras. Motivation for virtue came primarily 
from widespread fear - of things that could happen to individuals and their 
communities in life - as well as fear of eternal damnation. Private practices of 
repentance, and confession were increasingly important, but so were the older 
practices of public confession, penance and flagellation. 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
The theologian philosophers from Peter Abelard onward were fairly united in 
viewing virtue as essentially a habit — a habit of the 'well-constituted' mind or the 
will. 5 Abelard was credited with bringing this (and other) ancient Greek themes 
into Christian theology. St. Thomas Aquinas revived further Aristotelian details 
to the definition of virtue as habit of mind; asserting that the habit of virtue must 
be intentional, voluntary and orderly. It was not enough to do virtuous things 
automatically or occasionally, as a mere physical response or because they felt 
good, the habit must entail consistently, freely and intentionally using one's will 
and reason. 6 Like Augustine, Aquinas liked order in all things (his books are 
masterpieces of order) and the habit of virtue was understood to bring order or 
5 Abelard, Op. Cit., p 129 
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regulation to a person's life, and this habit used order or reason to choose 
virtuously. 7 
Virtuous habit, together with the personal and communal order it brought 
was possibly the only remedy for a society that was wracked with disharmony, 
insecurity, fear and violence. There were so many things to fear. The wars and 
calamities of the previous few centuries might return. The tentative new security 
and 'sweets of plenty' might be lost. 8 The things that did happen: strikes, 
insurrections, economic depression, bad weather and poor harvests, increasing 
prices, famine and Bubonic plague were significant crises. 9 Top these off with the 
Hundred Years War that occurred intermittently from 1337 onward and we are 
talking about catastrophe. Through this noise and violence, we hear some quiet, 
calm, generally quite methodical voices, like those of Aquinas and Christine de 
Pisan who used authorities from the past to illustrate and justify their moral 
visions in a time when `[n]othing that could be proposed was certain, except what 
had been vouchsafed for in the past.' 1° To choose the habit of virtue and with it 
the hope of Heaven, to try to create some sort of order in such a disorderly world 
was surely the only possible way to live. However, this was not a Hellenistic sort 
of endurance through indifference and rigorous mastery of passions and desires. 
Like many ancient writers (and unlike the early Christians) William of 
Ockham was anxious about the role of passions in morality, seeing them as 
something debilitating and necessary to overcome. Not so Aquinas, whose 
6 Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XXIII Virtue, Trans. W. D. Hughes, (London 
and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1969), p5 
7 Copleston F. C., Aquinas, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977), pp 205, 207 
8 Ralph Glaber quoted in Le Goff, Op. Cit., p57 
9 Le Goff, Op. Cit., pp 106-108 
I° Le Goff, Op. Cit., p 325 
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approach was integrative" asserting that passions were as necessary as reason, 
were good when they were controlled by reason, and reason needed to be attuned 
to sensitivity. 
[But] when [passions] are allowed to obscure reason and to lead us into acts, not 
necessarily external acts, which are contrary to right reason, they are bad. But it 
is false to say that man would be better off without any passions or emotions; 
for without them man would not be man. We have no right to say that all 
passions are evil. I2 
Aquinas' ideas on the passions were perhaps the beginnings of a very slow shift in 
perspective that will culminate with the Humean view of virtue as being 
essentially passion — more on this development in the coming chapters. 
Meanwhile, medieval people were passionate about many things — food and 
feasting, colour and stained glass windows, beauty and brightly painted sculpture, 
jewel encrusted bookbinding. However, 'behind this coloured phantasmagoria lay 
the fear of darkness and the quest for light which was salvation'. I3 These 
medieval passions were consistent with the prevailing concept of virtue and the 
need to keep fear at bay. 
An important project for the medieval theologian philosophers was to 
systematise morality (or re-systematise it) and to eliminate inconsistencies and 
contradictions in the early Christian ideas. Whereas the early Christians were 
happy to say that virtue was love and love was virtue, that Jesus was virtue and 
God was the source of virtue, Aquinas explained that: 
Augustine's saying is to be understood of virtue in its unqualified sense; not that 
every virtue is simply love, but that it depends in some way on love, inasmuch 
as it depends on the will, the primordial motion of which is love... I4 
"Steel Carlos, 'Rational by Participation: Aquinas and Ockham on the Subject of the Moral 
Virtues', in Franciscan Studies, 1998; 56: 359-82, p 379 
12 Copleston, Op. Cit., p213 
13 Le Goff, Op. Cit., p335 
14 Aquinas (1969), Op. Cit., p27 
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In:  line with this systematisation, Aquinas was keen to revive Aristotle's notion 
that the moral virtues were means between excessive and deficient behaviours. 
Some commentators see Aquinas as creating a problem with this, because the 
theological virtues clearly did not fit the model - there was no such vice as being 
too faithful or too charitable. However, Aristotle had viewed the mean as the 
essence of moral virtues, he did not apply it to his intellectual virtues — one could 
not suffer from too much understanding — so I would argue that it was quite 
consistent for Aquinas to similarly restrict the mean to the moral virtues. Again, 
we cannot help but see this systematisation as a response to the chaos of the 
medieval world. Moreover, the introduction of the Aristotelian mean in this time 
of great excesses and deficiencies appears extraordinarily apt, as well - we might 
imagine - as being readily understandable to Aquinas' listeners. 
The absence of any overarching unity in the virtues of this period suggests 
that in the cultural, social and political circumstances of the Middle Ages, unity of 
the virtues — by contrast with the unity provided by charity in the early Christian 
era - was either an impossible or an irrelevant notion. During this period the 
anxiety and physical deprivations arising from wars and crusades, violence and 
corruption, social upheavals, class struggles, Church schisms and rampant 
diseases appear to have been managed, coped with, contained, by classing almost 
every action and thought as a virtue or a sin. It is almost as if the abundance - of 
virtues, of ideas about virtues (relative to the previous era), of moral language - 
was an antidote to the scarcity of comfort and safety people were experiencing. 
Certainly moral instruction, moral formation of the individual and the self- and 
public examination of moral character and conduct were pervasive and every 
occasion involved virtue. For instance, even work was idealised in the Middle 
Ages. People did not work for their own economic gain or for collective 
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economic progress. Rather, they worked to avoid idleness — a dangerous opening 
for the Devil — or for penance, or to mortify the body. The economic aims of 
working were limited to personal subsistence and support of the un-propertied 
poor. I5 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
For all that philosophers - and writers such as de Pisan - were interested in the 
theoretical nature of virtue, the explanation and promotion of particular virtues 
formed the bulk of their ethical works. Hadot explains that as in antiquity, 
philosophy in the Middle Ages 'did not designate a theory or a way of knowing; 
rather it signified a lived wisdom, and a way of living in accordance with 
reason'. I6 Reason, the logos, of course meant the word of God. Medieval 
thinkers, like the early Christians before them, were focused on an orderly way of 
life that imitated the rational virtues of God and Jesus. 
During the centuries between the early Christians and the Middle Ages, it 
had become the norm that only a small number of people in the community — 
monks, clergy, princes — were expected to practice their religion fully. I7 Such 
people were also expected to be virtuous on behalf of the whole community. I8 
However, 'a new idea was taking hold among scholars meditating upon Holy 
Scripture, the explosive idea that salvation was not acquired by passive sheeplike 
participation in religious rites but was "earned" by an effort of self- 
15 Le Goff, Op. Cit., p222 
16 Dom Jean Leclercq quoted in Hadot (2002), Op. Cit., pp 240-241 
17 Duby Georges and Braunstein Philippe, 'The emergence of the Individual' in A History of 
Private Life, Volume 2, Revelations of the Medieval World, Georges Duby Ed., Arthur 
Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1988), p 528 
18 The rest were expected to quietly and respectfully observe the church services and sacraments, 
without actually understanding the Latin that that was used. Ibid. 
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transformation'. I9 We can view this as a new idea in the sense that it was a very 
long time since personal participation and virtuous transformation had been a 
universal practice, as it was for the early Christians. It was also only now in the 
Middle Ages that the concept of earning came about. Earning money 20, earning 
friendship2I , earning virtue — these were all new concepts and part of a new trend 
that had begun to place importance on the initiative, wealth and thus also the 
value of the individual. 22 For virtue and religion these new ideas manifested in 
the introduction of private confession — a promotion of virtue that was common to 
all the community, but emphasised private and inner life rather than public life. 
However, at this point in the history of virtue, such private, individual coaching 
was not the principal means of promulgating virtue. 
Instruction in virtue took the form of relentlessly repeated stereotypical 
anecdotes - moral tales, monotonously repeated and repeated - that were taught 
and preached by moralists and clerics. 23 Everywhere there were lessons in virtue 
— sculptures of personified virtues were in the doorways of cathedrals; bibles, 
psalters and herbals were filled with illustrations of virtue; even flowers, stones 
and animals all had symbolic meanings that were moralistic. 24 Just as formal 
education, which was based on grammar until the end of the Twelfth Century, led 
to, was superimposed by and then was topped off with ethics. 25 
19 Duby and Braunstein, Op. Cit., p 513 
rouby Georges, 'Introduction: Private Power, Public Power' in A History of Private Life, Volume 
2, Revelations of the Medieval World, Georges Duby Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1988), p xii 
21 Duby Georges, Barthelemy Dominique and Ronciere Charles de La, 'Portraits' in A History of 
Private Life, Volume 2, Revelations of the Medieval World, Georges Duby Ed., Arthur 
Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1988), p 70 
22 Duby and Braunstein, Op. Cit., p 512 
23 Le Goff, Op. Cit., p327 
24 Le Goff, Op. Cit., pp 352-353 and p 332 
25 Le Goff, Op. Cit., p 131 
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The pro-society quality of virtue 
Many changes had occurred to the virtue catalogue since the early Christian era. 
For instance, some of the virtues that had previously been moral virtues became 
subordinated to theological virtues - such as friendship to charity. Piety, which 
had disappeared in the last catalogue, reappeared with a new definition. 
Hospitality, which had appeared — after an absence — in the early Christian list, 
disappeared again. Constancy, a Homeric virtue for women, reappeared as a 
virtue for everyone. All but two of Aristotle's list were re-incorporated. Good 
humour was probably vital to coping with the fraught and gloomy medieval life, 
but it was not mentioned as a virtue per se. Ambition of any kind was now a vice. 
Many of the qualities Aristotle used to describe his virtues became virtues in 
themselves, such as perseverance, equity and respect. Wisdom or prudence, 
subsumed into faith by the early Christians had now been revived as important 
virtues. The following discussion will focus on six widely promoted and 
important medieval virtues — charity, chastity, obedience, wisdom and prudence, 
and sobriety. 
The virtue of charity 
In the Middle Ages, the virtue of charity was understood as the love or friendship 
between an individual and God. It was also held that by loving God and as a 
result of loving God, individuals would also love their neighbours and enemies. 
Charity was also described in very practical terms. 
[The charitable woman] would render service to everyone for the sake of God. 
She goes around to the hospitals, visits the sick and the poor, according to her 
ability, helps them at her own expense and physical effort for the love of God. 
She has such great pity for people she sees in sin or misery that she weeps for 
them as though their distress were her own. She loves her neighbour's welfare 
as much as her own, is always striving to do good, is never idle; her heart burns 
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ceaselessly with the desire to do works of mercy... Such_a woman bears all 
injuries and tribulations patiently for the love of God. 26 
Charity was needed to help individuals cope with the desperate difficulties of life 
in the Middle Ages and perhaps to gain a sense of making a difference, doing 
something to counteract the crises and calamities of the times. It also provided 
something of a safety net (not necessarily an effective one, but all there was) for 
the sick and poor of a community. 
Charity was something like friendship27 - direct friendship toward a person 
known and loved, indirect friendship with those who were not known personally 
but were connected with a friend, and friendship with strangers - even those who 
were hurtful or enemies. 28 Charity was not just friendship, but included 
agreeableness and good manners toward others, qualities that were associated 
with justice and fairness, and which were necessary for social survival. 
[B]ecause man by nature is a social being, in common decency he owes plain 
truth to others, since without this human society could not survive. But even as 
man cannot live together without truthfulness, neither can they without 
agreeableness. 29 
These were not mere platitudes. Violence, aggression, killing, maiming and 
torture were commonplace medieval occurrences. 30 Much of the ferocity arose 
through the practice of vengeance, which was associated with manliness, virility 
and family honour. Failure to exact vengeance was shameful in the extreme and 
some series of private vendettas can be traced from the Sixth through to the 
26 Pisan Christine de, The Treasure of the City of Ladies or the Book of the Three Virtues, Sarah 
Lawson Trans., (London: Penguin Books, 1987), p 44 
27 Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XXXIV Charity, Trans. R. J. Batten, (London 
and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1975), p 7 
28 Aquinas (1975), Op. Cit., p9 
29 Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XL! Virtues of Justice in the Human 
Community, Trans. T.C. O'Brien, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre 
& Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p 203 
30 Rouche Michel, 'The Early Middle Ages in the West', in A History of Private Life, Volume 1, 
From Pagan Rome to Byzantium, Paul Veyne Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, 
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Eleventh Centuries. 3I We can see then than the promotion of charity, friendship 
and agreeableness was aimed at counteracting the disorderly social relations, 
violent behaviour and widely held values of the immediate past. Which is not to 
say that vengeance was not a virtue — it was still included, for instance, in 
Aquinas' catalogue - merely that these virtues offered a chance to thwart some of 
the violence. 
The virtue of chastity 
In a characteristically charming blend of religion and pragmatism (though she 
may have intended some irony) de Pisan described the virtue of chastity as 
follows. 
Chastity has the property of rendering the person who has it agreeable before 
God; without it a person would not be able to please Him and he would perish, 
according to what St Ambrose asserts when he says that chastity turns a human 
being into an angel. And besides its being so highly regarded by God, 
experience shows us that it is likewise highly praised in the world, for there is 
no one so full of faults that if it is generally known that she is chaste people will 
not respect her, but if she has the opposite reputation, regardless of her good 
deeds she cannot avoid being mocked behind her back and respected less. 32 
Chastity was a means of loving God, of maintaining innocence, of constraining 
lust, exercising judgment and ensuring that one was well respected in the 
community. 33 
There were many possible reasons why chastity would be so important to 
social flourishing in the Middle Ages. The ownership and inheritance of property 
was always an important matter and could not be safely managed without an 
insistence on chastity, as least for women. The rigid control of the Church 
Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), p 
498 
31 Rouche, Op. Cit., p499 
32 De Pisan, Op. Cit., pp 174-175 
" Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XL!!! Temperance, Trans. Thomas Gilby, 
(London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill 
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infiltrated many aspects of the individual's life — not just sexual behaviour, but 
dress and food mores as well. Chastity, since the strong early influence of the 
Christian ascetics, had been viewed as a Christ-like excellence and the movement 
to make clerical celibacy mandatory (until now some Catholic clerics could 
marry) was a significant issue in this era. On a more pragmatic note, the 
promotion of chastity and virginity in the Twelfth Century — the so-called anti-
matrimony century — could well have been a remedy for the significant population 
growth of the time. 34 
The virtue of obedience 
Consistent with the early Christian view, obedience was particularly important for 
men and women living in medieval monastic communities, but was also a 
requirement of all the laity. Obedience was a hierarchical matter — first obey 
God's commandments, then obey the laws of society, finally obey the sovereign. 35 
Disobedience was associated with the Devil (who had disobeyed God) 36 and with 
justice and fair behaviour toward superiors - necessary because 'to obey superiors 
4 
is something required of us in keeping with the order that God has established.' 
Obedience was aimed at orderly, hierarchical social control, both religious 
and secular, though the priority of obedience to God was always unmistakable. 
Obedience had been vital to the survival of communities in the early Christian era 
and I would argue that this continued or even increased in the Middle Ages. 
Schisms and heretical movements throughout much of this period seriously 
threatened the authority of the Church and its control over society. These threats 
were often triggered by outrage at the corruption within the Church. Christianity 
Book Company, 1968), p 159 and Bingen St. Hildegard of, Scivias, Trans. Mother Columba Hart 
and Jane Bishop, (New York: Paulist Press, 1990), p 446 
34 Le Goff, Op. Cit., p 334 
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had largely replaced paganism by the Middle Ages, but conversions and re-
conversions were continuing. 37 The Crusades of the Eleventh and Twelfth 
Centuries provided opportunities not only for the acquisition of great wealth, but 
for creating a new Christian ideal — a social and religious 'unity Of thought and 
deed'.38 The Crusades were also a potential means to recovering respectability 
following the scandal of battles between Christians in earlier times. Crusades — 
such as the Albigensian Crusade — were intended to enforce obedience and to 
provide an ideal that associated the cross with triumph rather than suffering. 39 
The establishment of the Inquisition in the Thirteenth Century was also a 
manifestation of the urgent need for obedience and control. A flood of heresies 
since the mid Twelfth Century had been largely triggered by 'the moral laxity and 
corruption of the clergy — who's behaviour did not serve as an adequate model for 
a laity in search of moral and spiritual guidance at such a tumultuous time of 
change'.4° The establishment of the Inquisition was intended to quash these 
heresies and bring about a return to obedience and Church control. 
Also significant was the shift from the old hagiography emphasising 
solitary 'spiritual combat in the wilderness' to new stories of saints who 
exemplified the virtue of obedience. This shift had occurred in the Ninth and 
Tenth Centuries and reflected 'an increasingly dim view of the completely solitary 
life, for it allowed a man too much freedom'. 41 
35 De Pisan, Op. Cit., p 139 
36 Bingen, Op. Cit., p.427 
37 Le Goff, Op. Cit., pp 62-63 
38 Le Goff, Op. Cit., p 69 
39 Le Goff, Op. Cit., pp 69-70 
4° Burman Edward, The Inquisition: The Hammer of Heresy, (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 
2004), p 16 
41 Patlagean Evelyne, 'Byzantium in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries' in A History of Private 
Life, Volume I, From Pagan Rome to Byzantium, Paul Veyne Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
19$7), p631 
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The virtues of wisdom and prudence 
Wisdom, as intelligence and knowledge, and as understanding and judgment was 
revived as a virtue in the Middle Ages. Wisdom began with the love and fear of 
God — 'When a person wisely worships his God, his wisdom is the origin of good 
works.' 42 Wisdom led to understanding and provided a role model for others.43 
Intellectual or scientific wisdom was a matter of contemplating causes, judging 
and ordering, using principles to arrive at conclusions and being a good judge of 
principles and precepts." Wisdom was also construed in very practical terms, 
such as that wise people avoided debt and lived within their means. 45 
Prudence or practical wisdom meant acting well, by making sound choices 
and controlling passions and impulses.46 It required understanding, the ability to 
learn from the past, comparing the past with the present and foreseeing problems 
that might arise in the future. 47 Prudence involved doing and making, not just 
thinking, but it was necessary that actions be undertaken with the right 
intentions.48 
Some writers considered prudence and sobriety to be inseparable. 
Prudence was 'to love honour and a good reputation... good manners and 
behaviour... 49. Prudence required sobriety 'which does not extend only to eating 
and drinking, but to all other areas [in] which it can help to restrain excess.' 5° 
Sobriety also led to being easy to serve, contentment and modesty. Sleeping too 
42 Bingen, Op. Cit., p 438- 
'13 Ibid. 
" Aquinas (1969), Op. Cit., p45 
45 De Pisan, Op. Cit., p 130 
46 Aquinas (1969), Op. Cit., p 55 
47 Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XXXVI Prudence, Trans. Thomas Gilby, 
(London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1974a), p 5 
48 Aquinas (1974a), Op. Cit., pp 7 and 19 
49 De Pisan, Op. Cit., p 55 
50 Ibid. 
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much was not prudent because 'too much repose engenders sin and vice' . 51 
Sobriety and prudence also resulted in good sense in deeds and clothing, 
appropriate levels of enthusiasm, controlled speech and calm, composed sensible 
eloquence. 52 
Prudence was also connected to honesty, kindness, graciousness, making 
reasonable commands, and choosing 'people of good and upright lives who are 
devoted to God' for friends. 53 
•.; 
The revival of wisdom and prudence as virtues in the Middle Ages was 
inevitable. The need to substitute faith for wisdom, to differentiate from the 
Hellenized world that valued wisdom above all other excellences and to denigrate 
all pagan thinking (even when it had been synthesised into early Christian 
thinking) had passed. This is not to say that faith and insistence on Church dogma 
were not still hugely important, but room had now been made for wisdom and 
faith to coexist. The need for differentiation through denigration of wisdom and 
prodence had passed because Christianity was now the prevailing culture. 
Furthermore, the tentative beginnings of scientific thinking and the rise of 
universities meant that individual intellectual knowledge and wisdom had come to 
be valued. As for practical wisdom, prudence, sound judgment and 
understanding, these were now as necessary to social flourishing as they had been 
in the polis and the Roman Empire. Wisdom and knowledge were needed to 
manage and co-ordinate the vast Church network, to feed, arm and transport 
crusaders, to construct the gloriously elaborate and durable architecture of these 
times, and so on. Medieval communities also needed prudence — especially the 
51 De Pisan, Op. Cit., p 56 
52 De Pisan, Op. Cit., p 57 
53 De Pisan, Op. Cit., p 58 
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solemn sort of understanding and the curtailing of passionate impulses that seem 
to have been the preferred response to the calamities and tribulations of these 
times. To have keen insight and foresight would be highly desirable 
characteristics in preparing for and coping with wars, pestilence and all the other 
day to day difficulties of medieval life. 
The virtue of sobriety 
Sobriety seems to be an entirely appropriate virtue for the gloomy Middle Ages. 
Sobriety was not merely a matter of avoiding drunkenness (though it certainly was 
that too) — it was 'the companion of peace and Friendship and the enemy of all 
vioe'. 54 The emphasis on sobriety and moderation in eating as well were very 
likely a rigorous response to the gluttony and drunkenness that had been rife 
during the preceding centuries. Meals — even everyday meals not just special 
occasions — had been 'veritable religious rituals' in the past. 55 Drunkenness had 
been regarded as a form of ecstasy - a gift from the gods — alcohol was the only 
readily available tonic, and gluttony, drunkenness and overindulgence were 
available to 'nearly everyone in Merovingian and Carolingian society' . 56 The 
gluttony was largely due to extremely poor diet — people were eating vast 
quantities of food and remaining severely malnourished. 57 The medieval 
emphasis on sobriety can be seem as a direct and necessary counterbalance 
'intended as a criticism of the cult of the stomach' 58 as well as being a means of 
social order and control in the tradition of the ancient Greek virtue of self-control. 
54 De Pisan, Op. Cit., p 140 
Rouche, Op. Cit., p445 
56 Ibid. 
57 Rouche, Op. Cit., p446 
58. Rouche, Op. Cit., p 445  
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Unfortunately, there were just too many medieval virtues to be discussed in detail 
— within the space limitations of this thesis - however, their relevance to 
communal and individual survival and flourishing can be readily summarised. 
The virtues of love of God and of Heaven, faith and hope all provided a 
permanent and safe focus for contemplation and affection, trust and inspiration, 
when nothing seemed permanently safe in the medieval world. Mercy toward 
others was a preventative measure against a world where calamity struck regularly 
and unmercifully, and an adjunct to justice in a world where justice systems were 
unreliable and thin on the ground. Sanctity, religion and piety were the everyday 
expression and form of medieval life — personal and communal - so dominated by 
Church rituals and rules. Courage, perseverance, patience and constancy were 
necessary responses to the numerous large and small upheavals and tribulations 
faced by medieval individuals and communities. Martyrdom had to be a virtue 
given the central importance of stories about martyrs and saints that were used to 
illustrate and teach Church precepts and virtues. Magnanimity and magnificence 
were necessary to explain and justify the wealth and excess of the Church and 
secular elite in a world where the majority had no choice but to live in poverty and 
misery. Temperance, virginity, abstinence, fasting, discipline and modesty each 
played a part in social control and orderliness — at least an attempted control by 
Church, community and individuals over circumstances that often must have 
seemed quite out of control. Justice, equity, various modes of respect and 
gratitude were also mechanisms for coping with that out of control world, while 
vengeance — still a virtue for many including Aquinas 59 - was the only way of 
retaliating against the unfairness in that world. Liberality, almsgiving and peace 
keeping were attempts to solve or at least manage the social problems of poverty, 
59 Aquinas (1972), Op. Cit., pp 117-121 
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sickness and violence. Finally, victory 60 was a hopeful virtue in a world where 
the individual or community rarely experienced a sense of triumph. 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
Given the social and political conditions of the time, I wonder whether any 
motivating factors beyond fear - and there was a lot to be afraid of - were 
necessary to encourage virtue in this period. 'The middle ages was the realm par 
excellence of the great collective fears, and of the great collective, public and 
physical penances.' 61 Mass public confessions, mutual flagellation, hallucinated 
processions, dreams and visions of the Devil, angels, saints and God — these were 
partly due to malnourishment and disease, but they also offered hope. 62 
Ockham discussed being motivated for 'the sake of some useful or 
pleasurable good to be pursued' but dismissed this as not being a moral 
motivation.° Instead, he asserted that: 
[A]ctions performed for the sake of God are instances of perfect virtue, whereas 
actions performed because they are dictated by reason are instances of true 
virtue, though imperfect with respect to actions performed for the sake of God." 
However, could we expect that ordinary medieval people were motivated by the 
prospect of being perfect or practising their reason? In a world where people were 
bombarded daily by hunger, sickness, war, strife, death of loved ones or blame 
from the neighbour for the death of his cow, virtue was surely motivated by a 
desire for control — desire for personal and communal control over something, 
anything. 
60 Victory was one of the virtues St. Hildegard of Bingen described from her God-sent visions. 
See Bingen, Op. Cit., p 350 
61 Le Goff, Op. Cit., p 241 
62 Ibid. 
63 	• King Peter, `Ockham's Ethical Theory' in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, Ed. Paul 
Vincent Spade, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p 235 
64 Ibid. 
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Abelard -and Aquinas viewed repentance and shame respectively as 
motivations to virtue. Abelard saw repentance as 'sorrow of the mind' caused by 
doing wrong, but also connected it with fear of damnation.65 Following Aristotle, 
Aquinas said that shame was not a virtue in itself, but it was good and 
praiseworthy to be sensitive to shame. was an emotion rather than a habit; 67 it 
was a part of temperance and fostered 'a sense of honour by banishing what is 
offensive, without, however, itself attaining the perfection of being honourable.' 68 
Notably, honour returned as a motivation in this period. Honour was of 
course motivating the medieval courtly virtues, but after centuries of religious 
antagonism toward pagan ideas, Aquinas gave it Christian respectability. 
[H]onour is due to excellence.., and a man's excellence is gauged by his virtue 
above all... Properly speaking, therefore, being honourable amounts to the same 
as being virtuous. Virtues are desirable for their own sake, it is in this sense that 
Cicero speaks of virtue, truth, and knowledge attracting us by their force and 
beauty. This is enough to make them honourable. Some of the objects which 
are honoured beside virtue are better than virtue, thus God himself and 
beatitude, yet we know less about them by experience than we do about the 
everyday virtues. Hence they lay a greater claim to the name of honest worth.° 
This is a fascinating passage. Association between virtue and honour had been 
largely denied in the early Christian period, possibly due to the Roman association 
between honour and political appointments — which had very little if anything to 
do with virtue as such. This had also been consistent with the later Greek ages 
when 'love of honour was not considered a merit.., it came to correspond to 
ambition, as we know it." Aquinas was redefining a relationship between virtue 
and honour and placing it firmly in the sublunary, experiential domain of 
'everyday' virtues. He was also correcting the equation between virtue and God 
Abelard Peter, Peter Abelard's Ethics, Ed. D.E. Luscombe, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp 
77 and 79 
66 Aquinas (1968), Op. Cit., p57 
67 Aquinas (1968), Op. Cit., p 59 
68 Ibid. 
69 Aquinas (1968), Op. Cit., p73 
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that had been asserted by some of the early Christians.Honour and virtue were of 
this world and virtue was worthy in this world, whereas God and beatitude were 
something superior and beyond honour. Aquinas was also asserting the 
importance of communal opinion and respect in valuing virtue, in allocating worth 
and honour to the virtues of individuals. 
The telos or purpose of human life in the Middle Ages continued to be an 
ultimate happiness achieved only in the afterlife, and this was clearly appropriate 
given the limited opportunities for happiness or flourishing in the earthly world. 
Virtue was the means to this end, but while virtue justified worthy honour during 
life, it was not the ultimate human end. The ultimate telos was the happiness of 
contemplating God, possible only through living an earthly life of perfect and 
excellent virtue - that is theological and moral virtue — and of course necessitating 
the gift of God's grace. The only security, the only absolute happiness medieval 
people could rely on was to be found in the afterlife. We should note that virtue 
was no longer enough to achieve the human telos. God's grace was required as 
well, as in the early Christian centuries, which meant that the connection between 
virtue and happiness was no longer a direct and exclusive relationship. 
Despite the strength of the ties between virtue and communal survival, 
stability and flourishing up to this point, these ties were about to be loosened. The 
Renaissance opened up many difficult questions about virtue and morality, 
scepticism began to rise and a raft of different sorts of values and institutions were 
initiated that would — not quickly, but very slowly over the coming centuries - 
replace virtue as the means of community stability, order, flourishing and success. 
70- Jaeger, Op. Cit., p 11 
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8 
RENAISSANCE EQUIVOCATION, INDIVIDUALISM AND CHOICE 
[T]he Renaissance no longer knew a single, unequivocal, 
universally valid scale of values. At any given moment the 
system of values was a pluralistic one, and at the same time it 
was constantly changing; considerable differences existed, too, 
in the interpretation of one and the same value. 
AGNES HELLER 1 
The Renaissance began in Italy in the Fourteenth Century CE, then spread across 
Europe in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. The moral philosophy of this 
period can be viewed as fairly separate Aristotelian, Platonic, Stoic, Neo-Stoic 
and Epicurean debates as to what constituted happiness and the nature of ethics 
and virtue. 2 There was indeed, no distinct Renaissance ethical system or moral 
code and the very notion of systematisation was anathema to most Renaissance 
thinkers. The fifteenth century Italian humanists deliberately set out to destroy 
grand 'cathedrals of ideas' because they saw these as delimiting possibilities and 
imposing rigid patterns on the solving of problems.3 There were several reasons 
for the passionate commitment of individuals to one or other or a combination of 
these ancient moral visions. An obvious reason was that they were now available 
to be read and discussed by a burgeoning leisured, educated class. They were 
seen as vibrant and worldly4 — in striking contrast to medieval ideas - at once new 
and yet respectably ancient, and appropriate to life in the emerging new cities and 
Heller Agnes, Renaissance Man, Trans. Richard E. Allen, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1978), p280 
2 For instance, see Kraye Jill, 'Moral Philosophy', in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, Eds. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), pp 303-386 
3 Garin Eugenio, Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance, Peter Munz 
Trans., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), p 3 
4 Burckhardt Jacob, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, S. G. C. Middlemore Trans., 
(Vienna and London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1937), p260 
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-- states with their rising emphasis on nationhood, civic virtue and civic life. As 
Petrarch insisted 'above all.., it is necessary to find first one's own self and to 
discover in oneself one's true humanity. Only then can one rediscover oneself as 
a man among men.' s If individuals were to find their own humanity, then they 
must be able to choose a moral vision that suited them and such a choice was only 
possible if there was a variety of moral options. This commitment to a diversity 
of views was also a backlash against the relatively univocal, systematic moral 
vision of the medieval scholastic, Christian, immediate past history. Renaissance 
thinkers wanted to be different; they wanted to reject the old values and the old 
way of life; nevertheless, they were deeply concerned with the collapse of 
morality in which they found themselves entangled. 
In this chapter I shall endeavour to identify some general and significant 
trends and ideas that encapsulate the state of virtue in what was of course a long 
period of widely diverse cultural, social, political and religious experiences across 
Europe. I found for instance, that the humanists of Tudor England devised a fairly 
consistent and enduring moral vision that combined the flexibility and 
gentlemanly orientation of Aristotle, some of Plato's idealism, an Epicurean 
awareness of pleasures and a good dash of Stoic endurance. Montaigne offered an 
influential moral vision that criticised many of the commonplace attitudes of the 
time and provided a more contemporary slant on traditional Christian ideas about 
morality. However, it all began in Italy, where for the first time individuality, 
singularity, being different from one's neighbours, was not something to fear. 6 
5 Garin, Op. Cit., p 20 
6 Burckhardt Jacob, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, Volume 1, Dr Ludwig Geiger and 
Professor Walther Gotz Trans., (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p 143 
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This Renaissance individualism both caused and was fed by the 
breakdown of some aspects of the relationship between virtue and communal 
flourishing. The general focus for virtues - other than that iconic Renaissance 
virtue of magnificence - was on social order, but there was neither unity nor depth 
to these virtues or the sort of multi-faceted abundance of virtues found in the 
previous era. The suggestion emerged that it was everyday manners and customs 
that held society together, not virtue. There was no longer a universal set of 
virtues that were clearly and univocally defined - tension even existed in the 
definitions of the cardinal virtues. Moral education continued to be important; 
educational reform occurred in some places and was widely discussed. However, 
the long ties to religious instruction had been broken and ideas about secular 
moral education were by no means universal. Most of the virtues of this period 
were justifying an opulence and material excellence that had little to do with 
excellence of character or behaviour but much to do with maintaining and 
progressing the glory of Renaissance individuals and society. Some Renaissance 
virtues were strategies aimed (apparently unsuccessfully) at counteracting 
corruption, treachery, selfishness and cruelty. Meanwhile, specialised wisdom 
and knowledge was useful for action and industry, and together with flexible 
prudence, corresponded to the needs of exploration, discovery, innovation and 
invention that were hallmarks of this period. The scope of the relationship 
between virtue and societal flourishing was transformed in this period. Honour 
was no longer granted by the community, but was assumed by the individual. 
Shame was anathema. The happiness of the individual was no longer an exclusive 
matter of practising virtue but could be derived from a range of possibilities that 
were selected and manipulated by the individual. The flourishing of the 
community was certainly connected with the virtues of magnificence and wisdom, 
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but we no longer find the sort_of comprehensive and direct interdependence 
between virtue and the survival, orderliness or stability of society that was evident 
in the previous eras. The first denial of a telos for human life occurred in this 
period and the direct link between virtue and happiness was replaced with a 
competition between a range of potential sources of happiness. Motivation for 
virtue was also unclear as the various possibilities for motivation tended to be in 
conflict, rather than complementary as they had been in the past. 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
By the early Fifteenth Century, the word virtue or virtu had quite a few common 
meanings. It could mean the quality or property of an object, or the medicinal 
properties of a plant. It could mean military valour or even a military 'way of life 
that encouraged fortitude, valour, constancy and so on' 7; it could also mean a 
physical force. In addition, it retained its traditional meaning of excellence and 
nobility and was often particularly linked with stoic endurance and the 
management of feelings. These all sound predictable, yet in a remarkable 
turnabout, Italian humanists such as Poggio Brocciolini asserted that work, wealth 
and glory were the means and signs of virtue. 'Work... is here counted as a 
blessing and not a punishment. It is a means for the full development of human 
faculties.... Wealth becomes thus almost the tangible sign of divine approval.' 8 
Virtue would on this account be 'solitary and infertile' without 'health, wealth and 
fatherland'. 9 Virtue became directly associated with the wealth that came from 
work and the glory that came from wealth. Indeed, this glory was 'the tangible 
manifestation, the body, of virtue.., the echo virtue evokes in human society and 
7 McFarlane I. D., 'The Concept of Virtue in Montaigne' in Montaigne: Essays in memory of 
Richard Sacre, Eds. I. D. McFarlane and Ian Maclean, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p 77-78 
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is therefore inseparable from true civic virtue." ° Here we have a new way of 
viewing virtue that makes little or no pretence at morality as we generally 
understand it, but which directly maintained the link between virtue and the 
flourishing of societies. Tor virtue, if it is to be taken seriously, must be social 
and must lead to growth and to the enrichment of the commonwealth." In a 
similar vein, Leon Battista Alberti claimed that `[m]an is born in order to be 
useful to other men' 12 that is, co-operating with his neighbours and working for 
the betterment of the state and general economic good. However, in late fifteenth 
century Italy this ideal of social co-operation was overtaken by the tyranny of 
princes — new Caesars who eliminated the possibility of citizenly participation. I3 
This entailed a Machiavellian sort of view where virtue and lack of scruple were 
not necessarily in opposition but could coexist, as exemplified by some of the 
ancient Roman emperors who had been strong and powerful leaders — thus 
excellent, thus virtuous — and at the same time, great criminals. I4 It is not clear 
whether this apparently contradictory attitude was a reflection of unqualified 
enthusiasm for all things Roman or whether it was a convenient sophistry. We 
should note that the actions of these tyrannous princes were not necessarily 
applauded (despite the otherwise revered ancient models) and for instance, 
Machiavelli's Discourses is filled with outrage against lies and tyrarmy. I5 
A number of Renaissance thinkers perceived an essential connection 
between virtue and custom or habit. Not in the Aristotelian sense - that a virtuous 
8 Garin, Op. Cit., p 44 
9 Garin, Op. Cit., p 45 
1° Ibid. 
Garin, Op. Cit., p 46 
12 Quoted in Garin, Op. Cit., p 61 
13 Garin, Op. Cit., p 78 
14 Garin, Op. Cit., p 64 
15 Garin, Op. Cit., p 79 
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person would strive to make virtue a habit - but that habits and social customs 
were themselves virtue, or even that they were more necessary to social 
flourishing than virtue. In his widely read Galateo, Giovanni Della Casa wrote 
that testing one's virtue, proving oneself to be 'courageous, generous, 
magnanimous and heroic' on a daily basis was unnecessary and unrealistic. It was 
co-operation, polite gestures and words, and comportment - not virtue — that 
mattered. To fail in good manners might not be a mortal sin, but it would result in 
far greater social punishment than any failure of courage or generosity. Della 
Casa argued that 'all morality comes genuinely from living in obedience to human 
custom', indeed that custom provided the 'shape and substance' to practical, 
social virtue. I6 This development could be judged in two ways. Perhaps the 
content of virtue was keeping pace with whatever it was that made society operate 
efficiently — in this case good manners and so on. Alternatively, and this seems to 
be the view at the time and soon after, that morality was in decline and in urgent 
need of regeneration. I7 
Consistent with the general Renaissance aversion to systematisation, there 
was a range of opinions that claimed virtues varied according to individual 
temperament, social class or role, or according to the needs of the moment. For 
instance, Montaigne was suspicious of tabloid catalogues and definitions of 
virtues; he was also suspicious of the practice of looking to great men as 
exemplars. He argued there was not a standard model for virtue and that the 
temperament of each individual would be drawn to different virtues and would 
cause each individual to have a different focus. I8 Great men must have been 
greatly virtuous by temperament, so ordinary people could not hope to emulate 
16. barin, Op. Cit., p 170 
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them and must operate within their own temperament. I9 Furthermore, virtue 
varied essentially according to temperament, temperament was bound up with 
conscience and conscience was a matter of social habit. Society and social 
customs provided a pattern or framework within which the individual practised 
virtue in a way that suited his or her temperament. This was not a carte blanche, 
but a balance. As ever, balance was an essential characteristic of virtue and/or its 
relationship with other concepts — between the freedom to be oneself and the 
order that was necessary to and inherent in life within a human social group. 2° In 
addition, Montaigne explained, virtue was one of several instruments — along with 
judgment, experience and reason — which were applied according to temperament 
and luck in a flexible way in order to 'maintain a proper contact with reality... 
[and were thus] not just a quality, but a means, a means of existential hygiene.' 2I 
In other words, despite being a matter of individual temperament and social habit, 
virtue was a balance that both evidenced social order and flourishing, and was a 
means of social order and flourishing. 
The Tudor humanists generally held the view that 'the character of society 
and state was determined exclusively by its leaders, by the kind of education these 
leaders had received, and the kind of moral code they had adopted as a result of 
this education.' 22 Sir Thomas More and Erasmus developed an educational 
syllabus aimed at preparing young people for useful roles, that is, leadership or 
governing roles, in society. Based on classical texts chosen for their humanist 
principles, this education was to lead students to public-minded, unselfish active 
17 Garin, Op. Cit., p 182 
Is McFarlane, Op. Cit., p 87 
19 McFarlane, Op. Cit., pp 80-81 
20 McFarlane, Op. Cit., p90 
21 McFarlane, Op. Cit., p 93 
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virtue.23 The English humanists recognised that in their society, knightly valour 
and nobility of birth were not necessarily the means to success, either for the 
individual or for the realm. Knowledge and learning were much more useful. 
Action not based on knowledge was thought to be worthless; knowledge 
without resulting action was thought to be wasted. In this amalgamation of the 
active and the contemplative, the Platonic ideal was reborn; only he really 
fulfils his role in the world who, through learning and contemplation, attains the 
knowledge of the divine good, realises it within himself and reproduces it in his 
sphere of activity.24 
Knowledge, wisdom and active virtue had now returned to full prominence after 
fifteen hundred years of prominence for the intentional and otherworldly virtues 
of faith, hope and charity. In this period, '[a] man with a good practical 
knowledge of political affairs in his own and other countries, with a knowledge of 
"letters" and the law, was more useful to his monarch than a chivalrous warrior.' 25 
How like the Renaissance! This was the era of new discoveries, re-discoveries, 
world travel, a flood of books and ideas, innovative and gorgeous art works, 
emerging new science and technology, and the beginnings of capitalism, 
industrialism and the rise of the middle class. Knowledge and activity were 
exactly what this society needed, wanted and valued. 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
It was also a period of great superstition and witch-hunting; greater gaps between 
the social classes than ever before; terrible plagues and wars; plus huge (and often 
bloody) social and religious upheavals. For all of its great abundance of ethical 
discourse, there was a kind of moral bleakness apparent throughout much of this 
period. Some, like Machiavelli, had mixed feelings about virtue: 'virtue breeds 
22 Caspari Fritz, Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England, (New York: Teachers College 
Press, 1968), p 345 
23 Caspari, Op. Cit., pp 122-123 
24 CaSpari, Op. Cit., p 151 
25 Caspari, Op. Cit., p 13 
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quiet, quiet idleness [ozio], idleness disorder, disorder ruin; and similarly out of 
ruin order is born, from order virtue, out of this glory and good fortune.' 26 
Machiavelli usually used this word ozio as a term of disapproval, for instance in 
describing his own forced retirement from politics, despite the opportunity it gave 
him for working and writing. Others, like Shakespeare, saw virtue as a losing 
battle: 
Unruly blasts wait on the tender spring; 
Unwholesome weeds take root with precious flowers; 
The adder hisses where the sweet birds sing; 
What virtue breeds iniquity devours.27 
There had certainly been no time in the past when someone could write: [t]his 
above all, to thine own self be true ...'. 28 Above all... me? Now Shakespeare did 
go on to make this a statement about loyalty to others and the phrase was not 
generally understood - at the time - as an endorsement of individualism. 
Nevertheless, it will become in the future something of a catch-cry for 
individualism. Meanwhile, the negativity and general scarcity of direct comment 
about virtue in Shakespeare was one of the big surprises in my examination of this 
period of history. 
Furthermore, the quantity and diversity of Renaissance voices produced 
astonishingly extreme and polarised views on moral values in this period. 
In Castiglione's or Machiavelli's system of values 'thirst for glory' is one of the 
prime virtues; Cardano rejects it. For Vassari, 'haughtiness' is an object of 
respect; for Thomas More it is the source of the worst evil. Petrarch and 
Shakespeare deemed the passion for revenge wicked and senseless; Bacon 
places it among the positive values. 'Faith' is sometimes wreathed in respect, at 
other times it is the object of ridicule. The value of 'moderation' is central for 
Pico, but Giordano Bruno puts the immoderation of passion ahead of it. 29 
26 Grazia Sebastian de, Machiavelli in Hell, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), p 243 
27 William Shakespeare, The Rape of Lucrece (from L 869) 
28 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, Sc. iii, L 78 
29 Heller, Op. Cit., p 19 
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An important requirement for Renaissance virtue, revived from the_ancients, was 
education and one of the features of the period was the opening up of education. 
Not just in terms of what could be studied, but also who could receive an 
education, how it was received and of major importance to the humanists, what 
education should consist in and how it should be delivered. Tudor humanist Sir 
Thomas Elyot explained that 
True nobility was no longer derived from birth and knightly valor alone, but 
was supposed to be based on man's essential quality, his &parr' [arete] and to 
be expressed in deeds inspired by virtue and guided by learning. 30 
Learning had not been a notable requirement for virtue since the early Christians. 
Now, la]ction not based on knowledge was thought to be worthless; knowledge 
without resulting action was thought to be wasted.' 31 Nevertheless, theoretical 
knOwledge was a significant virtue especially for the Tudor humanists. For 
example, Thomas Starkey saw virtue as the 'immediate emanation of knowledge' 
and particularly the communication of that knowledge to others. 32 Again this was 
not universal - Montaigne did not link learning with virtue, as he was concerned 
with 'the vanity of learning that can culminate in pure pedantry, self-satisfaction, 
and a severance from the mainstream of life.' 33 While disagreement raged over 
whether wisdom and knowledge were virtuous, the form of wisdom was starting 
to change. 
To be wise came less and less to mean possessing universal knowledge. People 
were wise about something, in plain English, they became specialists. This 
process was only at its very beginning, of course, during the Renaissance, but 
its outlines can already be perceived.'4 
Caspari, Op. Cit., p 151 
31 Ibid. 
32 Caspari, Op. Cit., p221 
33 McFarlane, Op. Cit., p 85 
34 Heller, Op. Cit., p291 
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Specialised knowledge was generally only a possibility for the leisured classes, 
but another important Renaissance trend was that basic education and literacy 
skills increased — in some cities and states quite sharply - and became relatively 
widespread35 . In 1530, Erasmus wrote a 'best-selling' book called Manners for 
Children, which was not only the first book on etiquette, but was intended as a 
guide to universal manners and the virtues of civility for children of all classes - 
Catholic and Protestant. This book and its successors — which, reflecting growing 
class and religious anxieties, inserted specific manners and virtues for various 
religions and classes - became enormously influential. It was translated into many 
European languages and appended with basic educational tools such as a primer, 
in order to make it the principle textbook for the education of European children - 
aged between seven and twelve - over the next three centuries. 36 
The pro-society quality of virtue 
The virtue of courage 
There is an interesting tension to be found in the Renaissance attitude toward 
courage. In line with the courage of one's convictions and constancy, as 
exemplified by the martyrs and Christian tradition to date, the Renaissance virtue 
of courage was a civil matter rather than a martial one. For example, 'Romeo's 
steadfastness in observing the imperatives dictated by his love... Cordelia's truth-
telling, Emilia's rebellion are all examples of... civil courage. ,37 Yet constancy 
and steadfastness of convictions was surely unachievable or inapposite in an era 
35 Castan Yves, Lebrun Francois and Chartier Roger, 'Figures of Modernity' in A History of 
Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of the Renaissance, Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur Goldhammer 
Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1989), pp 112-115 
36 Revel Jacques, Ranum Orest, Flandrin Jean-Louis, Gelis Jacques, Foisil Madelaine and 
Goulemot Jean Marie, 'Forms of Privatization' in A History of Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of 
the Renaissance, Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), pp 168-173 
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characterised by an unprecedented multiplicity of voices, opinions, values and 
ideas, and a desire to overthrow authority and systems of thought. This suggests 
that courage, as constancy, was a stabilising mechanism (or at least an attempt at 
stabilising) for a society that had been unsettled by the disappearance of a 
universal morality. Alternatively, courage as constancy could have been a 
backlash to this disruption or it could be a matter of clinging to a past excellence 
even though it was no longer a necessary or even appropriate strategy for 
communal flourishing. 
The virtue of justice 
Sir Thomas Elyot wrote that without justice 'all other qualities and vertues can nat 
[sic] make a man good' 38 yet much of what was written about justice in the 
Renaissance was concerned with institutional and public justice rather than 
personal fairness and equity. The availability, firmness and impartiality of courts, 
'stern punishment of rebels' and maintenance of political and social order were of 
paramount importance for the Tudor humanists. 39 There was also — among the 
Italian humanists - a strong flavour of justice and laws being the means to 
controlling the 'mob and the common people', while educated, serious, intelligent 
people had no need of laws because their characters would automatically cause 
them to be virtuous.° We will find this us-and-them attitude was also common 
among the Enlightenment philosophes of the Eighteenth Century. Burckhardt 
explains that in Renaissance Italy: 
Each individual, even among the lowest of the people, felt himself inwardly 
emancipated from the control of the State and its police, whose title to respect 
37. Heller, Op. Cit., pp 301-302 
38 Caspari, Op. Cit., p 183 
39 Caspari, Op. Cit., pp 349-353 
4° Garin, Op. Cit., p 34 
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was illegitimate, and itself founded on violence; and no man believed any 
longer in the justice of the law.41 
Here we have yet another kind of equivocation in the virtue of justice — justice 
was understood as the means of controlling people, yet the same people had no 
respect for justice. 
The virtues of self-control and moderation 
During the Renaissance, self-control, temperance and moderation were all 
considered desirable, but as virtues they lacked much of the discipline and rigor of 
previous eras. The asceticism of the previous Christian periods was still evident 
for some groups such as the Puritans and Calvinists, but not the rest. The focus 
for self-control in Spenser's The Faerie Queene was more about managing sorrow 
ana dreariness than the more traditional Christian concerns with controlling 
pleasures and lusts. 42 For Montaigne moderation was 'the refusal of excess or 
lopsidedness, and ... the preliminary to the good health of one's being.' 43 
Montaigne's idea of moderation was aimed at discouraging fanaticism, 
martyrdom, heroism and greatness, and was encapsulated as `.1e propose une vie 
basse et sans lustre'.44 However, a basic or simple life without gloss and glamour 
is hardly the image we have of Renaissance life with its gloriously elaborate 
clothing, art and architecture. As with virtue in general, self-control was no 
lohger a simple, singular standard, in this case an ascetic standard, but was now 
generally viewed as a method for living and was synonymous — for some - with 
autonomy and freedom. 'Its component elements are a recognition of one's 
position, a feeling for one's concrete possibilities, a willingness to adjust one's 
41 Burckhardt (1937), Op. Cit., p233 
42 Cummings Robert, 'Spenser's "Twelve Private Morall Virtues" in Spenser Studies: A 
Renaissance Poetry Annual, Princeton, NJ. 1987; 8:35-59, p 46  
43 McFarlane, Op. Cit., p 93 
" Essais, iii.2, 782 (b); GF 20 quoted in McFarlane, Op. Cit., p96 
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desires and goals to the given situation and given possibilities, and a relative 
degree of contentment.' 45 Temperance was now largely a flexible equivocal 
value, relative to the individual and aimed at balancing the uncertainties, 
justifying the excesses and allowing for the new possibilities of the age. 
The virtues of wisdom and prudence 
With retrospect, we can see that wisdom and knowledge about specialised 
subjects were a requirement and a trigger for the rise and development of 
industrialisation, capitalism and the associated rise of the middle classes. 
Prudence and especially self-knowledge were also important in this period. 
Montaigne for instance, stressed the importance of 'know thyself', an ancient 
maxim that will be crucial for the Enlightenment philosophers. Self-
understanding was needed to distinguish between good and bad, to recognise the 
source of one's motivations and to determine (in line with one's temperament) 
which sorts of virtue could and should be practised. For Montaigne, virtue was 
closely 'linked to a conscious urge to discover the truth about ourselves.' 46 The 
Shakespearean statement about being true to self resonated with this as well. By 
contrast to this internal sort of view, Machiavelli considered prudence in very 
pragmatic terms. 
The new prince must learn to regard the traditional qualities as virtue or vice 
merely at first blush, as good or bad prima facie, as only seemingly good or bad. 
To do so would be to act prudently, for whenever the prince uses them as means 
they may prove to be the reverse of what they are traditionally classified. He 
may adopt them as useful, and therefore good, if on examination no bad effect 
is likely to follow, and drop them if they endanger the chosen end!' 
45 Heller, Op. Cit., p 289 
46 McFarlane, Op. Cit., p 84 
47 De Grazia, Op. Cit., p 309 
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In This light, prudence became an act of reason applied to choosing the right action 	 
for the individual and the situation he finds himself in, but it was also used to 
juggle the priority virtues. This was something of a general trend. 
The concept ofphronesis took on a new meaning. Not only must general values 
be applied in a manner appropriate to the individual, concrete situation; in each 
concrete situation the hierarchy of values must constantly be re-created, with 
some values being rejected and others reinterpreted, in the search for the 'mean 
value' between the general and the subjective-individual, between what is 
demanded and what is possible." 
This notion of a flexible, individual hierarchy was paralleled in the social 
hierarchy. Society continued to be hierarchical, but people were no longer 
necessarily locked in to the class into which they had been born. 
A man with a good sense of business, with an eye for enlarging and exploiting 
his land, had a fine chance of improving his lot, of becoming not a 'knight' - 
although he still might receive that title - but a `gentleman'...49 
This social dynamism encouraged a corresponding flexibility in the definitions 
and hierarchy of particular virtues — people needed and wanted to be able to adjust 
their values to the various social circumstances in which they found themselves. 
Thus, people with the skills and capability to move through the social structure 
particularly needed prudence in order to adjust their values and behaviours 
accordingly. However, there remained traces of more traditional views as well. 
For Elyot, prudence consisted of: honour toward God, maturity and moderation, 
foresight, consultation, decisiveness, experience, modesty, industry and 
circumspection5° - a prudent blend of old Christian values and the new 
appreciation for active, efficient industriousness. 
48. Heller, Op. Cit., pp 307-308 
49 Caspari, Op. Cit., p 13 
5° Elyot Sir Thomas, The Book named The Governor, Ed. S.E. Lehmberg, (London: J. M. Dent and 
Sons Ltd, 1970), pp 78-85 
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The virtue of magnificence 
The Renaissance virtue of magnificence was a Homeric sort virtue — to do with 
glory, nobility, material excellence, and not really a matter of character (as it had 
been for Aristotle and to some extent Aquinas) or moral behaviour at all. 
[Magnificence] entailed the appropriate expenditure of large sums of money for 
public buildings, religious offices and the like... [it] enjoyed a considerable 
vogue in the Renaissance, to some extent because it could be used as a suitably 
classical compliment when praising wealthy patrons such as Cosimo de 
Medici. 51 
Personal excellence, as evidenced by material wealth and nobility, by either birth 
or acquisition, typified the virtue of magnificence in this period. Think of the 
unprecedented opulence of fabrics and jewels that we see in the paintings of this 
period, and the astonishing sums of money spent by kings and queens, princes and 
popes on art works for cathedrals, palaces and their own personal collections. 
Aquinas' sense of magnificence, as doing great deeds in order to achieve heavenly 
happiness also persisted. For example, Spenser's Arthur was a character who 
achieved all the virtues finally arriving at magnificence that was 'demonstrated in 
doing great things, in "working his own perfection" which is the best that 
mortality can do, but its promise consists in partaking of the divine nature.' 52 
Naturally, in this era of disagreement, there were many people who disapproved 
ormagnificence and all its trappings. 
[Florimonte] maintained that men were so inclined to pursue pleasure that it 
was practically impossible for them to use wealth well because they were 
unable to resist the many opportunities for dissolute living which it offered 
them. The Calvinist Florens Wilson, who had an even lower opinion of human 
nature, thought it very rare indeed for a wealthy man to avoid the besetting sin 
of pride.53 
51 Kraye (1988), Op. Cit., p 332 
52 Cummings, Op. Cit., p41 
53 Kraye (1988), Op. Cit., p 332 
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Perhaps magnificence had to be a virtue if the full potential of this period — its art, 
its exploration, its artisans and its extraordinary personalities — was to be 
exploited or lavishly displayed in all its glory. Indeed, to be human in the 
Renaissance was to be practical - business like, money oriented, success oriented, 
Aristotelian, pragmatic, that is, concerned with what is possible rather than 
alisolute values. At the same time it was to be idealistic - Platonic, concerned 
with abstract ideas, beauty, order, bookishness, promoting the ideas of Utopias 
and education for all sorts of people. Thus to be magnificent was entirely 
consistent with simply being a human in the Renaissance. It was also a necessary 
component of being individually human. As the medieval barriers between 
classes became less concrete and people of different classes lived in closer 
proximity to each other, a new means of standing out from the crowd became 
necessary. Burckhardt explains that the modern form of glory, fame, celebrity 
became the moral postulate that governed individual aspiration and 
achievement. 54 This drive for glory was ostensibly a drive for excellence and 
virtue, but 'amid all the preparations outwardly to win and secure fame the curtain 
is now and then drawn aside, and we see with frightful evidence a boundless 
ambition and thirst after greatness, independent of all means and consequences.' 55 
The Renaissance virtue of magnificence was the least equivocal of all the major 
virtues of this period. Yet, its connection to societal flourishing, as such, was 
surely ambiguous. 
The virtues of honour, loyalty and courtesy 
Honour had been an outcome or a marker of virtue for the ancient Greeks, though 
as we have noted before, in the later stages of the Roman Empire it was a political 
54 Burckhardt (1958), Op. Cit., p 162 
55 Ibid. 
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reward representing ambition rather than virtue. The early Christians had resisted 
connections between virtue and honour until Aquinas finally gave it respectability 
again as an outcome or motivation for virtue. In Renaissance literature, notably in 
Shakespeare's Horatio, honour 'came to occupy the very pinnacle of the hierarchy 
of values.' 56 
The honest man was the one who could be counted on, who was there to help 
when there was trouble, who would not commit treachery. These were the 
simplest and most elementary values, but at a time when all other values were 
uncertain these fixed, elementary values could become centra1. 57 
Loyalty was a value that could no longer be taken for granted. Loyalty of a 
servant to a master had become problematic, as new class loyalties were emerging 
with the growing interest in equality. Loyalty could no longer be reliably bought - 
betrayal and treachery were commonplace — and loyalty that had been freely and 
autonomously chosen was now preferred." Furthermore, Id]uring the 
Renaissance it became self-evident once more that it was possible to be "true" to 
an idea, belief, or Weltanschauung59, that this kind of fidelity was more binding 
that any personal tie'6° thus reflecting the ancient position 'I love Plato, but I love 
truth more'. Moreover, what comprised the truth that deserved fidelity would 
have to be a matter for the individual to choose. 
Courtesy, as a Renaissance virtue, was more than good manners or the 
frills and formalities of behaviour at court, though it was certainly these things 
also. It was exemplified by the Tudor humanists, but it was common to major 
cities and especially courts elsewhere. Courtesy was very much class and gender 
bound. The courteous Renaissance gentleman — like the agreeable Athenian 
56 Heller, Op. Cit., p 293 
57 Ibid. 
58 Heller, Op. Cit., p294 
59 Philosophy of life or world view 
69 Heller, Op. Cit., p298 
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gentleman - behaved according to his station in life, being respectful,_affable or 
firm as appropriate. He would also enforce his moral values on 'recalcitrant, law-
breaking members of his own class,' and fight anyone who threatened his 
position, class or idea of justice. 61 This courtesy required courage and 
commitment to moral values as well as generosity, especially among the 
gentlemanly group. 62 
These three virtues — honesty, loyalty, courtesy — were each aimed to some 
extent at social order and the problems faced by Renaissance society of 
selfishness and corruption. They were perhaps the only virtues, other than 
magnificence, that had a clear relationship to what communities and society 
perceived was needed to thrive in this era. On the other hand, given the picture 
we have from the history of this period, society at this time was thriving on 
corruption, power abuse, exploitation and the aggrandisement of individuals. As 
with courage and constancy, these virtues might have been reactionary and a 
matter of clinging to values of the past. 
The virtue offriendship 
Friendship was important for the Tudor humanists and was emphasised in the 
works of Sidney, Elyot and Spenser as being closely connected with communal, 
indeed cosmic well-being. Friendship between good people provided the strength 
necessary to meet the difficulties faced in establishing and maintaining a good 
state. Friendship was 'a harmonious and unifying force' that both created and was 
concord — the world was held together by love and friendship. 63 For Montaigne, 
friendship comprised 'Moderation, loyalty, consistency, pleasure, tactile quality 
61 Caspari, Op. Cit., p 354-355 
62 Cummings, Op. Cit., p 51 
63 Caspari, Op. Cit., p 307 and p 339 
142 
(polissure), warmth of feeling and avoidance of total independence2_64 However 
Montaigne did not view friendship as a virtue per se, rather he saw it as something 
necessary for virtue. For Montaigne, virtue required the presence of other people 
and was justified and validated by two external reference points — God and 
friendship. Furthermore, virtue only existed because it could be externalised — 
and for Montaigne the means to this were friendship and writing. 65 Friendship 
would have been necessary or desirable for the co-operative ideal of early Italian 
humanism, but it fell by the wayside in the sixteenth century Italian culture of 
tyranny and distrust. Thus, it is problematic to view friendship as a characteristic 
Renaissance virtue. 
The virtue of piety 
Only Spenser, among many sources, included piety (or holiness) as a significant 
virtue - yet for all their rejection of the Scholastic system, Church authority and 
the multitude of Christian virtues, the people of this period were still, by and 
large, practising Christians. Countless people died for their religious beliefs - 
think of the brief but bloody reign of Queen Mary. The Reformation swept 
through large parts of Europe and was embraced by communities where the sort 
of magnificence and luxury described above was unknown or irrelevant. Piety 
seems to still have been a virtue and central to life in some parts of Europe, but 
• elsewhere was perhaps becoming more of a social custom. 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
This period was surprisingly modem in the considerable collection of sometimes 
conflicting motivating factors that might impel people to practice the virtues. 
Machiavelli was blunt about the role of self-interest; though he recognised that 
64 McFarlane, Op. Cit., p 99 
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self-interest need not necessarily conflict with virtue and goodness. He suggested 
that ethical principles and values were only certain of motivating virtuous 
behaviour when they coincided with self-interest. He also suggested that while 
virtues and ethics had a certain level of autonomy and power, they were 
themselves often determined by interest. Furthermore, he argued that pursuing 
one's own interests might lead to good, but only when these interests were in 
harmony with good values and virtues. 66 
Machiavelli also recognised that choice, circumstances and opportunities 
had an important role to play. If one's children were penniless and starving, one 
had no choice but to steal, that is, in certain circumstances one could not choose to 
be virtuous. Furthermore, if one was powerful and able to avoid punishment, one 
could choose to do wrong in ways that others, lacking such power, could not so 
easily choose. 
Montaigne was interested in the disparity that could occur between virtue 
and the appearance of virtue. He saw that what appeared to be a virtuous response 
might in fact merely be a horror of cruelty, poor judgment, anger, pride, or the 
mellowing of old age, and so on. He argued that true virtue had to be autonomous 
and motivated for its own sake — anything else was mere appearance of virtue. 67 
The Renaissance educational reforms, as well as works on Utopias and the 
nature of society were aspiring to achieve motivations for virtue that overtly made 
connections between individual moral choices and the success and good of 
society. Many Renaissance people were interested in the creation of a 'good' 
society and they saw leaders educated in the virtues to be the primary means of 
65 McFarlane, Op. Cit., p 100 
66  Heller, Op. Cit., p 319 
67  McFarlane, Op. Cit., pp 78-80 
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the social development they sought. Meanwhile the -old motivating factors of 
heaven and hell, Church and religion, together with the very old ones of glory and 
honour were all part of the debate as well. However, shame was so far from being 
a quasi virtue that in this period it did not even seem to be a motivating factor. 
Montaigne remarked (unhappily, I think) that 'repentance, so far from constituting 
a virtue, is taken to be a reneging on one's essential beffig.' 68 
Thus, we find deep tension between the old Christian ideas about what 
motivated virtue and new concerns about self-interest and what we might call self-
deception — placing value in what may only be the appearance of virtue. Given 
that virtue was now a matter of personal temperament, luck and circumstances, 
then the motivation for virtue would tend to be an individual matter as well. The 
decline of both shame and the importance of community response — who needs a 
reputation for excellence when one's material wealth and opulent way of living 
were visible for everyone to see and could even signify God's approval — were 
also.manifestations of this new individualism and individual choice. 
Along with the range of conflicting possibilities for the motivation to 
virtue was a 'bewildering diversity' of opinions about the source of human 
happiness. Again, these opinions were conflicting and seemed to reduce to 
individual choice. Montaigne wrote that people found happiness in virtue, 
pleasure, following nature, knowledge, the absence of pain, or in 'not being 
deceived by appearances'. 69 Happiness was no longer to be found exclusively in 
the practice of virtue and we should note that happiness from the contemplation of 
God did not even make it into Montaigne's lengthy list. Pico Della Mirandola 
explained at an important international meeting of humanists that everything has a 
68 McFarlane, Op. Cit., p 83 
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— nature - a particular way of being and behaving – except humans. 'Man alone has 
no nature which determines him and has no essence to determine his behaviour.' 70 
The individual created himself and his only compulsion was to 'be free and ... 
choose his own destiny'.7I Thus, each individual chose what would make them 
happy. Heller writes that happiness was now a 'category of everyday life' rather 
than an ethical concept. It was significant to the individual; it was understood in 
terms of its content for the individual and it continued to be a matter of rational 
choice by the individual, but by the Renaissance happiness was ethically neutra1. 72 
The age-old link between virtue and community leadership was also 
beginning to deteriorate. Machiavelli's prince was lord and master of his 
principality – through either inheritance or conquest – but his link with the 
territory and the people was 'external... fragile and continually under threat' 73 . 
His role was not to protect, strengthen and enhance the flourishing of his domain, 
but to retain, protect and strengthen his ownership. This was achieved by the 
prudent and highly contingent application (or lack of application) of virtue, 
, 
described earlier in this chapter. Here we have a significant change from the role 
of say a leader in Periclean Athens, whose virtue aimed at making a direct 
contribution to societal flourishing. 
Over the previous three chapters, we saw a series of diverse modes of 
human transformation through virtue. Hellenistic virtue transformed individuals 
such that they could create a sense of order and community while standing back 
from the chaos and alienation of Imperial society at large. Early Christian virtue 
69 Kraye (1988), Op. Cit., p317 
7° Garin, op. Cit., p 105 
71 ibid. 
72 Heller, Op. Cit., pp 286-287 
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—transformed individuals into people who created close-knit, 'alien' communities 
that were often deliberately and directly in confrontation with mainstream society. 
Medieval virtue transformed people in such a way that they could cope with all 
manner of disasters and difficulties and thus ensure the survival of family, clan, 
community, Church and society as a whole. 
Underpinning the relationship between virtue and societal flourishing were 
the same innate tendencies of humans - to foster reciprocal relationships, divide 
their labour, and depend on each other – which we observed in the Greek eras. 
Throughout these centuries from the Macedonian Empire to the beginning of the 
Renaissance, virtue was the only known way of life that was supportive and 
conducive to the order, stability and some level of trust between people that were 
necessary if people were to live together in social groups. I would argue that 
virtue could only have been the way of life if there were no other possibilities – 
and there apparently were none until the Renaissance – and while virtue delivered 
the stability, order and so on that society needed to flourish. The intriguing 
question that the history of Renaissance virtue raises is: 'What came first?' Did 
the mutual, reciprocal relationship between virtue and societal flourishing 
deteriorate leaving a vacuum to be filled by other values and institutions, or did 
the new ideas and possibilities push virtue from centre stage? Were individualism 
and scepticism – two factors that will become even more prominent in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries – the means to this deterioration or the 
result? I suggest there is more evidence of the former, though certainly the break 
down of the relationship between virtue and societal flourishing seemed to 
encourage and promote individualism and scepticism. 
73 Foucault Michel, `Governmentality' in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmental ity, 
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The Renaissance marks the time in history when the motivations for virtue 
became unclear, diverse and contradictory, and when virtue — previously always 
in a direct, exclusive and reciprocal relationship with happiness — began to 
compete with many other possibilities. This tension was also reflected in the 
extremes of optimism and pessimism that people had toward virtue in this period. 
The optimism of the early Italian humanists and the relative pessimism of the later 
ones can perhaps be understood simply in the light of the political tyranny of the 
later period. The optimism of the Tudor humanists and their profound concern 
with virtue, and the pessimism and absence of direct references to virtue in their 
contemporary Shakespeare seems more difficult to reconcile. Montaigne found 
the need to argue against sceptical and pessimistic people who 'teach us that the 
questing after virtue is rugged and wearisome'. 74 Meanwhile, some of the 
important mechanics of civilisation — values, shame and blame, honour and praise 
— had been disrupted. 75 The Renaissance and then the Reformation 
disenfranchised and opened to question established truths about morality, virtue, 
happiness and religion. People in the Renaissance could (and carefully did) 
question the scientific rationality of the notion of immortality, casting a shadow 
over the Christian foundation of ethics. Humanists such as the sixteenth century 
Pietro Pomponazzi insisted that a rejection of 'at least the rational certainty of 
immortality, cannot, however, shake the foundations of ethics' 76 because `[v]irtue 
and happiness are... two aspects of the same reality.' Nevertheless, doubts had 
been exposed. Not merely from virtue's association with immortality, religion 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller Eds., (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1991a), p90 
74 Montaigne Michel de, The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, Trans.and Ed. M. A. Screech, 
(London: Allen Lane Penguin Books, 1991), pp 90-91 
5 Rothwell Kenneth S., 'Hamlet's "Glass of Fashion": Power, Self and the Reformation' in 
Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, Eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman 
and Patrick H. Hutton, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p 81 
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and the Church, but also because of _a new awareness — through travel and the 
dissemination of books — that other cultures and other religions had different 
moral rules. How could people know what God 'really' wanted if there was more 
than one system of values? Scepticism about the Church, religion, authority of all 
kind and virtue; together with the shift from community ethos to individual choice 
depending on temperament, luck, circumstances and personal beliefs and 
preferences, were two of the key factors that will ultimately break down the link 
between virtue and societal flourishing. 
By the end of the Renaissance, virtue was a shaky, uncertain, equivocal 
concept, open to a raft of choices by the individual. Some of the most important 
virtues of this era might have been closely associated with the flourishing of 
society, but they had little to do with what we understand as moral excellence of 
character and far more to do with wealth, power and celebrity. Whether these 
particular virtues supported a desirable sort of flourishing might have been open 
to debate, but it is hard to see — in hindsight — how the steamrollers of modernity 
and individualism could have been stopped. The Seventeenth Century will see 
even greater scepticism, more options and possibilities for human choice and the 
first failures of virtue to be represented as a science. In a world where, 
increasingly, only those things that could be understood scientifically were 
considered real, this will be failure indeed. 
76 Garin, Op. Cit., p141 
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- 9 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY SEARCH FOR A MORAL SCIENCE 
[T]hey, who consider men by themselves and as though they 
existed outside of civil society, can have no moral science 
because they lack any certain standard against which virtue 
and vice can be judged and defined. 
THOMAS HOBBES 1 
This chapter will examine the state of virtue in the Seventeenth Century, not 
because this century was a clearly identifiable, differentiated historical era, but 
because it formed a bridge between the ideas of the Renaissance and the ideas of 
the Enlightenment. An examination of the ideas about virtue and the virtues in 
the Seventeenth Century enables us to understand how the meanings and 
significance of these values and concepts evolved. 
There had been very little that was systematic about moral philosophy or 
ethical thinking in the Renaissance. Knowledge had been valued highly, but it 
was generally - and preferably - a chaotic, colourful, equivocal inundation of 
information, not a scientific, systematic and univocal kind of knowledge. The 
principal characteristic of seventeenth century moral philosophy was the new goal 
of creating a science of ethics and morality. This aim to discover one 
fundamental, universal virtue, value or moral law that explained, supported and 
justified ethics would continue to be a notable theme in the Eighteenth Century. 
However the idea that a science of morals could be established without denying 
the role of God - Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz all gave God a central place 
in their scientific theories on ethics - was much more typical of the Seventeenth 
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Century than the Eighteenth. Indeed,_ for Leibniz the quest for scientific 
knowledge was in itself the ultimate form of worship and of loving God. Loving 
God and searching for new scientific understanding were equivalent and this unity 
provided the source of happiness. 
How do we explain this return to prominence of God as central to human 
morality? The Renaissance humanists, while not atheists, had sought concepts of 
morality and virtue as human ideals — not surprising given their fascination with 
the ideas of ancient Greece. Only the Tudor humanist Sir Thomas Elyot had 
argued strongly for virtue as beatitude. 1C]ontemplation of the divine and eternal 
good makes man similar to God. From it derives his virtue; virtue is active 
application in the world of the divine good which he has beheld.' 2 A view that 
seemed somewhat medieval, though perhaps placed a little more emphasis on 
active worldliness than had been common before the Renaissance. One obvious 
explanation is that many of the prominent seventeenth century philosophers were 
living in northern Europe — places that had not been hotbeds of Renaissance 
humanist thinking, such as Italy and England — though arguably all of Europe had 
been influenced by these ideas. A second explanation would be that the apparent 
atheism of so much humanist thinking — especially in Italy — had been just that — 
apparent. Humanism was repositioning ideals in the human domain rather than 
the divine domain, even though the majority of people continued to be devout 
practising Christians. It was also the case that Renaissance rejection of Church 
authority did not generally include rejection of God. Third, there had been a 
backlash against the atheism or apparent atheism of sixteenth century, Italian 
Hobbes, De homine (ch 13.8) quoted in Tuck Richard, `Hobbes's Moral Philosophy' in The 
Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, Ed. Tom Sorell, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p 180 
2 Caspari, Op. Cit., p177 
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humanist thinking. 3 I suggest all these were contributing factors, -but that the 
second theory is the most explanatorily successful. The decline of Christianity 
took place over many centuries. In the Renaissance a whole raft of new ideas 
were being overlaid and integrated into what were still fundamentally Christian 
ideas and values. These new ideas were interesting and exciting, but we should 
remember that the whole history of Christianity was one of incorporating, 
adapting and assimilating other people's ideas. We could therefore view the 
seventeenth century approach to virtue and ethics — with its attempt at integrating 
new science and rationality with old bedrock ideas about the central place of God 
as a re-balancing of the pendulum, albeit perhaps a temporary balance. 
By the end of the Seventeenth Century, the relationship between virtue and 
societal flourishing had deteriorated significantly. The concepts of virtue and 
virtues, which had so dominated the Western way of life, were now nudged aside 
in favour of concepts of passion and natural law, which seemed to offer more 
potential in the search to find abstract theoretical scientific explanations for 
morality. This search for a science became the centrepiece of the response to the 
problem of scepticism. However, scepticism and the lack of a universal set of 
virtues inherited from the maelstrom of Renaissance thinking were not remedied 
by the rational and scientific thinkers of the Seventeenth Century. Indeed the 
problem was compounded by the redefinition of many old virtues as passions — 
with a silent 'mere' hovering in the background. Moral education as always was 
important, but was largely based on books and values from the Renaissance. 
None of the notable seventeenth century philosophers offered any sort of 
comprehensive analysis of the particular virtues. Hobbes was vitally concerned 
3 Burckhardt (1958), Op. Cit., pp 272-278 
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with social order and social flourishing which he argued could only_be achieved 
through justice, but he shifted justice out of the realm of virtue and redefined it as 
a natural law. Prudence — sound understanding and judgment - was presumably 
necessary for a society that valued rational and scientific thinking, but no one felt 
the need to document or discuss it as a virtue for this period. The scope of virtue 
had almost completely narrowed down to the realm of the individual - in terms of 
the way virtue that was defined, the way virtues (or passions) were generally 
defined and the motivations that were described for virtue. This is somewhat 
ironic because Hobbes and Locke were writing about how virtue could not be 
understood except within the context of human society and communal living. The 
old ideas about a human telos — opened up to question in the Renaissance - had 
now been 'disproved' by science. A new goal of using science to discover a 
human nature that would explain virtue had come to prominence and would 
continue to be widely pursued in the Eighteenth Century. Furthermore, 
motivations for virtue focused on benefits for the individual, with little or no 
concern for communal opinion. 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
The goal of discovering a science of ethics gave rise to a variety of theories about , 
the nature of virtue. Four such theories were Leibniz's theory about the perfection 
of the will, Spinoza's theory about self-preservation, Grotius' theory about natural 
law and the widespread interest in the passions as a scientific explanation of 
morality. 
Leibniz theorised that virtue was essentially the perfection of the will and 
the intellect. (This was not in itself a new idea, but had been proposed by 
Ocicham in the Middle Ages.) The intellect was perfected by the imposition of 
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order on things and by the development of scientific theories (this was a new idea)— 
- and these were achieved via one's reason. The will was perfected through the 
governing and ordering of passions, again via reason. These reasoning processes 
were an imitation of God's wisdom in ordering the world. The idea was that 
people became most perfect, most like God by loving — and they loved because it 
was reasonable to love in proportion to the divine virtue that could be seen in 
others.4 However, Leibniz explained, this sort of love required considerable 
intellectual capacity — the person must scientifically know God - therefore perfect 
virtue was dependent on scientific education and was thus achievable only by an 
elite. The practical consequence of Leibniz's equation between happiness, virtue 
and human good was that individuals and states would be obliged to promote 
universal education in the sciences. 5 
Spinoza explained that the essence of anything was the act of 
endeavouring to persist in being itself, therefore the essence of virtue was the 
power of a human to persist in being himself; that is, the endeavour of self-
preservation and the preservation of one's own advantage. He did not mean 
persisting in being generically human, but persisting in being that particular 
human.' Virtue and endeavour, in Spinoza's view, were linked. Endeavour, the 
essence of self-preservation, defined the natural power and activity of the thing 
and the human's power, activity or capacity for self-preservation was virtue. In 
this respect, Spinoza saw virtue as instrumental and necessary for self-
preservation, but he also claimed we ought to want virtue for its own sake, that 
4 Brown Gregory, `Leibniz's Moral Philosophy' in Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, Ed. 
Nicholas Jolley, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p428 
5 Gregory Brown, Op. Cit., pp 411-413 
6 Spinoza, Ethics, Trans. Andrew Boyle, Introduction T.S. Gregory, (NP: Heron Books, ND), 4p20 
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there is not anything preferable to it, or more useful to us. 7 Furthermore, he_ 
claimed that acting from virtue and acting under the guidance of reason was the 
same thing. s There was no hint of any consideration for a social context or a 
community ethos in these ideas about virtue. They placed virtue firmly in the 
domain of the individual — alone with his thoughts about nature and God. 
There was fairly general agreement that a science of morality could be 
somehow based on the concept of natural law. Grotins — whose work was highly 
influential in this century and the next - presented humans as simultaneously 
sociable and self-interested. His view was that people were sociable because they 
could not survive alone and because they found pleasure in the company of other 
humans, but at the same time, they were unsociable because they tended to be 
independent and competitive. He saw natural law as the explanation for how 
people lived together co-operatively, despite being rational, thinking individuals. 
Grotius saw justice and virtue as both a protection against the conflict that was 
inevitable in any social group, given the unsociable sociability of humans, and as 
the means of sustaining society.9 
Other important theories concerned the passions: their relation to moral 
life, to virtue, and how they could or should be controlled. It had been generally 
assumed in the past that virtue and reason opposed vice and passion, but the 
Seventeenth Century saw a significant change in that relationship. It gradually 
became quite widely accepted that some of the passions had a role in recognising 
good and evil, some had a role in reason itself, and that not all passions were 
destructive and treacherous. Passions could be understood as the 'buds of virtue' 
7 Spinoza, Op. Cit., 4p18 
8 Spinoza, Op. Cit., 4p24 
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and by distinguishing between passions -and interest, and between calm passions 
and violent ones, a scientific understanding of ethics might be achieved. 1° 
We might well ask what did these theories have to do with living and 
flaurishing in the Seventeenth Century. Not a great deal, it would seem. As the 
Seventeenth Century progressed life became more sumptuous, mannered, 
ostentatious" - think of the Restoration and the reign of Louis XIV — good taste, 
appearances and civility were what counted most. 12 More and more people were 
learning to read and in the process were discovering 'the seductions of the self, 
giving priority to privacy and domestic intimacy 13 and, I would argue, retreating 
further and further from community values, common life and universal virtue as a 
way of life. There was awareness that ethical science was not having the desired 
effect on the community at large. 'Many people were unable to understand [the 
notion of ethical science], others understood but remained unmoved, and even its 
most fluent practitioners sometimes failed to act on the conclusions of their own 
proofs.' 14 Yet, Leibniz had been convinced that science not only would improve 
the mind of the individual thinker, but it would improve the material quality of 
human life in genera1. 15 This tension between theories and practice, and 
disappointment that a science of morality was not solving any problems, caused 
philosophers and moralists to increase focus on techniques for directing and 
9 Schneewind J. B., `Locke's Moral Philosophy' in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, Ed. Vere 
Chappell, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp 209-210 
10 James Susan, 'Reason, the Passions, and the Good Life' in The Cambridge History of 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Eds. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p 1391 
II Chartier Roger, 'Epilogue' in A History of Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of the Renaissance, 
Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur Gokihammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), p 610 
12 Revel et al, Op. Cit., pp 306-307 
13 Chartier (1989), Op. Cit., p610 
14 James, Op. Cit., pp 1377-1378 
15 Gregory Brown, Op. Cit., p341 
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controlling emotions, cultivating and perfecting dispositions. I6 Some of these 
techniques and exercises were for discerning people to apply to themselves, but 
many were intended to modify the passions and behaviours of others. Just as we 
saw a class-based discrimination - that subtly (or not so subtly) blamed others for 
the 'moral degradation' of society while assuming the moral high-ground for 
themselves among Renaissance thinkers - this attitude persisted and even 
increased over this century and the next. In the Eighteenth Century — in what was 
perhaps an extension of this attitude - we will find the beginnings of overt and 
deliberate intervention by the State in the morality and happiness of individuals. 
Yet despite the growing absence of a connection between societal 
flourishing, the way of life for individuals and the practice of virtue, seventeenth 
century philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke were arguing that virtue was the 
`meanes to peacable [sic], sociable, and comfortable living'. 17 Furthermore, as 
Hobbes explained, ethics could not be understood (scientifically that is) except 
within the context of a social group. 
[T]hey who consider men by themselves and as though they existed outside of 
civil society, can have no moral science because they lack any certain standard 
against which virtue and vice can be judged and defined. 18 
This has been interpreted as meaning 'UN a conventional moral language, with 
notions of duty or virtue, is inapplicable outside a particular civil society, then of 
course there can be no traditional ethics: 19 It was also taken to support the 
sceptical position that virtue was entirely relative and therefore an empty concept. 
Alternatively, as I suggest is clear from the history I have outlined so far, ideas 
about virtue - such as that virtues were habits, virtue was wisdom, virtue was love 
16 James, Op. Cit., p 1378 
17 Hobbes, quoted in Kraye (1998), Op. Cit., p 1306 
18 Ibid. 
19 Tuck, Op. Cit., p 180 
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- were not passed down the centuries pristinely, but were adapted and refined in 
each era. Virtues and ideas about virtue were periodically rediscovered, modified 
and tailored to suit the needs of the place and time. The point that I think Hobbes 
was making was that there was no such thing as personal or individual ethics, or a 
personal set of moral values, only ethics within an ethos - that it made no sense to 
separate virtue from society. However, Hobbes was incorrect in equating mores 
and virtues, because while it is clear that certain social customs — such as 
polygamy and fighting duels were 'praised by some and condemned by others' - 
these mores had never been accorded the status of virtues per se. Nevertheless, 
there was clearly a relationship — just not an equality - between the set of values 
that were called manners and the set of values that were called virtues. We saw 
earlier claims that manners and mores were more necessary to social flourishing 
than virtues, or that they were virtues themselves during the Renaissance. 
In a similar vein, Locke noted that 'The general agreement that virtue is 
praiseworthy can be explained as a result of the general awareness that virtue is 
useful to society.'" He also remarked that `Vertue [was] the highest Perfection 
of humane Nature [sic]' and was 'necessary to the preservation of Society, and 
visibly beneficial to all, with whom the Virtuous Man has to do.' 21 
The irony (from a twenty-first century perspective) is that at the same time 
that this important relationship — between virtue and the survival and flourishing 
of society — was being recognised, examined and discussed, virtue itself, as a 
compelling way of life that enabled societies to flourish, was on the wane. 
Actually virtue was not just quietly declining; it was under attack from several 
directions. Scepticism about morality, which was becoming evident in the 
20 Schneewind, Op. Cit., p200 
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previous period, had continued to grow and even works by people such as Locke 
who were trying to combat scepticism were being read and criticised as if they 
were promoting it. Despite the growing religious scepticism, seventeenth century 
European and British societies continued to be predominantly Christian and 
devout. However, the fifteen hundred-year association between virtue and 
religion, the grounding of Christianity in practical morality and virtue, had by now 
been swept away in significant sections of society by the Lutheran pronouncement 
of virtue as outside the realm of human endeavour. 22 The third and possibly most 
significant and enduring source of attack was the new science. Virtue seemed to 
defy scientific analysis and proof. Certainly, no one was able to define a set of 
Newtonian style laws that were persuasive and widely accepted. In a world where 
science was explaining nature in new and exciting ways it looked like virtue 
might not be explainable in this way and therefore might have no reality. In 
addition, the very act of attempting to create an ethical science — even when it 
aimed, as Hobbes' work did, to support rather than undermine conventional 
morality — was seen by readers to be materialistic, deterministic, atheistic and 
egoistic. The very process of attempting to describe ethics as a science was taken 
to be a threat to Christian values. 23 This is not surprising. Unquestioning 
obedience had been central to Christian morality and values for more than 
2 L Yolton John W., A Locke Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp 315-316 
22  By contrast with the rationalist perspective, the notion that virtue was a gift from God had been 
revived and given prominence again by Luther in the previous era. Increasing numbers of people 
joining (increasing numbers of) Protestant sects viewed virtue as not only something that was 
given by God, but were committed to the notion that no amount of effort by the individual could 
achieve it. In the Lutheran view, morality had nothing to do with reason and virtuous effort was 
irrelevant. This was because a moral life was available only through righteousness — and 
righteousness was a gift of God, rather than any kind of human achievement. The person aspiring 
to a moral life must passively believe and hope that 'God will give them the "alien righteousness, 
instilled in us without our works by grace alone" which is the only means to salvation.' See 
James, Op. Cit., p 1382 
23  Kraye Jill, 'Conceptions of Moral Philosophy' in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-
Century Philosophy, Volume 2, Eds. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp 1305-1306 
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fourteen centuries — this sort embedded, fundamental value could--not be swept 
aside quickly. Rational Christians like the Cambridge Platonists also objected to 
Hobbes' account of ethics. 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
In their concern to find scientific and fundamental laws to explain morality, 
seventeenth century rationalists had relatively little time for the particular virtues. 
Spinoza asserted that the 'Christian "virtues" [such] as humility, repentance and 
pity are not virtues at all but evils, because they are all species of sadness and 
hence indications of lack of power: 24 Hope was an emotion and an inconsistent, 
contradictory, possibly even irrational one at that. 'Hope is an uncertain pleasure 
arison [sic] from the idea of a thing past or present, the event of which we still 
doubt to some extent.' 25 Neither benevolence nor modesty were virtues according 
to Spinoza, but were merely 'the desire of doing such things as please men and 
omitting such as do not.' 26 Meanwhile Hobbes redefined repentance, hope, pity, 
charity and magnanimity as passions or emotions and he described them in the 
same manner as his descriptions of admiration, weeping, laughter, lust and 
indignation.27 Hobbes did not go so far as to call humility an evil, but he did 
describe it as 'the passion which utterly cows a man, that he neither dare speak 
publicly, nor expect good from any action.' We might imagine that Hobbes and 
Spinoza were not reliable sources for an examination of Christian virtues, being 
perhaps prejudiced by their own beliefs. However, nor had these virtues been 
promoted in Spenser's The Faerie Queene or in Sir Thomas Elyot's lengthy 
24 Garrett Don, 'Spinoza's Ethical Theory', in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, Ed. Don 
Garrett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p 305 
25 Spinoza, Op. Cit., 3d12 
26 Spinoza, Op. Cit., 3d43 
27 Hobbes Thomas, The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic, Ed. Ferdinand Tonnies, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), pp 30-33 
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analysis of virtue in The Governor, written in the previous era. Both of these 
works continued to be enormously popular in the Seventeenth Century and were 
viewed as excellent material for moral education. 
Young British boys continued to be taught the classical education syllabus 
devised by More and Erasmus, and throughout Europe, children were still being 
educated using books based on Erasmus' Manners for Children. The universities 
were teaching a syllabus based on Aristotle and the majority of people were 
practising Christians. Indeed Locke was convinced that 'only an understanding of 
morality to which God was essential could win the assent of the vast majority of 
Europeans'.28 Locke was notably concerned with the importance of education and 
virtue. He proposed strict guidelines for training and manipulating the desires of 
children 'from their very Cradles' to ensure they found pleasure only in virtuous 
or moral behaviour.29 Locke argued that such education was necessary because 
people had no innate sense of what was right and what was wrong. However, 
what virtues and morals were to be taught? I could find no seventeenth century 
descriptions of the virtues that were not repeating values from the Renaissance 
period or earlier. Why was there no distinctly seventeenth century virtue 
catalogue, not even a rough collection of vaguely shared values as we found in the 
Renaissance? 
The pro-society quality of virtue 
The Seventeenth Century had an odd sort of parallel to that earlier time of single- 
mindedness about virtue — the Hellenistic era. Nearly two thousand years earlier, 
the focus on endurance and management of fear had meant there was little 
28 Schneewind, Op. Cit., p219 
29 Colman John, John Locke's Moral Philosophy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 
pp 230-234 
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attention paid to many of the particular virtues. In this century, the particular 
virtues were again given scant attention, but this time it is because of a single-
minded focus on the pursuit of a scientific law or a theory that would rationally 
explain the whole of virtue. We find that the concepts of justice and prudence 
were held to be important to societal flourishing, but that they were not virtues as 
such any more. 
Hobbes maintained that justice was both one of the laws of nature and a 
legal obligation of the citizen. He examined the mutual trust and dependence 
between people living in a society and found it could only be 'dared' if each could 
rely on a certain level of justice from the other. 3° Hobbes was also highly 
concerned with issues of civil order and authority in the aftermath of the death of 
Charles 1 and the Commonwealth. The legal justice system and the necessity of 
obedience to constituted authority were important themes in Hobbes' work and 
both of these aspects of justice and just behaviour were necessary, in his view, to 
social order and flourishing. 
Leibniz also considered justice to be highly significant - but in a very 
different way. He constructed a legalistic three-tiered system of justice that 
encompassed all the old virtues. First, personal justice or prudence was motivated 
by self-interest and could be encapsulated by the precept 'Harm no man'. Second, 
social justice or the social virtues was motivated by a sense of humanity and was 
described by the precept 'Give each man his own'. The third level, spiritual 
justice or the moral virtues was motivated by religion and expressed by the 
precept 'Live righteously'. 31 This venture at a science of virtue as justice was 
30 Hobbes, Op. Cit., p65 
31 Hostler John, Leibniz's Moral Philosophy, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 1975), p 
56 
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interesting for the absence of any significant concern with or importance placed in 
social order or even mere social mechanics. Leibniz's system was concerned with 
virtue and justice as a matter for individual rather than societal flourishing. 
Justice for Leibniz was motivated by the individual's knowledge of God - who 
provided a perfect exemplar - and the individual's knowledge that all acts of 
justice and injustice would be, respectively, rewarded and punished. Furthermore, 
Leibniz's definition of justice — charity of the wise — saw justice and virtue as a 
synthesis of love and prudence in the moral agent. Virtue was a rational love of 
God, giving the agent such pleasure that altruism became possible without 
diminishing individual welfare, and was then tempered by prudence to form the 
notion of justice.32 Justice and virtue, in this science, were matters that fell within 
the domain of the individual and God only. Over the history I have outlined so 
far, many of the virtues had been defined and described as matters of individual 
choice and behaviour. However, it was rare indeed for justice — the most 
obviously socially oriented of the virtues, and the only one that could not possibly 
be practised alone — to be treated as a solely individual matter. 
Prudence on the other hand was often mentioned — named that is, not 
comprehensively described — as a virtue and we might imagine that prudence and 
wisdom should have been important virtues when rationality and scientific 
thinking were so highly esteemed. However, perhaps it was the case that if 
rationality and scientific thinking could not discover a law to explain morality and 
virtue, then wisdom and prudence could not be real virtues. 
There is very little potential for finding interdependencies between social 
flourishing, cultural, social and political needs and problems, and the virtues per 
32  Hostler, Op. Cit., p 54 
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se in this period. Hobbes linked his ideas about natural law and justice to social 
concerns of the time, but his contemporaries and almost all the thinkers of the 
next century displayed an urgent need to deny the scepticism, anti-religion, doubt 
and gloom they perceived in his work. Unless things such as good taste — in 
literature, music, architecture, gardening, clothing, food and so on — or social 
distinction were elevated to the status of virtue - and I have found no evidence 
that seventeenth century thinkers asserted or even implied this — then what 
actually made society flourish in this century had little or nothing to do with what 
had traditionally been understood as virtue. The drift we saw in the previous 
period - toward individual choice, individual conscience and the goals of 
satisfying individual desires and sense of self, and away from the sort of 
community oriented social ethos that had underpinned virtue throughout all its 
preceding history - had grown into an irreversible tide. 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
Meanwhile, it was not only the particular virtues that were under threat from new 
ideas. The human telos and its connection with virtue - in fact teleological 
thinking in general - was also challenged by the new science. Scholastic physics 
had long claimed that all things had a purpose — as ordained by God - and things 
had an innate tendency to move toward their 'natural sphere'. The newly 
discovered principle of inertia demonstrated that in fact when left to itself a body 
would continue to move according to its last influence. Non-teleological physics 
raised a serious question mark over traditional notions of Christian human 
teleology (that the purpose of human life was to know and love God) or the even 
older telos of eudaimonia or human happiness and flourishing in the world. It 
also accentuated the possibility that there was no particular human nature — that 
humans were 'essentially unstructured and completely open to external 
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influence'. 33 If there was no human telos to be achieved via the practice of virtue, 
then 'Why be virtuous?' suddenly became a crucial question. 
Perhaps as a remedy or backlash to these findings, the Seventeenth 
Century saw the beginning of a new sort of telos, with some thinkers seeking 
evidence of moral qualities or faculties in human nature and social institutions. 
This teleological or providential naturalism will be central to mainstream 
Enlightenment thinking in the next century, but it too will not provide enough 
evidence to make the awkward question of 'Why be virtuous?' disappear. 34 
Meanwhile, many seventeenth century thinkers continued to offer traditional 
teleological approaches to human life, virtue and happiness. For instance, Locke 
insisted that people constantly seek happiness and that it cannot be defined in 
entirely earthly terms. 'The complete achievement of happiness is not possible 
here on earth, but only in Heaven.' Locke argued that human life in this world 
was a 'pilgrimage.., under probation', that the terms of this probation could only 
be fulfilled by good actions and that this was the only means to true (heavenly) 
happiness.35 Likewise, Leibniz continued to privilege eternal life as a 
motivation.36 
The motivations for virtue in the Seventeenth Century were also notable 
for their apparent lack of prominence for community values and opinions. 
Leibniz described a continuum of three motives for virtue — consideration of one's 
own happiness, consideration of the happiness of others and finally the 
33 Norton, Op. Cit., pp 87-88 
34 Haakonssen Knud, 'Divine/Natural Law Theories in Ethics' in The Cambridge History of 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Eds. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p 1351 
35 Colman, Op. Cit., p 3 
36 Hostler, Op. Cit., pp 65-66 
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'conscience' that comes from an awareness of God. 37 However even Leibniz'-s 
motivation from consideration of the happiness of others had an undertone of: 
because that would make me even happier. As in the Renaissance, shame — 
except as a means of educating the passions of children within the family 
context38 - rated little mention from seventeenth century thinkers and did not 
apparently involve serious concern for community opinion. Spinoza merely 
stated that 'Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own 
which we imagine others to blame.' 39 
While the new science and rationalist ideas were clearly adding to the 
undermining of moral beliefs and values that had begun in the last period, these 
ways of thinking were not perceived as the danger to virtue, per se. There was a 
strong desire to accommodate scientific and rational ideas into morality and blame 
other factors for the threat. Scepticism and religious enthusiasm were both seen 
as major hazards to the decency and stability of society ° and provided much of 
the impetus for thinking and debate about morality and virtue in this century and 
the next. We have reached a point in the history of virtue where a significant 
proportion of the population was committed to a view that no amount of earthly 
effort could achieve virtue. Many of the rest had doubts about the relevance of 
virtue to their own life and happiness. The rationalism and science of the 
Seventeenth Century, aimed at dispelling the worrying doubts and scepticism of 
the previous couple of centuries had in fact produced more scepticism and worry. 
No one had been able to make a science of virtue or at least not a science that was 
convincing. Eighteenth century thinkers will view this as a crisis and concerted 
37 Hostler, Op. Cit., p 60 
38 Colman, Op. Cit., p231 
39 Spinoza, Op. Cit., 3d31 
4° Schneewind, Op. Cit., p219 
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but ultimately unsuccessful efforts will be made, on both sides of the Channel, to 
find a remedy. 
167 
10 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MORAL CRISIS 
Where is happiness to be found? Who knows it? Everyone is 
looking for it, but nobody finds it. 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU I 
Rousseau was no doubt a bit of a pessimist and other Enlightenment thinkers were 
determined to be more optimistic — nevertheless everyone agreed that finding a 
universal answer to this crucial question was a great concern and difficulty. The 
age-old link between happiness and virtue could no longer be taken for granted 
and did not seem capable of a rational explanation, justification or proof that 
would be universally accepted. In a variation on seventeenth century goals, 
eighteenth century thinkers placed their hopes in the notion that something 
essential in human nature could be discovered in a 'single interpretive principle' — 
along the lines of Newton's law of gravity — and that this would be the key to a 
universal morality and happiness. 2 The Socratic recommendation 'Know Thyself 
was seen by the Enlightenment philosophes as both the invitation to moral self-
mastery and the means to a universal moral science.3 
Beyond this hope in the discoverability and enlightenment of human 
nature, any unity that might be found in the Enlightenment thinkers certainly did 
not include unanimity. Some persisted tenaciously in their Christian beliefs, 
while others explored atheism and materialism. Some remained loyal to old class 
structures and dynastic authority, while others developed new ideas of democracy 
I Ouvres completes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (III, 349) quoted Grimsley Ronald, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, (Brighton, Sussex and Totowa, New Jersey: Harvester Press, 1983), p 12 
2 Ibid. 
3 Gay Peter, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation - The Rise of Modern Paganism, (New York 
and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1966), p 81 
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and freedom.4 A few were academics or held university positions, but most were 
not — the universities for the most part persisted with a syllabus that was founded 
in Scholasticism and overlaid with the humanist agenda set in the Renaissance. 
Aristotle was central to the university syllabus and anathema to most 
Enlightenment thinkers. They also ... patronized Plato, ignored the 
Neoplatonists, and ridiculed Augustine, but they inherited, despite themselves, a 
wide range of Platonic ideas, largely through the Stoics and such modern 
Platonists as Galileo: 5 There was great admiration for Cicero and the intellectual 
independence of the Enlightenment thinkers was tied up with eclecticism. The 
idea of eclecticism had great appeal and Diderot explained that an eclectic was not 
just lazily putting together bits and pieces from other people's philosophy, but 
was strenuously examining potential principles and only accepting those that had 
merit according to personal experience and reasoning. 6 There seem to have been 
two significant consequences arising from this taste for eclecticism. One was that 
many old ideas were revamped (with or without acknowledgement) in this period. 
The other was that Enlightenment ideas did not always fit together cohesively, as 
we will see, giving rise to more doubts, dilemmas and scepticism. 
By the end of this century we will find that virtue, if it had reality at all, 
constituted a bundle of choices made by the individual to suit his or her own 
preferences, level of education, ideas of what was rational, needs, capabilities and 
circumstances. The search for a science of virtue and morality had failed — 
neither passion, natural law, nor human nature had provided a way to the sort of 
compelling Newtonian explanation for ethics that the Friends of Morality were 
seeking. This failure in fact compounded the problem — by the end of the 
4 Gay, Op. Cit., p4 
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Eighteenth Century there were even more possibilities for the sceptical, 
pessimistic or just plain puzzled individual moral agent to choose between and be 
doubtful about. The confusion over virtues and passions in the previous century 
had now been compounded by debates about naturalness and artificiality. There 
was no sense of a universal set of values, and relativism — alluded to by 
seventeenth century thinkers such as Hobbes - had raised its ugly head. Moral 
education was still highly valued, but it was based largely on values that had been 
adapted to Renaissance society. There was little analysis of the individual virtues 
and of those that were examined, only Hume's virtue of greatness of mind had 
any sort of relevance to societal flourishing in the Eighteenth Century. However, 
this was not surprising — the goal for Enlightenment thinkers was to make a 
science, to theorise, not to articulate the set of values that suited their particular 
times. Virtue had become a matter of individual choice between options as to the 
nature of virtue, the motivations for virtue and the qualities that were to be valued 
as virtues in oneself and others. The immediate relevance to societal survival and 
flqurishing that had made virtue and the virtues so compelling in the past had now 
receded. There were suggestions about a teleological virtue associated with 
human nature, along with many other proposals as to what motivated people to be 
virtuous, but the very nature of the sceptical approach to thinking about these 
motivations made them debatable and weak. As we might expect, even when 
motivations involved other people, they were mostly described in terms of the 
moral individual. The sense of motivation for virtue being a public or communal 
concern had been largely overtaken by the motivations of self-esteem. 
4 
5 Gay, Op. Cit., pp 82-83 
6 Gay, Op. Cit., p 160 
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The_goal of a scientific, rational explanation for morality presupposed and 
encouraged a sceptical approach, but at the same time, this goal was driven by an 
urgent desire to refute scepticism and reinforce the reality of virtue and morality. 7 
In short, this moral scepticism maintained 'that there are no valid moral•
arguments, that morality has no rational basis and that the difference between 
right and wrong is merely a matter of taste, opinion or convention' •8  Response to 
this crisis took the form of either refuting these views, or trying to find ways to 
accommodate them within a new moral vision that also incorporated traditional 
moral values. 
The question of human nature was the starting point for much of the moral 
debate in the Eighteenth Century: Were people by nature completely selfish or co-
operative? What was the role of God and religion in human nature and morality? 
How did people discern the difference between virtue and vice and was this a 
natural facility or an artificial one? It is important to remember that everyone now 
agreed that human nature was part of nature in general — this had been hotly 
debated in the Renaissance. Further, that human nature was being examined in 
the context of amazing, new scientific developments that were dramatically 
changing the way people understood nature in general. On both sides of the 
Channel, there was considerable debate over whether people were naturally 
good/benevolent or naturally bad/self-interested. There was also widespread 
concern over the relationship and/or the declining relationship between virtue and 
society and there was an abundance of answers for the question of what was virtue 
in this period. 
7 Norton, Op. Cit., pp 11-13 
8 Marcus Singer, Generalization in Ethics, pp7-8, quoted in Norton, Op. Cit., p 12 
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The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
For Hume, virtue was something sensed — people contemplated a particular kind 
of character, then had a feeling of a particular kind of satisfaction or pleasure. 
'The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration... We do not infer a 
character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such 
a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous.' 9 Hume identified this 
feeling as a certain kind of love, a sympathy or identification with the other 
character and also perhaps an aesthetic kind of love - something like the love of 
beauty. Not everyone agreed that virtue was a feeling of pleasure. For instance, 
Wollstonecraft found the equation between virtue and pleasure trivialising and 
diminishing of virtue. She argued it offered only a veneer of respect for virtue 
and ignored the hard work and life long effort that virtue involved. 10 
Closely related to the idea that the feeling constituted virtue, was the moral 
sense theory that Hume, Hutcheson and others explored. Virtue was to be found 
in the character itself, which promoted certain feelings or had certain values or 
affections that promoted those same feelings. The feeling or sensation was 
secondary to the source of the sentiment, which for many, including Hutcheson, 
was benevolence.' Benevolence — in various guises - had of course long been 
considered a virtue, so the moral sense theory was part of the long tradition of 
offering one of the virtues as the essence of virtue. This was also a return to the 
notion of virtue being part of the character — not, as Aristotle would have it, the 
9 Hume David, Treatise of Human Nature, Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1978), p471 
I° Wollstonecraft Mary, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, and A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman, (KOln: KOnemann Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 1998), p 174 
II Stewart M. A., 'The Scottish Enlightenment' in British Philosophy and the Age of 
Enlightenment, Routledge History of Philosophy Volume V, Ed. Stuart Brown, (London: 
Routledge, 1996), pp 279-280 
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character's-disposition that had been acquired via practice and habituation — but 
an affection or passion which a character displayed. The moral sense theory was 
also perhaps an adaptation of the traditional Christian idea of love as the source of 
virtue. 
Shaftesbury, who has often been associated with the moral sense school, in 
fact had a somewhat different notion about what made a person virtuous. Virtue 
was to do with the character using reason or judgment and sentiment or senses. It 
required equity or justice, and most importantly for Shaftesbury it required 
reflection, that is, thinking or reasoning about feelings. 12  This comprehensive 
and quite balanced view, for which Shaftesbury would acknowledge a debt to the 
Stoics, seems to be yet another adaptation of Aristotle's ideas on the importance 
of deliberation and balance, and the relationship between justice and virtue. 
There was considerable disagreement in this period as to whether 
benevolence was or was not the whole of virtue. A major element of the human 
nature debate was the question of whether it was human nature to be entirely 
selfish, self-interested or self-loving, or entirely benevolent and altruistic. Not 
surprisingly, no one provided a really compelling argument either way, but I have 
found only one writer — John Brown — who pointed out that humans were not 
entirely one thing or another, but generally displayed a blend of self-interest and 
altruism. I3 
There was a common sense theory, widely supported among the 
philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, which held that people had certain 
fun. damental moral convictions that could not be explained by reasoning, that is, 
12 Cooper Anthony Ashley, rl Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times, Ed. Lawrence E. Klein, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p 173 
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they were commonsensical. There was a great deal of argument over whether or 
not these convictions were instinctive - naturally or as a result of experience - a 
reflection on experience, or religiously instinctive: 4 The common sense theory 
assumed that as all reasoning was ultimately based on unprovable first principles, 
so then moral reasoning must be as well. Therefore there must be first principles, 
or self-evident principles to do with morality and these principles were what could 
be called common sense. There could be no reasoning with a person who did not 
have these common sense principles — for instance that benevolence was 
preferable to malice, justice to injustice — any more than one could reason with a 
tone-deaf person about music. I5 There seem to have been echoes of this common 
sense idea in Rousseau as well, though not explicitly. He suggested that the 
principles of virtue were 'engraved on the human heart' and were more readily 
available to 'simple souls', presumably rather than sophisticated, educated ones. 
Rousseau claimed that to understand virtue a person needed to do no more than 
'withdraw into himself and listen to the voice of conscience in the silence of the 
passions.' 16 
Hume was of course famous for his claim that 'moral distinctions are not 
detiv'd from reason' t7, that morality and virtue were 'felt rather than judg' d,18 
and that these feelings stemmed from calm passions. 
Since morals... have an influence on the actions and affections it follows, that 
they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have 
already prov'd, can never have any such influence' . 19 
13 Monro D. H., (Ed.), A Guide to the British Moralists, (London: William Collins Sons & Co Ltd., 
1972), p 111 
" Stewart, Op. Cit., pp 288-292 
15 Stewart, Op. Cit., p 293 
16 Grimsley, Op. Cit., p 19 
17 Hume, Op. Cit., p455 
18 flume, Op. Cit., p470 
19. Hume, Op. Cit., p457 
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Hursthouse argues that 'reason alone'—would have to mean without using any 
notions of good or evil and that the difficulty of defining (and explaining) moral 
reason in this way was perhaps the reason Hume abandoned this position in his 
later work.2° Many people disagreed with Hume's initial claim and viewed the 
discernment of virtue and vice as a fundamentally rational process, though often 
also acknowledging the participation of sentiments. Shaftesbury argued that the 
universe was 'a well-ordered, intelligible system, in which humans have their 
proper place. By the use of unaided natural reason we can discover what role we 
are designed to play in that system and thus live virtuous and happy lives.' 21 
Wollstonecraft argued that reason, knowledge, virtue and perfection were 
intertwined. She explained that reason was the emanation of divinity, the 'simple 
power of improvement' and of discerning truth - that exercising reason perfected 
j the soul. Thus, virtue or the perfection of the self would be achieved through 
reason. Interestingly, she also stated that '[e]very individual is in this respect a 
world in itself.' 22 
We can view these ideas — the above survey is a sample only and does not 
encompass them all — as a vibrant, creative, enthusiastic investigation into the 
nature of virtue and morality. The problem was that none of them could be 
proven — a serious dilemma when engaged in science — and they could not all be 
'true'. Virtue and morality could not be the compelling universal way of life it 
had been for centuries past when the individual had to make choices about what it 
meant and how it worked, when every individual was his or her own world. 
20 Hursthouse Rosalind, 'Hume: moral and political philosophy' in British Philosophy and the Age 
of Enlightenment, Routledge History of Philosophy Volume V, Ed. Stuart Brown, (London: 
Routledge, 1996), p 183 
21 McNaughton David, 'British moralists of the eighteenth century: Shaftesbury, Butler and Price' 
in British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, Routledge History of Philosophy Volume V, 
Ed. Stuart Brown, (London: Routledge, 1996), p204 
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Moreover, if what virtue meant and how it worked was a matter ofindividual 
choice, then clearly these theories could not be explaining or promoting a 
universal science or a universal way of life. Furthermore, as MacIntyre asserts, 
when virtue became a matter of individual feelings and passions, society became 
'nothing more that an arena in which individuals seek to secure what is useful or 
agreeable to them'.23 The general needs of societies — order, stability, concord, 
glory, advancement and so on — could never be met by uncoordinated individual 
feelings and sentiments that stemmed from an insistence on individuality. People 
obviously continued to live in societies, but increasingly, 'the spirit of the age was 
individualistic' 24. In a further shift, that began in the Eighteenth Century, but 
would remain a minority view until the Nineteenth Century, morality as Rousseau 
articulated and demonstrated it was a matter of 'inner conviction and self-
knowledge' rather than externally verified reasoning and community values. 
Morality, in this view, was 'not so much a codification of relations between 
individuals as an inner conviction of innocence.' 25 
In addition to the important question about the source of virtue and the 
way it related to human nature, the question of moral relativism — largely 
triggered by Hobbes' work - was a major cause for concern. Whereas relativism 
might be viewed as a positive thing — respect and tolerance for diversity, 
understanding that values did not have to be the same for their holders to be good 
— it could also be viewed as profound scepticism. If values were relative then 
perhaps they had no reality. Many of the Enlightenment thinkers sought to 
identify something fundamental and universal to underpin morality that could also 
22 Wollstonecraft, Op. Cit., p 147 
23 Maclntyre (1984), p 236 
24 Revel et al, Op. Cit., p 325 
25 Revel et al, Op. Cit., pp 389-390 
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account for relativism among the details._ In A Dialogue, Hume tried to 'fix a 
stdindard' that could be defended as a universal moral code and would allow for 
the differences of virtues and values to be found in diverse societies and times. 
He argued that looking beyond the approved practices of, for example, pederasty 
(in ancient Greece) and duelling (in contemporary France) it could be seen that 
approval of these practices stemmed from principles of friendship, sympathy, 
mutual attachment, courage, honour and fidelity — about which no one would 
disagree. It was these source principles — if not the specifics - that gave rise to 
praise or blame rather than the particular activities themselves. 26 We can see from 
the preceding chapters of this thesis that this was a valid position. The values 
placed on certain activities, such as pederasty and duelling — and we might add 
many others — changed from time to time, but the general principles of friendship, 
generosity, wisdom and justice remained fundamentally the same. In a similar 
manner, Shaftesbury argued that there were certain things which, regardless of 
custom, social convention, fashion, law or religion, could not be virtuous - such as 
'treachery, ingratitude or cruelty', persecution of friends, tormenting prisoners of 
war, offering human sacrifice and so on. He viewed these as fundamental, 
'immutable', universal values.27 However, this was not general agreed. As 
influential and widely read as Hume and Shaftesbury were, people such as 
Mandeville were equally convincing in the opposite view. Virtue and morality 
thus had only a fifty-fifty chance — either individuals decided that these concepts 
were objective and real, or that they were relative and empty. 
Thinking about another aspect of the nature of morality, Diderot suggested 
that people were either born with a disposition to behave helpfully toward society 
2
• Hursthouse, Op. Cit., p 189 
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or with a disposition to be harmful — either possibility being a matter of chance. 
He also believed (along with most of the Enlightenment philosophes) that certain 
fundamental moral criteria — that comprised a universal morality - existed. This 
of course begged the (unanswered) question of why some people were born 
unfortunate and did not share in the moral code. Another inconsistency or 
dilemma associated with this perspective on human nature and the nature of virtue 
was the conviction that moral standards were not absolute but were acquired 
through learning and experience. 28 However, Diderot could not explain how 
someone born 'unfortunate', without a disposition to understand moral standards, 
would be able to learn moral standards. 
Hume's notion of the artificiality of many virtues exposed another aspect 
orthe relationship between society and virtue. Hume categorised virtues as either 
natural — dispositions that people held and approved of naturally — or artificial — 
dispositions that involved some invention or artifice in order to come into being. 29 
In other words, the division between natural and artificial correlated to the 
division between psychology and sociology. Hume's dichotomy between natural 
and artificial virtues seems to have centred on motive. In a nutshell, justice could 
not be natural because the motive for honesty was not readily explained by self-
love, public interest or benevolence - either generally or specifically to the person 
orte was being fair toward. Therefore the only obvious motive for being honest 
was being honest itself, which was either a circular argument or a 'sophistry' and 
27 Shaftesbury, Op. Cit., p 175 
28 Jimack Peter, 'The French Enlightenment II: deism, morality and politics' in British Philosophy 
and the Age of Enlightenment, Routledge History of Philosophy Volume V, Ed. Stuart Brown, 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp 257-258 
29 Mackie J. L., Hume's Moral Theory, (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1980), pp 76-77 
178 
could not be derived from nature, but only from education and conventions. 30 It 
turned out that the systematic and broad-based approval of virtues, even in 
strangers, and even in enemies, made Hume's notion of sympathy inadequate and 
an artificial, sociological system was necessary to explain even his natural virtues. 
The argument for artifice and the distinction from nature were tremendously 
complex. It was also weak, though excusable in part, for example, because Hume 
believed honesty was too 'strange and prima facie pointless' to be instinctive or 
natural - but he could not know 'what strange and elaborate instincts many 
animals have been given by natural selection and evolution'. 3 ' Hume's theory 
was further complicated by the fact that the motivation for the natural virtues — 
sympathy — also played a part in the artificial virtues.32 
Mandeville had a profoundly sceptical and pessimistic view on the link 
between society and virtue. He argued that virtue was an illusion perpetuated by 
education and dishonest politicians, that it was like fashion — uncertain and 
intangible — and only appeared to exist because people — in their pride — had been 
flattered into thinking they were or could be good, noble and virtuous. Indeed, 
Mandeville argued that successful societies were built entirely on vice, not virtue 
at all - that honesty and virtue lead to unemployment and the disintegration of 
• 	3 society. 3  Of course, the Friends of Morality, including Hume, responded to this 
with the full force of their eloquence and reasoning, but the fact remained that 
both sides were plausible, and neither side could provide indisputable scientific 
praof for their theory. 
30 Mackie, Op. Cit., p 77 
31 Mackie, Op. Cit., pp 80-81 
32 Mackie, Op. Cit., pp 121-122 
33 Norton, Op. Cit., pp 64-65 
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The aims of eighteenth century thinking about virtue and morality appear 
to have been irreconcilably in conflict. On the one hand, there was a strong desire 
to think about virtue and morality scientifically. Galileo had argued convincingly 
that nature could only be understood and its effects predicted by determining its 
mathematical structure. Anything that did not have a mathematical quality was 
not real but merely 'affections, secondary qualities, "mere names" masquerading 
as "primary phenomena" : 34 If they had no mathematical or scientifically 
describable structure then virtues and morality, good and evil could not be the 
objective things they had been when fact and value were intertwined in the 
Scholastic way of thinking about the world. 35 Yet in an odd sort of contradiction, 
the scepticism that this scientific way of thinking made inevitable was also 
attractive - because it resonated with the humanitas espoused by that great 
Enlightenment hero, Cicero. 
The man who practiced humanitas was confident of his worth, courteous to 
others, decent in his social conduct, and active in his political role. He was a 
man, moreover, who faced life with courageous skepticism: he knows that the 
consolations of popular religion are for more credulous beings than himself, that 
life is uncertain, and that sturdy pessimism is superior to self-deceptive 
optimism. 36 
Enlightenment thinkers wanted to be courageously sceptical; they wanted to avoid 
self-deception and credulity at all costs. On the other hand, there was a strong 
desire to hold on to the old moral objectivity, to hold on to traditional values and 
to refute the very idea of moral scepticism. Ironically, the philosophes appear to 
have been convinced that the way out of this dilemma was to persist in their 
scientific empiricism, in the expectation that human nature was scientifically 
knowable and that when it was known, the laws of morality would be indisputable 
34- Norton, Op. Cit., p 22 
35 Ibid. 
36 Gay, Op. Cit., p 107 
180 
and everyone would be thereafter happy. D'Holbach opened his Systeme de la 
nature with the sentence: 'Man is unhappy only because he does not know 
nature'. In other words, scepticism could be overcome by thinking sceptically. 
However, did these theories and the sceptical, empirical approach to 
thinking about virtue contribute to the flourishing of society? Apparently, not in 
any direct, orderly sense as in the past, but Enlightenment thinking did inspire 
many individuals to build hospitals, found schools, support humane causes and 
engage in other such benevolent activities.37 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
Whereas the Seventeenth Century had seen new interest in the link between 
society's needs and virtue, the Eighteenth saw recognition of a much more 
detailed, explicit and direct relationship. The closing words from Shaftesbury's 
Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, which was influential on both sides of the 
Channel throughout much of the century, concluded with a clear statement about 
virtue and societal flourishing. Virtue was that which 'upholds communities, 
maintains union, friendship and correspondence amongst men, that by which 
countries, as well as private families, flourish and are happy...' 38 D'Holbach was 
another who stressed the relationship and stated that 'virtue is everything that is 
truly beneficial, everything that is constantly useful to the individuals of the 
human race, living together in society' 39. He said that the most important virtues 
were those which produced lasting benefits to the individual and which preserved 
37 Gay, Op. Cit., p23 
38 Shaftesbury, Op. Cit., p230 
39 Thiery Paul Henri, Baron D'Holbach, The System of Nature, or The Laws of the Moral and 
Physical World, Volumes I and 2, Trans.M. de Mirabaud, (New York and London: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1984), Vol. 1, p 149 
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the order of society.° In fact d'Holbach argued that 'without virtue society can 
neither be useful nor indeed subsist; it can only have real utility when it assembles 
beings animated with the desire of pleasing each other, and disposed to labour to 
their reciprocal advantage...'. 41 This had clearly been true in the past when virtue 
correlated neatly to the particular cultural, social and political circumstances that 
societies and communities faced. However, how could virtues be providing this 
service in the Eighteenth Century if no one could or would explain what the 
virtues now were? 
The pro-society quality of virtue 
Enlightenment thinkers produced numerous ideas and analogies about the nature 
of virtue, what it was like, what it involved and how it could be recognised. 
Nevertheless, like their seventeenth century predecessors they had little to say 
about the particular virtues. 
Hume examined the virtues of justice and honesty in some detail and he 
mentioned chastity and modesty in this category, without explaining their 
virtuousness. Hume's primary concern was with his argument as to why justice 
was artificial, but he also provided glimpses of what he meant by justice. 
Now justice is a moral virtue, merely because it has that tendency to the good of 
mankind; and, indeed, is nothing but an artificial invention to that purpose. The 
same may be said of allegiance, of the laws of nations, of modesty, and of .good 
manners. All these are mere human contrivance for the interest of society. 42 
By 'justice' [Hume] means primarily the sort of honesty which respects what 
are regarded as the rights of owners of property. He quotes the traditional 
definition of justice as 'a constant and perpetual will of giving everyone his 
due' [Treatise III,ii,6], but he interprets this mainly as protecting everyone in 
the possession and use of what belongs to him and in the right to transfer his 
property voluntarily to someone else.'" 
4° D' Holbach, Op. Cit., Vol. 1, p 150. 
41 D' Holbach, Op. Cit., Vol. 2, p 10 
42 Hume, Op. Cit., p 577 
43 Mackie, Op. Cit., p 77 
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Interestingly, Hume included equity as a separate and natural virtue, although this 
had usually only been considered a part of justice. In addition Hume appeared to 
have been aware of the necessity of justice — together with some sort of equity, 
fidelity and honest promise giving - to the interests and well-being of society." 
Of the many natural virtues he named, only greatness of mind and 
benevolence were singled out and again, little information was offered about them 
as virtues per se. Hume's virtue of greatness of mind was a 'genuine and hearty 
pride' that was suitably controlled, avoided undue vanity and provided the sorts of 
courage and enterprise that were useful for both the individual and society in 
genera1.45 According to Hume, the merits or virtues of generosity, humanity, 
compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness and liberality 
formed the 'character of good and benevolent' 46, but he provided no details of 
what these meant in practice. He also explained that 'Courage and ambition, 
when not regulated by benevolence, are fit only to make a tyrant and public 
robber.' 47 Goodness or benevolence, the two seem to be synonymous for Hume, 
were to do with love - which was the 'agreeable sentiment, which is excited by 
sympathy' with these qualities. 48 Meanwhile, Hutcheson identified three kinds of 
benevolence. 
One is a calm, extensive goodwill directed equally toward all beings capable of 
happiness or misery. Another is 'a calm deliberate affection... toward the 
happiness of certain smaller systems or individuals; such as patriotism... 
friendship or parental affection' - but parental affection of a judicious, self-
controlled, sort. The third consists of various passions of love, pity, sympathy, 
or what he calls 'congratulation', that is, immediate pleasure in the observed 
happiness of someone else.49 
" Mackie, Op. Cit., pp 99-101 
45 Mackie, Op. Cit., pp 125-126 
46 Hume, Op. Cit., p603 
47  Hume, Op. Cit., p604 
48 Hume, Op. Cit., p605 
49 Mackie, Op. Cit., pp 28-29 
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Thus, for Hume and Hutcheson, benevolence seemed to be a superset of virtues 
and a sort of regulator or controller of virtues as well. 
Hume excluded a number of characteristics that had been sometimes 
thought of as virtues, arguing that these were in fact natural abilities that could not 
be learned. He noted, for example, that no amount of exhortation would make a 
naturally foolish person prudent. These involuntary merits also included 
constancy, industry, patience, vigilance, temperance and frugality. 50 Butler also 
had some doubts about prudence as a virtue. 
It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a 
reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the 
meaning of the word prudence in our language; it should seem that this is 
virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable; since in the calmest way 
of reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct in 
ourselves and others. 5I 
It should seem like a virtue, but Butler was ambivalent about prudence because it 
was more a case that people disapproved of folly than approved of prudence 
which, he claimed - like religion - taught people to be 'interested and selfish'. 
Moderation was crucial for Shaftesbury, not surprisingly given his 
commitment to universal balance and harmony. It was central, along with justice 
and equity, to Shaftesbury's highly influential ideas about virtue and the passions. 
Nor will it be found necessary after this to call to mind the excellence and good 
of moderation, or the mischief and self-injury of immoderate desires and 
conceited fond imagination of personal advantage in such things as titles, 
honours, precedencies, fame, glory, or vulgar astonishment, admiration and 
applause.52 
Wastonecraft offered an interesting slant on modesty that, while it may not have 
been a widespread view, certainly resonated for instance with Jane Austen's 
dismissiveness of conventional modesty. Wollstonecraft described modesty as a 
50 flume, Op. Cit., pp 610-611 
51 Monro, Op. Cit., p 175 
52 Shaftesbury, Op. Cit., p 223 
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seriousness that avoided vanity, but was distinguished from the self-abasement 
that was humility. Modest people were not unambitious and would be tenacious 
in carrying out their great plans. Modest people were steady but not timid, nor 
presumptuous, they were genuine and refined, but not innocent or coy. 53 
Other writers mentioned virtues they thought important without offering 
any sort of explanation or evaluation. For instance, d'Holbach stated that 'above 
all, let him be fully persuaded that it is of the utmost importance to the inhabitants 
of this world to be JUST, KIND, and PEACEABLE: 54 Berkeley briefly mentioned 
justice, chastity and loyalty as moral virtues.55 Hume also addressed national 
allegiance in his section on artificial virtue, but I could get no sense of this as a 
virtue as such. 
Moderation and modesty were very pleasant and attractive qualities and 
some sort of justice and honest promise giving was necessary for any human 
society to function, but did these virtues — other than greatness of mind — have 
anything to do with the flourishing of eighteenth century society and 
communities? This was a period of rising education, rising affluence and 
influence of the middle classes, along with and associated with the beginnings of 
significant advances in technology and industrialisation. These cultural and 
political developments might well be connected with the sorts of ambition and 
tenacious carrying out of grand plans that Hume and Wollstonecraft's virtues 
referred to. However, the strident voices of thinkers like Mandeville make it 
difficult to argue that such virtues were not entirely a matter of individual 
flourishing. 
53 Wollstonecraft, Op. Cit., p 236-238 
54 D'Holbach, Op. Cit., Vol. 1, Preface p x 
55 Monro, Op. Cit., p221 
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Jane Austen's six novels provide another source of information about 
eighteenth century virtues where we find an Aristotelian moral vision that does 
not seem to fit neatly with the Enlightenment debate. 56 Austen's Aristotelianism 57 
can be readily observed from: her treatment of virtue as a process rather than an 
event; her praise of intelligence, understanding and self-control; her preference for 
not blindly following rules; the importance she places on friendship and 
community; and from the ease with which one can find examples of all Aristotle's 
virtues and all his vices of excess and deficit. This sort of moral vision was quite 
a contrast to the Enlightenment's vehemently anti-Aristotle and 'scientific' 
perspectives on morality. But we must remember that her father was teaching the 
classical education syllabus - devised by More and Erasmus two hundred or so 
years earlier - to her brothers and paying-students in the next room. Furthermore, 
he and many of the men in Austen's social and family circle had been educated at 
Oxford where Enlightenment thinking had not penetrated. Austen's family and 
friends read widely and they may have been read and discussed Enlightenment 
ideas — there is no clear evidence in her novels or letters. Nevertheless, the 
enormous popularity of her work suggests that that the blend of Stoic endurance, 
Aristotelian flexibility and Platonic idealism designed to suit the needs of Tudor 
society, was still the bedrock of morality for the educated classes. Significant for 
the purposes of this thesis is that Austen's moral code was specific to the home 
and social domain of middle class women. Her stories never ventured into the 
domains of politics or public administration, industry, estate management or 
finance, or even the workings of the Church and the Navy, that employed or 
56 The following is a brief overview of the detailed analysis of virtue in Jane Austen's work that 1 
carried out in 2002 for my Honours Thesis, entitled 'Jane Austen's Moral Vision: Variations on an 
Aristotelian Theme'. It also refers to material from a paper that I currently have in progress, with 
the working title of 'Solving the mystery of Jane Austen's Aristotelianism'. 
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provided incomes for the fathers and lovers of Austen's protagonists. Jane 
Austen's Aristotelian virtues of good humour, self-control, generosity, proper 
pride, courage, friendliness and good taste were necessary to the flourishing of 
individuals within their domestic domain, but they were not noticeably connected 
to the flourishing of the wider community or society as a whole. 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
In line with their numerous ideas about the nature of virtue, eighteenth century 
thinkers identified an astonishing range of (often inconsistent) ideas about what 
motivated virtue, and indeed, what motivated the absence of virtue. Shaftesbury 
and many of the encyclopeclistes - such as Voltaire - held that people (like 
themselves) who had aristocratic tastes, education and manners were motivated to 
be virtuous purely out of their admiration for the good. However, they saw 
themselves as a class apart from the majority, the common people or le vulgaire, 
who needed laws - together with the threat of Hell and promise of Heaven - in 
order to govern their behaviour. 58 Shaftesbury also claimed that virtuous people 
were conscious of the pleasure and delights arising from good in their own lives 
and in the lives of others. This sympathetic pleasure together with the love and 
esteem from others that came from and was earned by virtue, would be 
considerable and rewarding. 59 
Diderot and d'Holbach viewed self-esteem — from observing one's actions 
with pleasure — as the 'inestimable' reward of virtue and were convinced that even 
someone not 'naturally inclined to love it' would be able to see this reward and be 
57 For an overview of Austen's Aristotelianism and Platonism see Gallop David, 'Jane Austen and 
the Aristotelian Ethic' in Philosophy and Literature, Vol.: 23.1 (1999), pp. 96-109 
58 Schlegal Dorothy B., Shaftesbury and the French Deists, (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1956), pp 39-40 
59 Shaftesbury, Op. Cit., pp 193-196 
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motivated by it. 6° Diderot and d'Holbach also considered the motivation from _ _ 
shame, working in conjunction with self-esteem, self-respect and self-love. The 
disapproval of others would be a deterrent for anyone - the wicked would be 
ashamed and unhappy and the virtuous would be deterred from any wrong action 
'just as the person who has acquired the habit of cleanliness hates getting dirty ,.61 
On the other hand, mutual esteem — the 'amicable society' of people who valued 
and admired virtue in others and were valued and admired by others for their own 
virtue was suggested as the motivation for virtue by St. Andrews theologian 
Archibald Campbe11. 62 
The Lisbon Earthquake and the Seven Years War shook many people's 
confidence in a benevolent but judgmental God. Nevertheless, many people 
continued to hold the view that God and his rewards and punishments were the 
motivations for virtue — at least for others if not themselves. Indeed, Voltaire 
argued that the moral order of society was at risk if there were no belief in a 
punitive God who would reward virtue and punish sin, and 'If God did not exist, 
he would have to be invented.' 63 
Yet another possibility was that human nature was the motivation for 
virtue. D'Holbach suggested that people were aware of their moral duties - from 
their experience and reason - and that these duties were necessary to preserve the 
relations between people. People were compelled by these duties because without 
them, they would not achieve their natural end. This natural end of a person was 
to 'render the beings with whom he lives happy' and 'contribute to his own 
60 Jimack, Op. Cit., p 259 
61 Jimack, Op. Cit., p259 
62 Stewart, Op. Cit., p 280 
63 Voltaire [10.16], 10;403 quoted in Jimack, Op. Cit., p 256 
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individual happiness'. 64 We should note that it was not the happiness of others 
generally that was important, but the happiness of people with whom the moral 
agent lived. The perspective of the individual was paramount. 
Consideration was also given to factors that would disincline people to 
virtue. Shaftesbury was concerned that fear of death might cause people to ignore 
certain earthly virtues in favour of those that would achieve salvation in the next 
life. D'Holbach was concerned that too much emphasis on life after death would 
result in indifference or torpor towards one's present flourishing. Both were 
concerned with religious 'enthusiasm' — what we might call fundamentalism or 
claiming to reveal God's intentions or opinions — as it caused religious and 
international wars. 65 Finally, Joseph de Maistre, in complete opposition to 
mainstream Enlightenment thinking, argued that: 'the desire to immolate oneself, 
to suffer, to prostrate oneself before authority, indeed before superior power, no 
matter whence it comes, and the desire to dominate, to exert authority, to pursue 
power for its own sake' were at least as powerful as the desire for virtue. 66 
This unprecedented range of competing and somewhat incompatible 
motivations for virtue, together with strong motivations against virtue, reflected 
both the crisis that Enlightenment thinkers were engaged in battling, together with 
their own preference for sceptical, scientific analysis of all the possibilities. The 
individual moral agent was presented with unprecedented options from which to 
choose. He or she was faced with options about what motivated virtue and about 
what discouraged virtue, about the nature of virtue and the nature of being human 
and about what behaviours were virtues and in what context they were good. All 
64 O'Holbach, Op. Cit., Vol. 1, pp 150-151 
Schlegal, Op. Cit., p 86 
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these options meant that eighteenth century individuals were forced into making 
choices about what virtue meant to themselves and why they would be virtuous — 
if at all. Individual choice, I suggest — and this notion will be examined in the 
final chapter - was both a cause and an effect of the decline of virtue. What had 
made virtue compelling in the past was the exclusive, reciprocal relationship 
between virtue, individual flourishing and societal flourishing, and by the end of 
the Eighteenth Century, this relationship seems to have largely disintegrated. 
However, there was another, perhaps even more significant development 
in the Eighteenth Century that shifted individual and communal well-being even 
further — if that's possible — from the domain of virtue. Between 1779 and 1790 a 
series of six books by the German author J. P. Frank set about detailing the 
administrative and bureaucratic responsibilities of the State for fostering the 
health, well-being and indeed the happiness of individuals. 67 These 
responsibilities were to be carried out by the 'Police' — a public sector 
organisation whose bailiwick (unlike today's Police) encompassed almost all 
government functions except the courts, the army and tax collection. Care for the 
self, which had traditionally incorporated care of others and care for the city, had 
become — in the eighteenth century model of the State in France and Germany — 
the responsibility, indeed the duty of governments. Foucault traces this 
development from an early seventeenth century utopian work by Louis Turquet de 
Mayenne, which asserted that people's lives, behaviours, activities, productivity 
and happiness were the 'true object' of the `Police'. 68 Throughout the Eighteenth 
66 Berlin Isaiah, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, Henry Hardy 
Ed., (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 167 
67 Foucault Michel, 'The Political Technologies of the Individual' in Technologies of the Self: A 
seminar with Michel Foucault, Eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton, 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp 153-157 
8 Foucault (1988), Op. Cit., p 156 
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Century, treatises and manuals were published and implemented by French and 
German 'Police' administrators. These manuals detailed the interventions that 
were to be made in the domains of religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, 
highways and town buildings, public safety, liberal arts (arts and sciences), trade, 
factories, servants and factory workers, and the poor. This hierarchy of priorities 
was consistent within the various manuals that were produced. 69 The 'Police' 
were to see to 'everything pertaining to men's happiness'. 
The police deal with religion, not, of course, from the point of view of dogmatic 
orthodoxy but from the point of view of the moral quality of life. In seeing to 
death and supplies, the police deal with the preservation of life. Concerning 
trade, factories, workers, the poor, and public order, the police deal with the 
conveniences of life. In seeing to the theatre, literature, and entertainment, their 
object is life's pleasure. In short, life is the object of the police. The 
indispensable, the useful and the superfluous. Those are the three types of 
things that we need, or that we can use in our lives. That people survive, that 
people live, that people do even better than just survive or live: That is exactly 
what the police have to ensure." 
In this modem sort of world, the practice of virtue, the individual striving to 
achieve a human or divine ideal, virtue as the means to human happiness and 
flourishing, virtue as the means to societal and communal flourishing was 
apparently becoming something of a redundancy. 
69 Ibid. 
" Foucault (1988), Op. Cit., p 157 
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11 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the course of this thesis, I have argued that for more than two thousand years 
the practice of virtue enabled the flourishing of communities and societies. 
Undoubtedly, virtue was a transformational process that enabled the individual to 
achieve certain highly desirable ends — such as glory, honour, happiness, 
flourishing, pleasure and eternal life. As well as caring for the self, virtue 
cultivated the care of others — stimulating responsibility for family, friends and 
community and promoting their well-being. However, virtue also transformed 
individuals into the sorts of people that societies and communities needed to 
survive or flourish in the face of the social, cultural and political circumstances of 
the time — and when communities flourished, so did individuals. Virtue was a 
way of life that transformed individuals into exactly the sort(s) of person that was 
needed for society to flourish — hero, politician, Christian witness, monk, prince, 
and so on. Virtues often correlated to the leadership skills that were pertinent to 
cultural, social and political circumstances. On the other hand, societies - 
furnished with people disposed to virtue — were able to provide safety and 
security, social order and control, crisis management strategies and occasionally 
even glory. We do not need to view this dual relationship — virtue and individual 
flourishing, virtue and societal flourishing — as mutually exclusive.' Rather, the 
history of virtue shows that there have been various kinds of individuality and 
communality espoused by humans and various ways virtues have enabled and 
supported societal flourishing. Virtue was the way for humans to live in society 
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and this way of living had profound, mutual benefits for that society and for its 
individuals. This inextricable interrelationship existed from the earliest times of 
Western civilisation until some point between the beginning of the Renaissance 
and the end of the Eighteenth Century. 
The history of virtue from Homer to the Enlightenment offers evidence in 
support of my claim that virtues were not merely a cultural or social fashion that 
randomly or accidentally varied from time to time and place to place. Rather, that 
for at least two millennia, virtues were imperative to both individual and 
communal flourishing. During the four hundred years from the Renaissance to 
the end of the Eighteenth Century this profound and necessary relationship 
gradually deteriorated, leaving only traces - found in arguments about what virtue 
should do and be - that implied it was no longer occurring. Over these first four 
centuries or so of modernity, virtue gradually ceased to be the only way of 
successfully living in a social group and became merely one option among many 
that individuals can choose. 
The apparent breakdown of the relationship between virtue and societal 
flourishing raises several questions that will be explored in this final chapter. 
What caused or enabled the two thousand-year cohesion between virtue and 
societal flourishing? What caused or enabled the cohesion to deteriorate? Does 
the relationship exist today in any form, and what questions, problems or solutions 
does its presence or absence present for contemporary virtue theory and practice? 
Rajchman John, Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan and the Question of Ethics, (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1991), p 100 
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The historical cohesion between virtue, individual flourishing and 
societal flourishing 
There were probably many factors that contributed to the existence of the 
relationship between virtue and societal flourishing; however I have identified 
four that I suggest would have been sufficient. These are: anthropology and 
biology — that humans are and always have been social animals; identity — that 
until the beginnings of Renaissance individualism, humans had always identified 
themselves in terms of their community and their role in that community; the 
qualities of the relationship itself— that it was flexible, adaptive, unquestioned and 
so on; and finally the environment in which the relationship existed. 
Neo-Darwinists now seem generally agreed that 'Exclusive dog-eat-dog, 
tooth-and-claw competition, rather than cooperation, is probably not the way of 
natural selection.' 2 Co-operation, together with a desire for social cohesion and 
inclusion in the community are basic drives for certain social animals, including 
humans.3 We could certainly see a blend of co-operation and competition in the 
Homeric virtues of hospitality and kindness to strangers, along with fighting skills 
and cunning. In Athens, there was co-operation in temperance, justice and 
friendship; and competition in ambition, magnificence and proper pride. The 
early Christians co-operated in almsgiving, hospitality and obedience; and 
competed in obscure ways with humility — not everyone can sit at the lowest seat 
— and with courage and the intense determination of some people to be martyrs. 
However, it is also argued that the inclination to virtue that humans have widely 
displayed is not proven 'by parallels in the animal kingdom, but by the very lack 
of convincing parallels.' Instead, it is the unique 'human obsession' with virtue 
2  Klein Sherwin, 'The Natural Roots of Capitalism and Its Virtues and Values' in Journal of 
Business Ethics. J111 03; 45(4): 387-401, p 8 
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that needs explaining.4 What was it about virtue that was so beneficial to humans 
it could be an obsession? For a million years or so humans have organised their 
societies, communities and social groups along the lines of a division of labour. 5 
Humans have always been dependent on each other and they manage this 
dependence by conscious or unconscious reciprocity. Reciprocity — and we 
remember this was central to Homeric virtue and evident in one form or another 
within virtue through to the Renaissance — produces long term benefits and is 
possible because humans, unlike other sorts of social animals, have stable 
relationships and good memories. 6 Furthermore, division of labour is necessary 
because people have unequal intellectual and physical skills and capabilities. 
D'Holbach argues 'it is the variation of his faculties, the inequality which this 
places him in, with regard to his fellows, that renders morals necessary to 
man... , 7 . Humans may well carry out this division of labour with more intention 
and mindfulness than say ants; however there has never been a human society that 
has chosen not to practice division of labour. This suggests that the practice is 
either innate or is the only feasible strategy given human needs and limitations. 
Ntvertheless, I would suggest that being social animals - organising our societies 
according to the concepts of reciprocity and division of labour - was only one of 
the factors that contributed to this cohesion between virtues and societal 
flourishing. 
'We come into a world that is already organised; we are creatures of 
organization; we live in each other's lives; we understand ourselves through our 
3 ibid. 
4 Ridley Matt, The Origins of Virtue, (London: Penguin Group, 1996), pp 38-39 
5 Ridley, Op. Cit., p6 
6 Klein, Op. Cit., p 8 
7 D'Holbach, Op. Cit., Vol. 1, p 134 
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reflection in the perception of others; we die in the lives of others.' 8 In other 
words, humans are social beings that comprehend and go about their lives within 
the framework of .relationship. However, people in the past perceived their 
identities somewhat differently from people in modern individualistic societies. 
Up until the beginning of the Sixteenth Century, people identified themselves 
consistently in terms of their clan and their conununity. 9 They understood that 
they were separate individuals, but what mattered most was the relationship they 
each had with their community, and their association with the identity and well-
being of the community itself. In ancient times, to live outside the community 
was to be outcast and experiencing a living death il); and by the Middle Ages it 
was to be possessed, mad or dangerous.' I The community defined the boundaries 
of a familiar world where the individual knew everyone; where work, leisure and 
home life were inseparable; and where the communal rituals and values that 
organised everyday life were defined. I2 MacIntyre suggests that 'moral rules are 
first formulated in order to define the duties of people who assume roles in the 
social order, such as king or warrior or shepherd.' 13 However we can see from the 
Homeric poems that early moral rules were not systematically defined at all and 
people certainly did not wait until they devised the concept of moral rules before 
having expectations about the roles of kings and shepherds. I would argue it is 
More likely that virtues and social roles developed hand in hand and were never 
separated — until perhaps the last few centuries - from the needs of the 
community. 
8 	• Pincoffs E., Quandaries & Virtues, (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1986), p 7 
9 Revel et al, Op. Cit., p 325 
I° Pearson, Op. Cit., p 48 
I I Duby and Braunstein, Op. Cit., p510 
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The third factor that enabled the relationship between virtue and societal 
flourishing to persist was that it was flexible and adaptive. Tradition and 
traditional virtues were never sacrosanct. As we saw in the history, they could 
always be reinterpreted (such as wisdom), mis-remembered (such as courage) or 
simply left in abeyance (such as hospitality) until they were necessary again. The 
priority — or place in the hierarchy — of particular virtues could shift depending on, 
for example, whether courage, wisdom or love was most likely to lead to 
communal success. The relationship was also adaptive in the sense that 
individuals and societies both contributed to, complied with and benefited from 
meeting needs, providing laws, setting standards of behaviour and requiring 
enough conformity to ensure social order, stability, survival and sometimes great 
fame. The content of particular virtues — especially courage, wisdom, 
temperance, friendship and justice — was also flexible and adaptive, keeping step 
with the circumstances and needs of the time. The relationship between virtue 
and flourishing was never expected to be simple or perfect. No one ever expected 
or sought a single virtue or a single moral rule to serve all moral questions — at 
least not until the Seventeenth Century. People did not question the fact that some 
moral problems could only be solved by sacrificing one virtue in favour of 
another. Virtues simply were not judged according to whether or not they 
eliminated or avoided all conflict — this expectation did not occur until modern 
times. Indeed, for the ancient Greeks, conflict was considered necessary if love, 
beauty and harmony were to be experienced at all. Whereas for Christians the 
very notion of virtue presupposed the existence of sin that must be battled 
12 Aries Philippe, 'Introduction' in A History of Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of the 
Renaissance, Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), pp 1-2 
13 Wong, Op. Cit., p53 
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continuously. Furthermore, until the Renaissance, people had only a limited 
knowledge and understanding about the virtues and moral standards that were 
practised in other times and places - and we could reasonably assume that people 
are far less likely to question the validity of their way of life if it is the only one 
they know. 
The final factor that enabled virtue and societal flourishing to cohere was 
the cultural environment itself. In each historical era until the Renaissance, 
people shared a common, basic education that instilled the values of their 
4 
community. Public opinion within their community promoted and encouraged 
consistent ideals — human or divine as the case may be. The most respected 
people in the community — heroes, sages, monks or princes — practised and 
epitomised these same virtues. Although the notions of what it meant to be 
human changed from time to time, they were persistently associated with virtue 
and with the general approach to achieving success or flourishing for a 
community. Virtues were what individuals wanted to have - because they brought 
praise, respect, esteem, honour and sometimes wealth. Virtues catered for the 
needs of the community, and it was taken for granted that when the needs of the 
community were satisfied, individuals thrived as well. 
The gradual breakdown of the cohesion between virtue and societal 
flourishing 
The causes of the deterioration of the relationship between virtue and communal 
flourishing are many and complex. Four causes stand out particularly: the 
Renaissance revolt against virtue — and indeed all traditional systems — as a way 
of ,life; the rise of individualism and commitment to the notion that people are 
entitled to choose the virtues and values that best suit their own needs, 
temperaments and interests; the rise of science and scepticism, which threw doubt 
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on the validity and reality of virtue; and the rise of the modern State — with its 
assumption of responsibility for ensuring individual happiness and its legislation 
for a level of behavioural conformity designed to ensure social stability and order. 
There are also a variety of other, probably less significant causes: the demise of 
the seriousness and sacredness of virtue; the tension between passive morality and 
active virtue; the loss of universal, univocal values; and the loss through 
translation of ancient Greek word associations. 
As we saw in Chapter 8, Renaissance people deliberately set out to 
disassemble and reject the systems, values and beliefs associated with virtue, 
largely because these were seen as traditional, systematic and bound up with the 
authority of the Church. It was suddenly possible for many more people to read 
and ponder the alternatives offered in ancient texts. We also saw that virtue came 
to be understood as something occasional, like fighting tigers - not an everyday 
matter. Other behaviours, like good manners and civility were perceived as more 
relevant to everyday living and the maintenance of polite social relations. 
Commencing in the Renaissance there were new notions of: being true to 
oneself, realising one's personal potential, setting moral standards and goals 
depending on one's temperament, preferences and personal moral vision — and a 
strong preference for independence over obedience. With individualism, the only 
moral failing was not to serve one's inner vision. Obeying, worshipping, 
respecting or imitating a sage figure of some kind — human or divine — was 
abandoned in favour of a new idea of the self as creating and shaping its own 
world. I4 This creative individualistic notion of the self also involved the 
repudiation, discrediting and denouncing of the traditional communal surveillance 
14 Berlin, Op. Cit., pp 189-190 
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of behaviour and virtue. Such surveillance came to be viewed as an intolerable 
invasion of the individual's right to choose, to create his or her own values and of 
'what came to be known as privacy, the private sphere being that which was not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the community'. I5 The commitment to 
independence, privacy and choice was supplemented by the notion that each 
person 'carried the sources of knowledge in himself; either in his power of sense 
perception... or in his power of intellectual intuition'. I6 The idea that each 
individual had the intellectual capacity to answer the big moral questions for 
themselves endured from Descartes . and Bacon to until about the middle of the 
Eighteenth Century. I7 This confidence then disappeared - probably not because 
people no longer had the confidence or capacity, nor because the moral dilemmas 
became more difficult, but because the shared communal value system that long 
underpinned the individual's answers to moral questions had fallen away. Finally, 
individualism meant that people could choose what would make them happy from 
a wide range of options. Socrates had said with great and long-lasting authority: 
I did not care for the things most people care about — making money, having a 
comfortable home, high military or civil rank, and all the other activities, 
political appointments, secret societies, party organization, which go on in our 
city... I tried to persuade each one of you to concern himself less with what he 
has than with what he is, so as to render himself as excellent and rational as 
possible.' 8 
However, with individualism came a decline in the influence of all such 
authorities, as well as the loss of any powerful communal prohibition on deciding 
that having these things would make one happy. 
15  Chartier Roger, 'Introduction: Community, State and Family: Trajectories and Tensions' in A 
History of Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of the Renaissance, Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur 
Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1989), pp 400-401 
16 Norton, Op. Cit., p 11 
17 Berlin, Op. Cit., pp 180-182 
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In the history of seventeenth and eighteenth century virtue we saw how the 
escalation of scepticism that began in the Renaissance and the commitment to 
science that began in the Seventeenth Century fed on each other and together 
discredited virtue and the virtues as human or divine ideals. Indeed, the fact that 
these concepts were ideals and thus not measurable or subject to some kind of 
mathematical structure helped the discreditation process. Science and scepticism 
also disproved the ancient notion of a human telos and at a stroke invalidated the 
long held belief that the human purpose was earthly or heavenly happiness 
achieved through the practice of virtue. Indeed, as Berlin argues, by the mid 
Eighteenth Century people were no longer confident that the big questions — How 
should I live? What will make me happy? — could be answered at al1. 19 Almost 
certainly, they could not be answered with virtue, because virtue was no longer 
assuredly objective and real. 
We saw in the history of eighteenth century virtue that new ideas about 
State responsibility for individual happiness were being implemented in Germany 
and France. The rise of the modern State began during the Renaissance and had a 
variety of impacts on the relationship between virtue and societal flourishing. The 
State was intended to establish social peace" - an achievement expected of virtue 
since at least the time of Aristotle. The State was intended to strengthen and 
regulate the bonds between individuals21 - another old expectation of virtue. 22 
The rise of the new State — in conjunction with the loss of 'one Church' at the 
18  Plato, The Apology, quoted in Hadot Pierre, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Ed. Arnold I. 
Davidson, Trans. Michael Chase, (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd., 1995), p 90 
19 Berlin, Op. Cit., pp 180-182 
20 Yves Castan eta!, Op. Cit., p 16 
21 Ibid. 
22 Western governments have continued to take responsibility for peace, the regulation of human 
relationships and the provision of human happiness, which they understand to derive from ever 
increasing economic and material wealth. 
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time of the Reformation - also 'broke the spell of one world, one universal law, 
and consequently one universal goal for all men everywhere, at all times' . 23 
Furthermore, this equivocation about virtue, moral laws and the source of human 
happiness raised the problem of relativism, and in turn added to the loss of faith in 
the reality of communal values and virtues. 
Then there were a number of lesser factors. That virtue had - by the end 
of the Eighteenth Century - become largely a matter of pleasure and sentiment 
rather than the serious, authoritative, sacred ideal it had been in the past could 
only diminish its influence and value. Equally diminishing for the cultural value 
of virtue was that for many Lutheran and Calvinist Protestants morality had 
become a passive and unreasoning faith, rather than an active struggle to learn, 
practice, habituate and exemplify virtues. Finally, there was the matter of 
translations. In Chapter 4 we saw that for the ancient Greeks, the notions of 
virtue, moral disposition and the place where people lived well - ethike, ethos and 
ethos - all had an etymological connection. Every time these words were spoken, 
the connection between virtue and society was clear. However, with translations 
of these concepts into Latin and subsequently the modern European languages, 
this connection between the concepts inevitably became less distinct. 
Now if these are the causes of the original relationship and the triggers for 
its break down, some significant questions arise for virtue in the present day. For 
instance, are virtues the behaviours that enable twenty-first century, Western 
society to flourish? How are virtues corrunonly portrayed in our society and can 
people learn to be virtuous - would they want to be virtuous - given the way 
virtue is publicly perceived and promoted? We could perhaps argue that the 
23 Berlin, Op. Cit., p 32 
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relationship is of a primordial nature — that it reflects the very beginnings of virtue 
(and perhaps society) from which some other kind of virtue or relationship 
between virtue and societal flourishing has developed. Without ruling this out, we 
might also argue that the relationship that can be found in the history of virtue 
continues to exist, perhaps in a different way, or perhaps merely very deeply 
hidden. As a way of throwing light on the present day status of the relationship 
between virtue and societal flourishing, let us consider each of the four historical 
themes in terms of present day practice and theory of virtue. 
The association between the style of virtue and the stability of 
society 
Contemporary virtue theory regards virtue as a matter of the character of an 
individual moral agent — an entity that defines or chooses his or her own values, 
virtues and motivations. Contemporary virtue theory often (though not always) 
starts from the model of virtue found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and 
avoids or overlooks the social, cultural and political implications of virtue, as well 
as the social group behaviours that he describes elsewhere. A number of 
philosophers have argued that there is no such thing as an individual moral agent 
separated from relationships, social values and social institutions24 — casting doubt 
on the validity of any theories based on such a model. Contemporary virtue 
theory then, appears theoretically weak when it fails to take into account the 
reciprocal influences between virtue and social, cultural and political 
circumstances, social stability, and societal flourishing. One potential explanation 
for the exclusively individual focus of contemporary virtue theory is that the 
individual is no longer understood to be responsible for making independent 
24 See for instance, Dewey John, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1957), pp 169-172, or Pincoffs, Op. Cit., pp 7-8 
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contributions to social stability. Another explanation is that social institutions 
such as police, courts, defence forces and various sorts of legislation achieve the 
necessary level of behavioural conformity to maintain social stability. 
A number of twentieth century critiques of modernity offer potential 
explanations for this shift in responsibility from the individual to governments or 
social institutions. One would be Heidegger's famous critique of modernity 
contained in 'The Question Concerning Teclmology' 25 that represents the essence 
of technology as a ubiquitous enframing that transforms all aspects of the world 
into resource or standing reserve. All-encompassing control — including, perhaps, 
social control and order - is attempted through the bringing together of all things 
in the single frame of 'available resource'. In this view, there would be no 
requirement for individual contribution to societal flourishing or social order — 
any human desires and activities would be limited and constrained by the 
gathering together and ordering that is the character of technology. 
A more direct explanation for the devolution of responsibility for societal 
flourishing from individuals to the State or institutional can be derived from 
Foucault's critique of modernity contained in the essay entitled 
`Govenunentality' 26. In this view, all-encompassing social control is achieved 
through the drive for economic efficiency that is fundamental to modern 
bureaucratic and legal structures. Economic efficiency is the context, objective 
and justification for public policy and decision making. Whereas the controlling 
character of technology is obscured by the presentation of technology as 'a mere 
Heidegger (1993), Op. Cit., pp 311-341 
26 Foucault (1991a), Op. Cit. 
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servant of human needs and desires', economic efficiency is the proud 
centrepiece of organisational strategic plans. It is diligently applied to almost all 
types of governmental activities from arts grants to decisions about hospital beds 
and education funding. 28 From this perspective, it would be governmentality and 
control through economic efficiency that delivers social ordering and control. 
On the other hand, it might not be necessary for some kind of activity, 
principle or system — such as the enframing of technology or the governmentality 
of public institutions - to render superfluous the contribution of individuals to 
societal flourishing. Instead, it might be simply a matter of defining individuals 
out of the equation. Foucault discusses the rising concern with government 
through the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. This concern 
progresses from the notion that 'there are three fundamental types of 
government.., the art of self-government, connected with morality; the art of 
properly governing a family, which belongs to economy; and finally the science 
of ruling the state, which concerns politics.' 29 By this definition, the individual 
and virtue have no part to play in the orderly management and stability of the state 
and society. In the Eighteenth Century, thinking about government develops into 
the notion that: 
To govern a state will ... mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the 
level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the 
wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as 
attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods. 3° 
27  Malpas Jeff and Wickham Gary, 'Governance and the World: From Joe Dimaggio to Michel 
Foucault' in UTS Review, Vol. 3, 1997: 91-108, p 102 
28 Malpas and Wickham, Op. Cit., p 103 
29 Foucault (1991a), Op. Cit., p91 
30 Foucault (199 I a), Op. Cit., p92 
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Indeed, by the Eighteenth Century, good government is synonymous with 
economic government 3I and it involves a complex economic management of 
territory, things and people. Govenunent now provides the surveillance and 
control that the communal system of virtue had previously entailed. 
Notwithstanding Western society's commitment to individualism, 
governments are in the business of controlling populations, not individuals. The 
purpose of governments is to manage the welfare of the population and to 
improve its health and wealth. Governments stimulate birth rates; direct the 
geographic location of homes and work-places 32; provide incentives for saving 
money, buying houses, working part-time, studying and learning skills; and a 
myriad of other interventions in the daily life of individuals — as mere elements of 
the population. Ironically, each of these interventions — carried out in the name of 
welfare and improvement — limit the individual's choices and control over their 
own flourishing. Governments, by regarding individuals as population, also 
reinforce the expectation that individuals cannot make a difference to the 
flourishing of their society. Moreover, the apparent redundancy of individual 
contribution to societal flourishing would seem to be supported by the way we 
understand society-wide or public matters of morality. Public morality is 
generally dealt with by legislation and (largely faceless) institutions such as 
Ombudsman offices and Ethics committees, and which typically form no part of 
contemporary virtue theory. 
The public elucidation and promotion of virtue 
One of the most prevalent contemporary perceptions about virtue is that it is 
relative to places and times and therefore any single set of virtues cannot be relied 
31 Ibid. 
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on as objective or rea1. 33 Now, if we were looking for a set of virtues that would 
suit all times and all places, past, present and future, then this judgement would of 
course be correct. However, why would we want an ethics that paid no attention 
to the circumstances in which we live? Why would an ethics need to 
accommodate the needs of all times and places in order for it to be held with 
conviction? We can see from the history of virtue that changes in ideas and 
values associated with virtue and the virtues occurred for very good reasons. Yet 
modern scientific thinking has insisted that virtue has no reality unless it can be 
articulated as an all-inclusive law, which by defmition would not address the 
particular social, cultural or political circumstances faced by people in actual 
societies. 
Another prevalent modern perception — or at least expectation — is that 
virtue must be applicable to everyone. As we saw in the history of virtue, this 
idea that everyone in a society could or should practice virtue was a late medieval 
notion. In the Renaissance, it was sometimes claimed that civility and manners — 
rather than virtue as it had been practised in the past - were what society needed 
from 'everyone'. Hume and his Enlightenment colleagues rested their hopes for a 
moral law on universal benevolence — a virtue as middle/upper class as civility 
was in the Renaissance. I doubt that Hume would expect a poverty-stricken 
woman transported to the colonies for stealing bread to feed her children could 
practice benevolence. Likewise, the Italian humanists seeking universal civility 
were not concerned with the manners of peasants. The 'democratisation' of virtue 
up to the Eighteenth Century was still limited to those with influence and power 
32  Foucault (199 la), Op. Cit., p 100 
33  Despite a variety of cogent arguments from some contemporary philosophers aimed at dispelling 
or modifying this perception, 1 regularly hear or read this view expressed in popular as well as 
philosophical contexts. 
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and I suggest that ambivalence about the universality of virtue persists today. On 
the one hand, the idea of virtue as the domain of an elite or associated with a 
minority characterised by prudishness or empty piety is anathema. On the other, 
virtue is not widely promoted as an aspiration for everyone. 
Here we have two widely held dilemmas about virtue — its relativism and 
its universalism — that clearly make it difficult for the notion of virtue to have 
widespread public credibility. How can people know whether they should be 
thinking about, learning or practising virtue if its reality and relevance to 
themselves is unclear? Indeed, is it even rational to choose and esteem particular 
values and virtues? According to Weberian, Western capitalistic norms, the 
answer is 'no'. 
[Whereas] an agent may be more or less rational in acting consistently with his 
values, the choice of any one particular evaluative stance or commitment can be 
no more rational that that of any other. All faiths and all evaluations are equally 
non-rational; all are subjective directions given to sentiment and feeling.34 
The individual with a desire for virtue is left standing at the edge of an abyss - 
facing the possibilities that to choose virtue is irrational; that virtue is an empty 
concept; and that virtue is an elitist, priggish or self-righteous mode of being. 
Another issue for the public elucidation and promotion of virtue is the 
question of how the promotion of virtue happens, if it happens at all. As a general 
rule, Australian primary and secondary schools tend to avoid discussion about 
particular moral values and virtues that might be interpreted as moralising or 
discriminating against people who hold different views. This is a dilemma. 
When virtue was the way of life, people were not practising abstract concepts, 
they were practising particular virtues that were clearly defined and 
communicated. Yet, we have no very clear, widespread idea of what virtues are 
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now and who can and should practise them. Meanwhile, virtues are sometimes 
brandished — not unlike early Christian use of the virtue of hospitality - by 
politicians aiming to demonize people and values that are different from their 
own.35 In addition, various particular virtues are frequently the subject or 
underlying theme of television programs and movies. However, if — as it is 
widely asserted — we do not learn to be murderous and aggressive from watching 
images of people killing and maiming each other, nor do we learn to be virtuous 
from watching images of courage and justice. 
The pro-society quality of virtue 
Before concluding the discussion, let us briefly examine the role of virtues such as 
courage, wisdom, friendship, self-control, good humour and justice in our society. 
These virtues persist in the sense that we value and admire them when they 
feature (as they regularly do) in the 'human interest' stories that pad out the 
nightly television news and are found in newspapers and popular magazines. 
They also feature in our public narratives, in books and particularly movies — 
when was the last time Hollywood produced a movie that was not about 
friendship, justice, good humour, self-control or courage? Justice — in the form of 
matters before and concerns with the institutionalised justice system - features 
heavily in the serious news and is of course the subject of much contemporary 
moral philosophy. However, the contribution of a just individual to the justice or 
otherwise of our society appears to be minute — if it happens at all. Likewise, the 
34  Maclntyre (1984), Op. Cit., p 26 
35  For instance, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard centred an election campaign on 
diatribes against refugees who had 'thrown their children overboard'. It turned out (well after the 
election) that the people in question had been complying with a request from the Australian Navy 
to abandon a sinking ship. 
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courage, wisdom or friendship of individuals has little or no impact on the peace, 
concord, order, stability or glory of our society.36 
So what does make our society flourish — in the particular way that it does 
— and what human behaviours, habits and dispositions contribute to this 
flourishing? These would seem to be 'virtues' or habituated dispositions 
associated with and conducive to the persistence of the doctrines that underpin the 
particular kind of flourishing of our society — such as the interconnected doctrines 
of consumerism, free market competition, entrepreneurism and economic 
rationalism. For instance, consumerism persists because people are habituated to 
shopping and choosing disposable products rather than reusing, repairing and 
recycling, and because we are habituated to the notion that well-being involves 
continually acquiring new and better material goods. The free market approach 
persists because people are habituated to purchasing products that are 
manufactured by impoverished third-world factory workers, who are paid a 
fraction of what we would demand for the same work. Or perhaps because people 
are disposed to sanctioning the importation of foods from other countries, while 
our own farmers send the same sorts of foods to other countries — thus generating 
wealth from inefficiency — as is common throughout the capitalist West. 
Admiration and respect for entrepreneurial skills — the ability to discover and 
exploit markets, raw materials and human effort in order to make ever-increasing 
monitory profit appears ubiquitous and unquestioned. From a Weberian point of 
view, the pervasive spirit of Western capitalism gives rise to the 'leading 
principle' that 'Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the 
3 6. 
Even a million citizens walking the streets of Australian cities to protest our Government's 
decision to invade Iraq were unable to influence the peacefulness of our society. 
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ultimate purpose of his life.'" Here we have a contemporary telos for human life 
— acquisition — directly associated with a virtue of making money, in particular, 
making profit. Economic rationalism persists because people are habituated to 
measuring the value of all goods, services and human activities in terms of their 
monetary value. Weber explains that indeed modern Western rationality has its 
genesis from 'recognising the fundamental importance of the economic factor, 
above all [taking] account of economic conditions.' 38 So not only is good 
government a matter of economic government, but rationality is a matter of 
economic rationality. Our habituation to 'virtues' associated with consumerism, 
free market competition, entrepreneurism and economic rationalism seem to be 
what enables our society to flourish. Using language that resonates with the way 
we speak of virtue, Weber writes: 
The capitalistic economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into which 
the individual is born, and which presents to him, at least as an individual, as an 
unalterable order of things in which he must live.39 
However, unlike virtue as the way of life, the individual in a capitalistic way of 
life is 'force[d] to conform to the capitalistic rules of action' 40 . We seem to have 
no choice but to measure the well-being and success of our society and 
individuals by a steadily increasing economic growth, wealth and the acquisition 
of houses and cars or sophisticated military weapons and equipment. 
The significance of public recognition and motivation for virtue 
Much has been written in the last few hundred years about the motivation for 
virtue — far more I would estimate than in the entire previous two millennia. There 
was probably less need to analyse or promote motivations when virtue was the 
37 Weber Max, Max Weber on Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion: A Selection o Texts, 
Stanislav Andreski Ed., (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p 114 
38 Weber, Op. Cit., p29 
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only way of life and the motivation for virtue was therefore self-evident. In 
parallel with the centring of virtue theory on the individual character, modern 
motivations for virtue have also centred on the individual. These include 
motivations such as: a personal love of virtue itself; a personal relationship with 
God; love, sympathy or empathy for others; or a love for values or principles 
themselves. The implication is that there are no longer any communal 
motivations - raising the question of whether indeed there is any common life in 
present day Western society. 
Mill asserts that 'Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign. 141 This plays out as individual freedom of conscience, 
thoughts, feelings, opinions, sentiments, tastes and pursuits, life plans and 
freedom to unite 'for any purpose not involving harm to others'. 42 So is it 
possible to have a common life that incorporates indeed demands such individual 
freedom to create oneself? Anecdotally, I would be inclined to say no. People 
frequently lament the loss of a sense of community in our contemporary big-city 
oriented society. Social alienation is evident in widespread vandalism, drug 
abuse, depression, road rage and so on. For many people, the only common life is 
the one they view on television and of course they do not actually participate in 
that life, but merely observe it passively. When people do try to participate in a 
common objective — such as protesting Australian involvement in the Iraq 
invasion, or protesting the logging of ancient Tasmanian forests — they are 
igfiored, abused and trivialised by opinion makers, that is by the media and by 
leaders of our liberal democratic governments. 
39 Weber, Op. Cit., p 115 
4° Ibid. 
212 
While individualism insists that people can — if they wish - find goodness 
in a lifestyle that supports capitalism, consumerism and economic rationalism, 
there are, of course, people who choose to live according to different values. 
There are people who form their own small communities - which may or may not 
correspond to a particular geographical place - and who endure or stand at a 
distance from the values of society at large.43 We could perhaps define virtues 
that are associated with and conducive to the sort of community that promotes 
care for the environment, peace and disarmament, or a simpler, more self-
sufficient way of living. Or virtues that enable the flourishing of communities 
who value and practice art, crafts, music, growing organic vegetables, 
skateboarding, or ideologies such as Buddhism. These and other focal activities 
enable people to share, promote, and live in ways that allow them to participate in, 
contribute to and benefit from community. 'What matters at this stage is the 
construction of local forms of community within which civility and the 
intellectual and moral life can be sustained.. 2. 44 The people who create and 
maintain these sorts of communities may be the inheritors of our long virtue 
trddition. 'It is sometimes said that we today live among different ethical 
traditions without being able to say any longer why we should adopt them or how 
to choose among them.' 45 It is suggested that we must choose either pluralism 
and retain all the traditional values, or monism and devise a 'single correct 
41 Mill John Stuart, On Liberty and Utilitarianism, (London: David Campbell Publishers Ltd., 
1992), p13 
42 mill, Op. Cit., p 15 
43 This approach bears a striking resemblance to the common life shared by Stoic and Epicurean 
communities within (yet alienated from) the Roman Empire. However, I would hesitate to 
recommend the Hellenistic models of virtue as a basis for contemporary virtue theory because they 
were founded on the policy of some of Plato's successors of waiting for the world to get better; 
waiting for the world to become a place (as envisaged by Plato) where philosophers ruled. The 
Hellenistic model might be a starting point, but the time for waiting and hoping for a better world 
may have passed. 
44 Maclntyre (1984), Op. Cit., p263 
45 Rajchman, Op. Cit., p 145 
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theory'.46 However, the history of virtue shows that there are many catalogues of 
traditional virtues and that we have failed for centuries to devise that elusive all-
purpose theory. Perhaps even more importantly, neither of these approaches leads 
us to critically examine those traditional virtues for their suitability in dealing with 
present day social, cultural and political circumstances and difficulties. In this 
scenario, twenty-first century excellences are not the virtues that enable 
capitalism, consumerism and economic rationalism to persist, nor are they the 
virtues that enabled past communities to flourish. Rather, our virtues are practices 
and excellences that enable people to create and sustain community and that 
enable individuals to make a difference to their own flourishing and that of their 
community. These practices — or some of them - are certainly the subject of 
attention from ethicists and ethical theorists. However, perhaps it is time we 
began widespread public promotion of them as virtues, to be practised in a quiet 
everyday manner by both individuals and communities. 
This brings us to the final problem for contemporary virtue theory that I 
wish to highlight in this thesis: the problem of perceiving virtue as behaviour for 
special occasions only. This was a perception that began in the Renaissance with 
comparisons of virtue to occasional activities such as fighting tigers. It continues 
toclay with discussion of virtue as 'recollections and anticipations of great things 
and great events.., bonds of continuity with past greatness.... the practiced and 
accomplished facility that makes one equal to a great event.' 47 Such thinking 
places virtue outside the realm of possible achievement for anyone except those 
who might be able to influence or participate in a great event. It places virtue 
outside the realm of everyday people, everyday living and everyday communal 
46 Ibid. 
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flourishing. More significantly, the history of the virtues shows us that whereas 
perfect virtue — being a sage — may have been a matter of greatness, practising 
virtue for everyone else was a way of life. It was not a way of living that entailed 
waiting for something great to happen, but a way of everyday living that ensured 
that individual and societal flourishing happened. Fighting a battle was the 
Homeric hero's everyday life. Making just choices about public policy was 
everyday life for the Athenian citizen. Striving for self-control and courage in the 
face of plague and war was everyday life in the Middle Ages. The circumstances 
in history that people responded to with virtue may seem great and exceptional to 
us now, but that is only because today we face different circumstances and 
challenges. 
Perhaps the relationship between virtue and societal or communal 
flourishing that we find in the examination of the history I have surveyed in this 
thesis will enable us to rethink our understanding of virtue in contemporary 
society. By expanding our focus - from patterns to be found in individual 
character, reasoning and emotions - to include patterns to be found in communal 
flourishing, a new understanding of virtue may develop. We might find that 
twenty-first century virtues are different from the virtues of our tradition — but so 
they should be. Our social, cultural, political and technological circumstances are 
rather different from those of our past — even our recent past. 48 We may even find 
that virtues are thriving (despite relativism and other problems), along with a way 
of living together in communities that can flourish within, yet detached from, 
prevailing Western norms. 
47 Borgmann Albert, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Lift: A Philosophical 
Inquiry, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p 224 
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After all, as social animals, we are relational and as such, we continue to create 
and sustain communities. History tells us that virtue and communal flourishing 
are intertwined. History provides hints that we will find our virtues - not in 
tradition, not in abstract moral agents and not in simple, universal laws - but in the 
examination of how contemporary people create and sustain flourishing 
communities. 
So that virtue, which of all the excellencies and beauties is the 
chief and most amiable, that which is the prop and ornament of 
human affairs, which upholds communities, maintains union, 
friendship and correspondence amongst men, that by which 
countries, as well as private families, flourish and are happy, 
and for want of which everything comely, conspicuous, great 
and worthy must perish and go to ruin — that single quality, thus 
beneficial to all society and to mankind in general, is found 
equally a happiness and good to each creature in particular and 
is that by which alone man can be happy and without which he 
must be miserable. 
SHAFTESBURY49 
48.  For instance, we may find that by focusing on communal flourishing — relativistic as this may be 
— tolerance becomes an indispensable virtue. In a world that spends more money on weapons than 
almost any other single thing, tolerance may be the only defence communities have against attack. 
49 Shaftesbury, Op. Cit., p230 
216 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abelard Peter, Peter Abelard's Ethics, Ed. D.E. Luscombe, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971) 
Adkins Arthur W. H., Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960) 
Anscombe G.E.M., The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M Anscombe, 
Volume 3 Ethics, Religion and Politics, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume =IV Charity, Trans. R. J. 
Batten, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & 
Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume dlOCXVI Prudence, Trans. 
Thomas Gilby, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & 
Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974a) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XXIV The Gifts of the Spirit, 
Trans. Edward D. O'Connor, (London and New York: Blackfiiars, in conjunction 
with Eyre & Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974b) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XXXI Faith, Trans. T.C. 
O'Brien, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & 
Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974c) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XLI Virtues of Justice in the 
Human Community, Trans. T.C. O'Brien, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in 
conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XAXVII Justice, Trans. Thomas 
Gilby, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & 
Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974d) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XXIII Virtue, Trans. W. D. 
Hughes, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & 
Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XLIII Temperance, Trans. 
Thomas Gilby, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & 
Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume 10CXIII Hope, Trans. W. J. Hill, 
(London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode 
and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966a) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XLII Courage, Trans. Anthony 
Ross and P. G. Walsh, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction with 
Eyre & Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966b) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Volume XXXIX Religion and Worship, 
Trans. Kevin D. O'Rourke, (London and New York: Blackfriars, in conjunction 
with Eyre & Spottiswoode and McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964) 
Aquinas St. Thomas, The Pocket Aquinas: Selections from the Writings of St. 
Thomas, Ed. Vernon J. Bourke, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1960) 
217 
Aries Philippe, 'Introduction' in A History of Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of 
the Renaissance, Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1989), pp 1-11 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred, (London: Penguin Books, 
1998a) 
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Trans. David Ross, Revised by Ackrill and 
Urmson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998b) 
Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, Trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred, (London: Penguin 
Books, 1991) 
Aristotle, The Politics, Ed. Stephen Everson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988) 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Trans. Martin Ostwald, (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1962) 
Arnaoutoglou Ilias, 'Between koinon and idion: legal and social dimensions of 
religious associations in ancient Athens' in Kosmos: Essays in order, conflict and 
community in classical Athens, Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett and Sitta von Reden, 
Eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp 68-83 
Attfield R., 'Postmodernism, Value and Objectivity' in Environmental Values, 
Vol. 10, No 2, May 2001: 145-162 
Attfield R., 'How Not to be a Moral Relativist' in Monist: An International 
Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry, Vol. 62, Oct 1979: 510-523 
Babich Babette, 'The Essence of Questioning After Technology: Techne as 
Constraint and the Saving Power' in British Journal of Phenomenology, 30/1 
(January 1999): 106-124 
Baker Gordon, 'Wittgenstein on Metaphysical /Everyday Use' in Philosophical 
Quarterly, 2002; Volume. 52: 289-302 
Barnes Jonathan, Early Greek Philosophy, (London: Penguin Books, 1987) 
Beal M. W., 'Essentialism and Closed Concepts' in Ratio, December 1974; 
Volume. 16, Number 2: 190-205 
Beardsmore R. W., 'The Theory of Family Resemblance' in Philosophical 
Investigations, Ap 92; 15(2): 131-146 
Benson Hugh H., 'Socrates and the beginnings of Moral Philosophy' in From the 
beginning to Plato, Routledge History of Philosophy Volume 1, Ed. C.C.W. 
Taylor, (London, New York: Routledge, 1997), pp 323-355 
Berlin Isaiah, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, 
Henry Hardy Ed., (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) 
Bingen St. Hildegard of, Scivias, Trans. Mother Columba Hart and Jane Bishop, 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1990) 
Borgmann Albert, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A 
Philosophical Inquiry, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1987). 
Brady Michael S and Pritchard Duncan, 'Moral and Epistemic Virtues' in 
Metaphilosophy. Ja 03; 34(1-2): 1-11 
218 
Brown Gregory, Leibniz's Moral Philosophy' in Cambridge Companion to 
Leibniz, Ed. Nicholas Jolley, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp 
411-441 
Brown K. C. (Ed.), Hobbes Studies, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965) 
Brown Peter, 'Late Antiquity' in A History of Private Lift, Volume 1, From 
Pagan Rome to Byzantium, Paul Veyne Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1987), pp 235-311 
Brunt P. A., 'Philosophy and Roman Religion' in Philosophia Togata: Essays on 
Philosophy and Roman Society, Eds. Griffin Miriam and Barnes Jonathon, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp 174-198 
Burckhardt Jacob, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, Volume 1, Dr 
Ludwig Geiger and Professor Walther Glitz Trans., (New York: Harper & Row, 
1958) 
Burckhardt Jacob, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, S. G. C. 
Middlemore Trans., (Vienna and London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1937) 
Burman Edward, The Inquisition: The Hammer of Heresy, (Stroud: Sutton 
Publishing Limited, 2004) 
Burt Donald X., Friendship and Society: An Introduction to Augustine 's Practical 
Philosophy, (Grand Rapids, Michigan and Cambridge: William B. Eerdrnans 
Publishing Company, 1999) 
Cartledge Paul, 'Introduction: Defining a kosmos', in Kosmos: Essays in order, 
conflict and community in classical Athens, Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett and Sitta 
von Reden, Eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp 1 - 12 
Caspari Fritz, Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England, (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 1968) 
Castan Nicole, Aymard Maurice, Collomp Main, Fabre Daniel and Farge Arlette, 
'Community, State, and Family: Trajectories and Tensions' in A History of 
Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of the Renaissance, Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur 
Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), pp 397-607 
Castan Yves, Lebrun Francois and Chartier Roger, 'Figures of Modernity' in A 
History of Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of the Renaissance, Roger Chartier 
Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), pp 13-159 
Chartier Roger, 'Introduction: Community, State and Family: Trajectories and 
Tensions' in A History of Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of the Renaissance, 
Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), pp 399- 
401 
Chartier Roger, 'Epilogue' in A History of Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of the 
Renaissance, Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1989), pp 609-611 
219 
Churchland Paul M, 'Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues in 
The Foundations of Cognitive Science, Joao Branquinho Ed., (Clarendon Oxford 
Press : Oxford, 2001), pp 77-98 
Colman John, John Locke 's Moral Philosophy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1983) 
Comte-Sponville Andre, A Short Treatise on the Great Virtues, (London: Vintage, 
2003) 
Cooper Anthony Ashley, 3 rd Earl  or Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times, Ed. Lawrence E. Klein, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 
Copleston F. C., Aquinas, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977) 
Cummings Robert, 'Spenser's "Twelve Private Morall Virtues" in Spenser 
Studies: A Renaissance Poet?), Annual, Princeton, NJ. 1987; 8:35-59 
Davis Paul, 'On Apologies' in Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2002; 19(2): 169- 
173 
Deane Herbert A., The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine, (New York and 
London: Columbia University Press, 1963) 
Deleuze Gilles and Guattari Felix, What is Philosophy? Trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
and Graham Burchill, (London: Verso, 1994) 
Derrida Jacques, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, Ed. John D Caputo, (New York: 
Forclham University Press, 1997) 
Descartes Rene, Selected Philosophical Writings, Trans. John Cottingham,Robert 
Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
Dewey John, Theory of the Moral Life, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1960) 
Dewey John, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1957) 
Dreyfus Hubert and Spinoza Charles, 'Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger 
and Borgmann on How to Affirm Technology' downloaded from 
socrates.berkeley.ed /hdreyfus/html/paper_highway.html, 2002 
Dreyfus Hubert, 'Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment' in Heidegger: 
A Critical Reader, Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (Eds.), (Oxford UK and 
Cambridge USA: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1992) 
Driver Julia, 'The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue' in Metaphilosophy, 
Ap 03; 34(3): 367-383 
Dronke Peter, Poetic Individuality in the Middle Ages: New Departures in Poetry 
1000-1150, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) 
Dtiby Georges, 'Preface' in A History of Private Life, Volume 2, Revelations of 
the Medieval World, Georges Duby Ed., Arthur Goldhatnmer Trans., (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1988), pp ix-xiii 
Duby Georges, 'Introduction: Private Power, Public Power' in A History of 
Private Life, Volume 2, Revelations of the Medieval World, Georges Duby Ed., 
Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1988), pp 3-31 
220 
Duby Georges, Barthelemy Dominique and Ronciere Charles de La, 'Portraits' in 
A History of Private Life, Volume 2, Revelations of the Medieval World, Georges 
Duby Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1988), pp 35-309 
Duby Georges and Braunstein Philippe, 'The emergence of the Individual' in A 
History of Private Life, Volume 2, Revelations of the Medieval World, Georges 
Duby Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1988), pp 509-630 
Edwards Catherine and Woolf Greg, `Cosmopolis: Rome as World City', in Rome 
the Cosmopolis, Catherine Edwards and Greg Woolf Eds., (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp 1-20 
Edwards James C., Ethics with Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life, 
(Tampa, St. Petersburg, Sarasota, Fort Myers: University Presses of Florida, 
1985) 
Elyot Sir Thomas, The Book named The Governor, Ed. S.E. Lehmberg, (London: 
J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd, 1970) 
Feenberg Andrew, Ileidegger, Haberman, and the Essence of Technology, 
downloaded from www-rohan.sdsu.edu/Faculty/Feenberg/Kyoto.html,  2002 
Flanagan Sabina, Hildegard of Bingen, 1098 -1179: A Visionary Life, (London, 
New York: Routledge, 1998) 
Flanagan Sabina, Secrets of God: Writings. of Hildegard of Bingen, (Boston & 
London: Shambhala Publications Inc., 1996) 
Foucault Michel, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of Foucault 
1954-1 984 , Volume 1, Ed. Paul Rabinow, (USA: Penguin, 2000) 
Foucault Michel, The History of Sexuality, Volume 2 The Use of Pleasure, Trans. 
Robert Hurley, (London: Penguin Books, 1992) 
Foucault Michel, `Govemmentality' in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller Eds., (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991a) 
Foucault Michel, The Final Foucault, Eds. James Bernauer and David 
Rassmussen, 2" Printing Cambridge (Massachusetts, London England: MIT 
Press, 1991b) 
Foucault Michel, The History of Sexuality, Volume 3, The Care of the Self, Trans. 
Robert Hurley, (London: Penguin Books, 1990) 
Foucault Michel, 'The Political Technologies of the Individual' in Technologies 
of the Self: A seminar with Michel Foucault, Eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman 
and Patrick H. Hutton, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp 
145-162 
Foxhall Lin, 'The politics of affection: emotional attachments in Athenian 
society', in Kosmos: Essays in order, conflict and community in classical Athens, 
Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett and Sitta von Reden, Eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp 52-67 
Freud Sigmund, Civilization and Its Discontents, Trans. James Strachey, (New 
York: W. Norton & Co Inc., 1962) 
Gallop David, 'Jane Austen and the Aristotelian Ethic' in Philosophy and 
Literature, Vol.: 23.1 (1999), pp. 96-109 
221 
Garin Eugenio, Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance, 
Pdter Munz Trans., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965) 	— 
Garrett Don, 'Spinoza's Ethical Theory', in The Cambridge Companion to 
Spinoza, Ed. Don Garrett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 
267-314 
Gay Peter, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation - The Rise of Modern Paganism, 
(New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1966) 
Gibson A. Boyce, The Philosophy of Descartes, (London: Methuen & Co., 1932) 
Gilligan Carol, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's 
Development, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) 
Grazia Sebastian de, Machiavelli in Hell, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1989) 
Green T.H., Prolegomena to Ethics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899) 
Grimsley Ronald, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, (Brighton, Sussex and Totowa, New 
Jersey: Harvester Press, 1983) 
Guignon Charles B., 'Authenticity, moral values and psychotherapy' in The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Ed. Charles B. Guignon, 
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp 215-239 
Haakonssen Knud, 'Divine/Natural Law Theories in Ethics' in The Cambridge 
History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Eds. Daniel Garber and Michael 
Ayers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp 1317-1357 
Hadot Pierre, What is Ancient Philosophy?, Trans. Michael Chase, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2002) 
Hadot Pierre, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Ed. Arnold I. Davidson, Trans. 
Michael Chase, (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd., 1995) 
Harris C.R.S., Duns Scotus, Volume II The Philosophical Doctrines of Duns 
Scotus, (New York: The Humanities Press, 1959) 
Heidegger Martin, Basic Writings, Ed. David Farrell Krell, (San Francisco: 
Harper Collins, 1993) 
Heidegger Martin, Parmenides, Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz Trans., 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992) 
Heidegger Martin, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
Trans. William Lovitt, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977) 
Heidegger Martin, Discourse on Thinking: a translation of Gelassenheit, Trans. 
John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966) 
Heinaman Robert, (Ed.), Aristotle and Moral Realism, (Bolder, San Francisco: 
Westview Press, 1995) 
Heller Agnes, Renaissance Man, Trans. Richard E. Allen, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978) 
Hobbes Thomas, The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic, Ed. Ferdinand 
Tonnies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913) 
222 
Hofstadter Richard, Social Darwinism in American Thought, Revised Edition, 
(New York: George- Braziller Inc., 1959) 
Hostler John, Leibniz 's Moral Philosophy, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers 
Inc., 1975) 
Hume David, Treatise of Human Nature, Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978) 
Hunter J. M. F., Understanding Wittgenstien: Studies of Philsophical 
Investigation, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985) 
Hursthouse Rosalind, 'Hume: moral and political philosophy' in British 
Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, Routledge History of Philosophy 
Volume V, Ed. Stuart Brown, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp 179-202 
Infinito Justen, 'Ethical self-formation: A look at the later Foucault', in 
Educational Theory, Spring 03, Volume 53, Issue 2: 155-171 
Irwin Terence, Plato's Ethics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
Jaeger Werner, Paideia: the ideals of Greek culture, Trans. Gilbert Highet, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1945) 
James Susan, 'Reason, the Passions, and the Good Life' in The Cambridge 
History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Eds. Daniel Garber and Michael 
Ayers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp 1358-1396 
Jimack Peter, 'The French Enlightenment II: deism, morality and politics' in 
British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, Routledge History of 
Philosophy Volume V, Ed. Stuart Brown, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp 251 -273 
Jones W.H.S., Greek Morality in Relation to Institutions, (London: Blackie & 
Son, 1906) 
Kerr-Lawson Angus, 'The Non-Empiricist Categories of Santayana's Materialism' 
in Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society, Winter-Spring 02; 38(1 -2): 47- 
77 
King Peter, `Ockham's Ethical Theory' in The Cambridge Companion to 
Ockham, Ed. Paul Vincent Spade, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), pp 227-244 
Klein Sherwin, 'The Natural Roots of Capitalism and Its Virtues and Values' in 
Journal of Business Ethics. Ji ll 03; 45(4): 387 -401 
Kovesi Julius, Moral Notions, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967) 
Kraye Jill, 'Conceptions of Moral Philosophy' in The Cambridge History of 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Volume 2, Eds. Daniel Garber and Michael 
Ayers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp 1279-1316 
Kraye Jill, 'Moral Philosophy', in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, Eds. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press, 1988), pp 303-386 
Kruschwitz R. and Roberts R., (Eds.), The Virtues: Contemporary Essays on 
Moral Character, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1987) 
Kuehn Manfred, 'The German Aufklarung and British Philosophy' in British 
Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, Routledge History of Philosophy 
Volume V, Ed. Stuart Brown, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp 309-331- 
223 
Lattey C., (Ed.), St. Thomas Aquinas: Papers from the Summer School of Catholic 
Stadies held at Cambridge, August 4-9 1924, (Cambridge: W. Heifer & Sons Ltd, 
1925) 
Le Goff Jacques, Medieval Civilization 400-1500, Julia Barron Trans., Oxford and 
New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989) 
Levinas Emmanuel, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, Trans. Michael B. 
Smith and Barbara Harshaw, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 
Liddell Henry George and Scott Robert (Compilers), A Greek-English Lexicon, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
Long A. A. and Sedley D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1 
Translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 
Lottenbach Hans, 'Monkish Virtues, Artificial Lives: On Hume's Genealogy of 
Morals', in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 1996 Sept; 26(3): 367 -88 
Lovibond Sabina, Ethical Formation, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2002) 
Luscombe D. E., 'Peter Abelard and Twelfth-Century Ethics' in Peter Abelard's 
Ethics Ed. D.E. Luscombe, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp xiii-xxxvii 
MacIntyre Alasdair, 'Virtue Ethics', in Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2"d Edition, 
(Routledge NY: Becker and Becker, 2001) pp 1757-1763 
MacIntyre Alasdair, After Virtue: A study in Moral Theory, 2"d Edition, (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) 
MacIntyre Alasdair C., A Short History of Ethics, (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1967) 
Mackenzie Catriona, 'Reason and Sensibility: The Ideal of Women's Self-
Government in the Writings of Mary Wollstonecraft', in Hypatia's Daughters: 
Fifteen Hundred Years of Women Philosophers, Ed. Linda Lopez McAlister, 
Bloomington, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp 181-203 
Mackie J. L., Hume 's Moral Theory, (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1980) 
Maclean Ian, The Renaissance Notion of Woman: A study in the fortunes of 
Scholasticism and Medical Science in European Intellectual Life, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980) 
Malpas Jeff and Wickham Gary, 'Governance and the World: From Joe Dimaggio 
to Michel Foucault' in UTS Review, Vol. 3, 1997: 91-108 
Mason John Hope, The Irresistible Diderot, (London: Quartet Books Limited, 
1982) 
McFarlane I. D., 'The Concept of Virtue in Montaigne' in Montaigne: Essays in 
memory of Richard Sacre, Eds. I. D. McFarlane and Ian Maclean, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982), pp 77-100 
McHoul Alec and Grace Wendy, A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the 
Subject, (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1993) 
McNaughton David, 'British moralists of the eighteenth century: Shaftesbury, 
Butler and Price' in British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, Routledge 
224 
History of Philosophy Volume V, Ed. Stuart Brown, (London: Routledge, 1996), 
pp 203-227 	- 
McNeill William, The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of 
Theory, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999) 
Meeks Wayne A., The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries, 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993) 
Mill John Stuart, On Liberty and Utilitarianism, (London: David Campbell 
Publishers Ltd., 1992) 
Miller Clarence H. and Berrey Caryl K, 'The Structure of Integrity: The Cardinal 
Virtues in Donne's 'Satyre III", in Costerus: Essays in English and American 
Language and Literature. Blacksburg, VA. 1974; N.S. 1: 27-45 
Mireaux Emile, Daily Life in the Time of Homer, Trans.Iris Sells, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959) 
Monro D. H., (Ed.), A Guide to the British Moralists, (London: William Collins 
Sons & Co Ltd., 1972) 
Montaigne Michel de, The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, Trans.and Ed. M. A. 
Screech, (London: Allen Lane Penguin Books, 1991) 
Moser Simon, 'Toward a Metaphysics of Technology' in Philosophy Today, 
1971; 15: 129-156 
Murdoch Iris, The Sovereignty of Good, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970) 
Murray James A. H. and Others, Eds., The Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1933) 
Nietzsche Friedrich Wilhelm, The Birth of Tragedy; and The Genealogy of 
Morals, Trans.Francis Golffing, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor 
Books, 1956) 
Norton David Fate, David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical 
Metaphysician, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982) 
Nussbaum Martha C., The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
Nussbaum Martha C., 'Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?' in The Journal of 
Ethics, 3, 1999: 163-201 
Nussbaum Martha C., The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic 
Ethics, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994) 
Osborn Eric, Ethical Patterns in Early Christian Thought, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976) 
Passmore John Arthur, Hume 's Intentions, (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. 
Ltd., 1968) 
Patlagean Evelyne, 'Byzantium in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries' in A History 
of Private Life, Volume 1, From Pagan Rome to Byzantium, Paul Veyne Ed., 
Arthur Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), pp 551-641 
Pattison George, The Late Heidegger, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000) 
Pearson Lionel, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1962) 
225 
Pierce Robert B., 'Defining "Poetry' in Philosophy and Literature, 27.1 (2003): 
151-163 
Pincoffs Edmund L., 'Virtues', in Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2" Edition, (Routledge 
NY: Becker and Becker, 2001) pp 1763-1768 
Pincoffs E., Quandaries & Virtues, (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1986) 
Pisan Christine de, The Treasure of the City of Ladies or the Book of the Three 
Virtues, Sarah Lawson Trans., (London: Penguin Books, 1987) 
Plato, The Republic of Plato, Trans.I. A. Richards, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1948) 
Plato, Gorgias, Terence Irwin Trans., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) 
P.ortalie Eugene, A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine, Trans.Ralph J. 
Bastian, (London: Burns & Oates, 1960) 
Powicke Frederick James, The Cambridge Platonists: A Study, (Connecticut: 
Archon Books, 1971) 
Price A.W., 'Plato: Ethics and Politics', in From the beginning to Plato, 
Routledge History of Philosophy Volume 1, Ed. C.C.W. Taylor, (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1997), pp 394-424 
Prior William J., Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics, 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1991) 
Rajchman John, Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan and the Question of Ethics, 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1991) 
Revel Jacques, Ranum Orest, Flandrin Jean-Louis, Geis Jacques, Foisil 
Madelaine and Goulemot Jean Marie, 'Forms of Privatization' in A History of 
Private Life, Volume 3, Passions of the Renaissance, Roger Chartier Ed., Arthur 
Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), pp 161-395 
Ridley Matt, The Origins of Virtue, (London: Penguin Group, 1996) 
Rorty Richard, 'The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres' in Philosophy in 
History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, Eds. Richard Rorty, J.B. 
Schneedwind and Quentin Skinner, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), pp 49-75 
Rothwell Kenneth S., 'Hamlet's "Glass of Fashion" : Power, Self and the 
Reformation' in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, Eds. 
Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton, (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp 80-89 
Rouche Michel, 'The Early Middle Ages in the West', in A History of Private 
Life, Volume 1, From Pagan Rome to Byzantium, Paul Veyne Ed., Arthur 
Goldhammer Trans., (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), pp 411-549 
Rousseau Philip, The Early Christian Centuries, (London, New York: 
Longman/Pearson Education, 2002) 
Russell Bertrand, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political 
and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, 2" Edition, 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961) 
226 
Sapiro Virginia, 'A woman's struggle for a language of enlightenment and virtue: 
Mary-Wollstonecraft and Enlightenment 'feminism" in Per:Oectives on Feminist 
Political Thoughts in European History, Eds. Tjitske Aldcerman and Siep 
Stuurman, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp 168 - 185 
Saunders Jason Lewis (Ed.), Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1996) 
Sayers Dorothy L., Further Papers on Dante, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1957) 
Sayers Dorothy L., Creed or Chaos? and Other Essays, (London: Methuen & Co 
Ltd, 1947) 
Sayers Dorothy L., Unpopular Opinions, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1939) 
Schlegal Dorothy B., Shaftesbury and the French Deists, (Chapel Hill, N. C.: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1956) 
Schneewind J. B., `Locke's Moral Philosophy' in The Cambridge Companion to 
Locke, Ed. Vere Chappell, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp 
199-225 
Schofield Malcolm, 'Political friendship and the ideology of reciprocity' in 
Kosmos: Essays in order, conflict and community in classical Athens, Paul 
Cartledge, Paul Millen and Sitta von Reden, Eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp 37-51 
Schwyzer Hubert, 'Essence without Universals' in Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, September 1974; Volume. 4, Number 1, 69-78 
Sharples R.W., Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic 
Philosophy, (London and New York: Routleolge, 1996) 
Sim May, 'Aristotle in the Reconstruction of Confucian Ethics', in International 
Philosophical Quarterly. D 01; 41(4): 453 -468 
Singer Peter (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics, (Oxford U.K.: Blackwell Reference, 
1994) 
Sfaughter Eugene Edward, Virtue According to Love, in Chaucer, (New York: 
Bookman Associates, 1957) 
Stole Michael A., Goods and Virtues, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) 
Smart Ninian, The World's Religions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989) 
Smith Jay Todd, Virtuosity: Beautiful Living in an Indifferent World, An Essay, 
[online]. Sendaro Magazine. Available from: www.thisisquest.com/sendaro  
[Accessed July 2005] 
Sokolowski Robert, 'Phenomenology of Friendship' in Review of Metaphysics. 
Mr 02; 55(3): 451-470 
Spinoza, Ethics, Trans. Andrew Boyle, Introduction T.S. Gregory, (NP: Heron 
Books, ND) 
Steel Carlos, 'Rational by Participation: Aquinas and Ockham on the Subject of 
the Moral Virtues', in Franciscan Studies, 1998; 56: 359-82 
Sterba James P., (Ed.), Ethics: Classical Western Texts in Feminist and 
Multicultural Perspectives, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
227 
Stephens John A., 'Friendship and Profit in Xenophon's Oeconomicus' in The 
Socratic Movement, - Ed. Paul A. Vander Waerdt, (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1994), pp 209-237 
Stewart M. A., 'The Scottish Enlightenment' in British Philosophy and the Age of 
Enlightenment, Routledge History of Philosophy Volume V, Ed. Stuart Brown, 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp 274-308 
gtriker Gisela, 'Plato's Socrates and the Stoics' in The Socratic Movement, Ed. 
Paul A. Vander Waerdt, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994) 
Tarnas Richard, The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that 
have Shaped our World View, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991) 
The Holy Bible, King James (Authorized) Version, (Cambridge: The British and 
Foreign Bible Society, ND) 
Thiering Barbara, The Book that Jesus Wrote, (Sydney: Doubleday, 1998) 
Thiery Paul Henri, Baron D'Holbach, The System of Nature, or The Laws of the 
Moral and Physical World, Volumes 1 and 2, Trans.M. de Mirabaud, (New York 
and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1984) 
Tuck Richard, 'Hobbes's Moral Philosophy' in The Cambridge Companion to 
Hobbes, Ed. Tom Sorell, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
Van Hooft S., Understanding Virtue Ethics, Major Movements in Modern 
Thought Series, (Chesham: Acumen Publishing, forthcoming November 2005) 
Veyne Paul, 'The Roman Empire' in A History of Private Life, Volume 1, From 
Pagan Rome to Byzantium, Paul Veyne Ed., Arthur Goldhammer Trans., 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1987), pp 5-233 
Vico Giambattista, Selected Writings, Ed. & Trans. Leon Pompa, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
Vlastos Gregory, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, (Ithaca N. Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1991) 
Voltaire, Candide, (New York: Bantam Books, 1981) 
Vossler Karl, Mediaeval Culture: An Introduction to Dante and his Times, 
Volume 1, (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1958) 
Vyvyan John, The Shakespearean Ethic, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1959) 
Warnock G. J., The Object of Morality, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1971) 
Weber Max, Max Weber on Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion: A Selection o 
Texts, Stanislav Andreski Ed., (London: George Allen and Unvvin, 1983) 
Webster T. B. L., Athenian Culture and Society, (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 
1973) 
Williams Bernard Arthur Owen, Shame and Necessity, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993) 
Williams Bernard Arthur Owen, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976) 
Wollstonecraft Mary, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, and A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman, (Köln: Konemann Verlagsgesellschafl mbH, 1998) 
228 
Wong David B., Moral Relativity, (Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1984) 
Wright Georg Henrik von, The Varieties of Goodness, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1963) 
Yamagata Naoko, Homeric Morality, (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1994) 
Yolton John W., A Locke Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993) 
Zagzebski Linda Trinlcaus, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the nature of 
Virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 
Zi,tnmerman Michael E., Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, 
Politics and Art, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) 
Zimmerman Michael E., Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's 
Concept of Authenticity, 2nd Printing, (Athens, London: Ohio University Press, 
1982) 
229 
